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The global commodities super cycle is not showing any sign of coming to an end in the 
near future. This is no different for the steel and the raw materials to this industry. Iron 
ore demand has been increasingly rapidly and the deepening supply constraints have led 
to phenomenal increases in its price across the globe. India has significant reserves of 
iron ore and has emerged a major exporter taking advantage of the burgeoning Chinese 
demand. The high levels of exports attained in the past few years and the possibility of 
the same growing further have also raised some concerns about the supply constraints 
hitting the domestic steel industry which is expanding rapidly.  This necessitates that a 
balance be achieved between export and domestic requirements. Whether iron ore should 
be conserved for the domestic steel industry  through active policy intervention, or, 
whether the market forces be allowed to play freely for optimum allocation of resources 
between domestic use and exports, has emerged as a  major policy issue.  At the same 
time, the government as well as the industry recognize the urgency for reforms in the 
mineral industry to draw investment and modern technology into it to raise output to raise 
output, generate employment and create wealth in the society. This study examines these 
critical issues from the perspective of mining as well as user industries and arrives at 
some definite conclusions backed by examination of the facts regarding resource 
availability, demand forecasts and other related issues pertaining to the iron ore industry 
in India.  The study throws an independent perspective on some of the complex issues 
with conflicting views. It is hoped that the study by Dr. A.S. Firoz will help clarify the 
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This study examines the utilization of iron ore in India. It takes into account the 
significant reserves of iron ore in India and allays fears that the country's steel industry 
will run out of iron ore resources if exports continue at the current level. On the contrary, 
it says that exports are necessary to maintain a structural balance in the market between 
production and consumption of lumps and fines as nearly 80% of exported ores are fines 
which are not adequately used in India. This study also highlights the specific problems 
of the Goa/Radi region. It examines the bilateral agreements with countries like Japan 
and Korea as well.  
  
The study says that the size of mineral resources is a dynamic concept and depends on 
exploratory efforts, which have not been enough in India due to lack of investments. It 
recommends on the basis of international experience that increased investment in the 
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Executive Summary 
 
The huge surge in demand for metals worldwide has led to a corresponding rise in the 
demand for and consequent increase in the prices of the respective minerals. This has also 
given rise to a fear of minerals shortages hitting the growth of the mineral based 
industries. This has been so particularly for iron ore.  
 
Chapter – 1: Resources and Reserves of Iron Ore in India 
 
•  In the context of external trade in iron ore, the current policy debate is largely 
centered around the issue whether there are sufficient iron ore resources in the 
country to feed the estimated growing demand of the domestic iron and steel 
industries and also to maintain exports at the current or a ‘reasonable’ level. 
•  Total resources of iron ore in the country has been estimated at a little over 25 
billion tonnes. This consists of 14.63 billion tonnes of haematite ores. Of the total 
haematite resources, 7 billion tonnes fall in the category of reserves. Reserves of 
magnetite ores are only   207 million tonnes with the rest 10.4 billion tonnes being 
classified as remaining resources.  
•  There is no exact or final estimate for iron ore reserves/resources in India ( or 
globally, for that matter ).While the knowledge about total resources and their 
absolute supply potential may improve with increased exploratory efforts, the 
categorization of the deposits and their mineability depend on several techno-
economic factors. 
•  In India, the resources of iron ore have increased in total over the years despite 
continuous extraction for domestic consumption and export. There has also been 
an increase in the ratio of reserves to resources for haematite ores. However, there 
was an absolute decline in the size of the magnetite reserves.  
•  The resources and reserves of iron ore have been under-estimated as the methods 
followed do not provide for an exhaustive estimation of the same. 
•  Geo-physical and geo-chemical mapping done so far in India have not been 
adequate.  
•  It is possible, therefore, that greater exploratory efforts will lead to increase in the 
total resources as also in the reserves base of iron ore. 
•  The reserves and resources of iron ore have been mostly estimated considering a 
depth of only 50-60 meters or so. In practice, deposits can be found and 
economically mined even up to 200 meters or more. The economic viability of 
mining at such depths will nevertheless depend on specific conditions and vary 
from mine to mine. However, at current prices of iron ore worldwide, it will 
certainly be economical to reach higher depths or undertake mining under more 
difficult conditions.  
•  Haematite ores with less than 55 per cent Fe (Iron) have not been included in the 
category of reserves or resources. Current technology of beneficiation and iron 
ore prices provide sufficient economic value to process iron ore with much lesser 
Fe (iron) content. If the same is considered, the estimates of reserves and 
resources of iron ore will rise further.   iv
•  While talking about availability of iron ore, it is important and relevant to take 
note of the global resources rather than remain confined to the possible supplies 
from the domestic sources only.  
•  The global iron ore resources have been estimated at over 800 billion tonnes 
containing more than 230 billion tonnes of iron. More resources have been 
discovered which will take the figure far beyond that.  
•  India produces 9.13 per cent of the global iron ore output. In terms of pure iron in 
it, India’s share is 10.86 per cent as in 2005. 
•  Therefore, there is no immediate concern about iron ore resources turning out to 
be a constraint   to the growth of the steel industry. 
 
Chapter – 2: Iron Ore Production and Trends of Investment in India 
 
•  India is the fifth largest producer of iron ore in the world with production at 181 
million tonnes in 2006-07. The figure seems to have been under-estimated. This 
could be due to well known statistical errors on account of under-coverage. 
Production growth has been continuous and has largely been driven by export 
opportunities. 
•  There has been a slowdown in iron ore production – with the annual growth rate 
falling from 18.9 per cent in 2004-05 to 13.2per cent in 2005-06 to 9.48per cent in 
2006-07.  
•  The share of lumps in total iron ore production has been about 40per cent with the 
rest being accounted for by fines and concentrates. The share of lumps in total 
iron ore varies across the states depending on the quality of the deposits, operating 
practices followed and the commercial judgment of the miners. 
•  The iron ore quality varies in production according to its Fe content based grade – 
with 83.7per cent of the total production having Fe content of 62per cent and 
above.  
•  Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Jharkhand and Goa are the major iron ore 
producing states in India. 
•  About 22.7per cent of the total production was from captively held mines with 
rest coming from merchant mines.  
•  Production increases have come almost entirely from the existing mines and more 
so from those in the private non-captive sector. Increase in iron ore production 
from captive mines was small. Captive mines recorded only 21.6 per cent growth 
in output during 2002-03 – 2006-07 compared to 109 per cent in the case of non-
captive mines.  
•  Iron ore production growth has been lower in the public sector at 39 per cent in 
the last six years compared to 223 per cent recorded in the private sector.  
•  Iron ore production has increased mainly driven by export demand and 
consequent increases in the prices of the same in the international market. 
•  The mineral sector in India has not drawn all the necessary investments. The 
sector accounts for only 2.8 per cent of the country’s GDP. This is fairly small 
compared to several other mineral rich countries in the world. Investment in the   v
sector has been extremely low and whatever little increase has been recorded in 
the past few years has been largely due to global demand.  
•  Low prices and very low returns to investment in the past and that too in a volatile 
and uncertain world of business discouraged investment in mining in the past. 
This has constrained exploration efforts and proper extraction of the deposits. It is 
only in the recent past that investments have moved into the sector at the sight of 
attractive returns. 
 
Chapter – 3: Domestic Consumption of Iron Ore 
 
•  Domestic consumption of iron ore has been reported at about 58 million tonnes by 
the government in 2005-06.  However, the ICRIER estimates are higher at 77 
million tonnes for that year (and 98 million tonnes for 2007-08). Of that, about 37 
million tonnes were lumps with the rest being fines and concentrates. 
•  The figure for estimated consumption of iron ore does not fully take into account 
the possible under-coverage of steel and sponge iron production. 
•  Iron ore consumption in the country falls far short of production. In the absence of 
adequate domestic demand, fines generated in the process of production are being 
largely exported.  
•  Technologies for direct use of fines have not come to India. These are to be used 
in iron making by adequate agglomeration to the form of pellets or sinters.  
•  Blast furnaces in India normally use sinter and lumps as iron ore feed. The 
proportion of sinter (and also pellets) used in blast furnaces in India has been 
increasing due to favourable economics. There is strong potential for that to rise 
further considering the global experiences. The gas based sponge iron units can 
take both lumps and DRI grade pellets. Pellets are not preferred alternatives for 
the relatively inefficient coal based DRI units. 
•  Apart from the fact that there is not adequate sintering or pelletising capacities in 
India to take care of the surplus of fines, utilization of capacity in the sintering 
and pelletising plants has been lower compared to the iron making facilities in the 
country. The actual production of sinter and pellets in the country and the iron ore 
fines needed for that fall short of the current production level of iron ore fines in 
the country.  
•  There is a regional imbalance also in respect of production of fines and the total 
agglomeration (sintering and pelletisation) capacities. This is prominent in the 
East and the South Western part of the country. This leaves no other option but to 
export these fines.  
 
Chapter – 4: Export of Iron ore 
 
•  India exported about 89 million tonnes of iron ore in 2005-06 and 93 million 
tonnes in 2006-07. The same is expected to drop to about 88 million tonnes in 
2007-08. 
•  There has been a slowdown in exports of iron ore. The annual growth rate has 
fallen from 29.1per cent in 2003-04 to 4.2 per cent in 2006-07.    vi
•  About 80 per cent of the ores exported are fines. China accounts for more than 80 
per cent of the total iron ore exports. Most of the iron ore is sold on the global 
spot market.  
•  Exports have risen by 114 per cent during 2001-02 and 2005-06.  
•  India's prospect of being a significant exporter of iron ore would vary depending 
upon a number of critical factors namely, the ability of the Indian mining industry 
to raise mining capacity, the rate of growth of domestic demand, willingness to 
buy Indian iron ore at prices which are not competitive in relative terms by the 
Chinese steel makers, etc. 
•  Many expert agencies have expressed their doubt if the iron ore exports to China 
can be increased continuously. Although demand for iron ore is increasing due to 
the strong growth of steel production in the country, consolidation within the 
Chinese industry and their long term supply concerns are already making them 
dependent on long term contracts as against spot purchases. Given the 
fragmentation and regulation in the mining sector in India, it is unlikely that the 
Indian miners will get engaged in long-term contracts. The India-centric spot 
market will thus become considerably unattractive. 
•  Massive investment plans by companies like CVRD and BHP Billiton in mining 
as also in shipping to reduce costs will reduce sharply the space available for 
Indian exporters in the Chinese market especially if the exports tax is to continue 
in the long run.  
•  Iron ore mining costs of stand-alone mining companies are set to rise more than 
proportionately given the fact that to raise mining capacity from now on will 
involve significantly higher investment and at the current costs of capital those 
will be substantially higher even on per tonne of iron ore mined. 
•  Profitability in iron ore exports varies across regions depending on the state of 
infrastructure in and around the mines, transport logistics, quality of the ores and 
local factors, etc.. Profitability is significantly lower for exports from the eastern 
India compared to those from the south. Actual profits coming to the miners are 
fairly high on an average, yet, significantly lower than those in the popular 
perception.  
•  The profitability of the exporters will be sharply hit if the export tax is to be 
raised. Such a measure will hit the merchant mining companies in the private 
sector the most, a segment that has accounted for the bulk of the growth in the 
industry.  
•  Such a measure may discourage flow of investment further leading to capacity 
constraint in the industry.  
•  Any stoppage to exports will necessarily mean closure of significant mining 
capacity as the volumes cannot be diverted to domestic use under any 
circumstances. Closure of mines will involve naturally expected consequences in 
terms of loss of economic activities including jobs. 
•  At a macro level, in general, trade restrictions lead to inefficiency in resource 
allocation. An artificial trade barrier may lead to price distortion, failure to price 
discovery for prospective investors and subsidization of an inefficient industry at 
the cost of an efficient industry.   vii
•  Profits from iron ore export business are ploughed back into the economy which 
derives from them the well expected gains in terms of employment, revenue to the 
government and the rise in the level of investible capital.  
•  The issue of conservation of iron ore for domestic industry may be reviewed, if 
there is need for it, as recommended by the Hoda Committee after 10 years or so.   
 
Chapter – 5: Demand for Iron Ore in India 
 
•  Iron ore demand depends on the production of iron and steel which in turn 
depends largely on the domestic demand for the same. According the 11
th Plan 
Working Group on Steel, demand for iron ore would rise to 130 million tonnes by 
2011-12.  
•  Our demand forecasts for iron ore up to 2015 under different scenarios indicate 
that even in the best case scenario, the cumulative consumption of iron ore in the 
country between 2007-2015 will be around 5 per cent of the total estimated iron 
ore resources in the country today.  
•  Although demand for steel in the country is expected to rise at a reasonable pace, 
a substantial part of the steel market is likely to be covered by imports. If this 
happens, steel production potential will not be realized in the medium term and as 
a result the iron ore demand will also be proportionately lower. 
•  The very long term forecast of iron and steel production and the consequent 
demand for iron ore made on optimistic assumptions also show that the steel 
industry can remain comfortable with domestic iron ore supplies even with an 
annual iron ore exports of 100 million tonnes till about 2070 at the current 
estimates of resources in the country.  
•  If the steel industry plans are considered, the projection of demand for iron ore in 
terms of fines and lumps will create a structural imbalance in the market which 
will compel export of lumps and import fines if the current ratio of fines to lumps 
continues in total production. Freer market conditions and fuller access to the 
global market with exports as the key element can take care of such imbalances. 
 
Chapter – 6: Iron Ore in Steel Industry Perspective 
 
•  The steel industry sees iron ore as the most important competitive advantage in 
global comparison making up for the disadvantages arising out of other factors 
such as high costs of coking coal, high internal freight and poor infrastructure. 
The industry seeks the advantages of captive mining to support its future growth.  
•  For plants with captive iron ore, iron ore accounts for not more than 10 per cent of 
the finished steel costs. For some, it is as low as 4 per cent in India. For those 
without captive iron ore and largely dependent on iron ore lumps or pellets, the 
costs do go up sharply. Part of this cost rise is accounted for by freight costs. 
Against this coking coal constitutes as high as 20 per cent of the total costs of 
finished steel.    viii
•  Demand for additional cost advantages through captive mining and 
discouragement to exports presupposes that the iron ore business will always 
remain attractive with scarcity keeping prices up. Current research conducted 
globally on the subject does not hold such a view. Additional new capacities in 
iron ore and slowdown in their demand from the steel industry are expected to 
pull prices down latest by 2011 from their peaks.  
•  Today, scrap constitutes a significant percentage of the total metallic requirement 
for the steel industry globally. Over a period of time, steel scrap use in the steel 
industry has risen substantially and more and more steel is now being produced 
using scrap rather than going through the virgin iron ore route. Recycled scrap is 
estimated to have contributed to about 330 million tonnes of the crude steel 
produced globally in 2005 out of a total estimated production of 1240 million 
tonnes. 
•  Given the supply potential of domestic iron ore, none of the iron and steel projects 
currently planned is expected to face shortage of iron ore in the life time of its 
plants and machinery.  
•  According to the steel makers, magnetite ores involve high costs in use, but, there 
are no technological barriers to their use in steel making.  The costs of production 
of steel will still remain competitive even if local magnetite ores are used in India.  
•  The rapid increase of coal based DRI industry that uses the high quality haematite 
ores but for insignificant value addition also leads to proportionately higher 
production of fines which are being exported currently. The steel industry is 
concerned about excessive growth of this technology route. However, choice of 
technology is best left to the market. 
•  Steel makers have expressed their concern over security of iron ore supplies to the 
industry in Karnataka. The export ratio for the state is the highest and given the 
environmental concerns holding supplies down, they have sought restrictions in 
their export. 
•  The steel industry needs to plan their projects out carefully, fully appreciating the 
specific area based constraints that may come about in future.  
•  The steel makers and the government agencies have argued that instead of 
exporting iron ore, there should be efforts to export steel or any other value added 
products derived from iron ore. However, for that, the steel industry should be 
able to find a profitable market for steel. Further, the value addition argument 
does not hold as strongly as one sees it in a general (rather simplistic) macro-
economic framework. 
•  The steel industry as also the government are looking at the means of using the 
fines currently produced in excess in the country through necessary 
agglomeration, especially concerting them to pellets. While this is a sound 
economic proposition currently, one will also have to take into account the 
volatility in the pellets market, high investment requirement to set up a pellet 
plant and the price differential between pellets and iron ores in other forms.     
   ix
Chapter -7: Policy Issues 
 
•  The main policy issue whether iron ore should be freely exported or is to be 
conserved for domestic steel industry depends on whether there is sufficient ore 
ores resources in the country to meet the growing demand form the steel industry. 
From the estimates made, it is clear that there is no ground to believe that the steel 
industry even on its strong growth path will run short of domestic iron ore any 
time in several decades from now. There is no threat to iron ore security for the 
steel projects currently under different stages of conception and implementation. 
•   No shortage of iron ore is expected globally even in the most optimistic scenarios 
about steel production growth. 
•  Exports of iron ore from India are taking place due to product and grade based 
mismatch between domestic production and consumption with high volumes of 
fines naturally produced having no corresponding domestic demand.  
•  Implication of any policy measure that seeks to restrict exports of iron ore from 
the country will have to be seen from several angles. India’s iron ore exports were 
valued at US$3860.3 million in 2005. This constituted 3.76 per cent of the total 
value of exports from India that year. About 86.4 per cent of the total value of 
iron or exported were accounted for by China.  This also amounts to 49.6 per cent 
of the total value of all exports to that country. If exports of iron ore are restricted, 
it will disturb the trade balance between the two countries. 
•  At a macro level, trade restriction leads to inefficiency in resource allocation. An 
artificial trade barrier may lead to price distortion and subsidization of an 
inefficient industry at the cost of   an efficient one competing for the same factor 
resources like raw materials, capital or land. 
•  Given the estimated level of iron ore security for the domestic steel industry, there 
is no need to rush into a conservationist and protectionist policy framework to the 
larger detriment of the national economy and especially the mining industry.  
•  The steel industry has sought captive mining leases which have been opposed by 
the mining industry. The concerned government agencies are following a system 
of preference to captive mining whereas globally the mining industry has been 
developed independently in the private sector. Captive mining rights given out on 
terms having no relationship with the value of the mining assets (mines) can bring 
in inefficiency in terms of non-optimal utilization of resources, inefficient 
operational practices and sub-optimal technology choice.  
•  If priorities are assigned to captive mining, the domestic merchant iron ore market 
will not grow and if at the same time exports are stopped or regulated, the 
merchant iron ore output will have to be brought down significantly.  
•  The iron ore industry in India remains highly fragmented with very few large 
players operating in it. Whereas there was potential in many such mines to grow 
to global size and technology levels, the captive mining has come on the way. 
There is a need to scale up the mining operations and, therefore, to allot mining 
leases to large players with significant financial strength to be able to capitalize 
on the economies of scale as also to bring in modern technology and 
infrastructure. This is being recommended also by the Hoda Committee.   x
•  The recent policy adopted by the state governments to recommend mining leases 
only to those setting up steel plants within the states needs thorough review. This 
will create exclusivity of mining rights only to steel mills in a significant way. 
Captive mines and stand-alone mines should be allowed to co-exist. Existing 
untapped mines (already explored and prospected) should be given for mining to 
the highest bidder, irrespective of whether there is plan for value addition or not..  
•  Absence of an open market will slowdown investment in the iron ore mining in 
the absence of price discovery.  Since most of the large steel plants under 
conception are to be based on captive mines and the plants that will be dependent 
on merchant iron ore sourcing will be relatively small, the iron ore merchant 
market will face hurdles in attaining economies of scale for efficient operation. 
This will reduce investment flow into the industry. 
•  There is a significant competition policy issue related to the captive mining. In 
fact, there are three different kinds of costs/prices the user industries are faced 
with in respect of iron ore. First, the cost of iron ore for those who have captive 
mines fall in the range of Rs.300-600 per tonne at plant. Then the iron ore sold by 
the government owned companies to large customers on a longer term basis is at 
about Rs. 2000-2500 per tonne on comparable basis. The last, the iron ore sold by 
the merchant iron ore companies to small and medium companies – falling in the 
range of Rs. 3500-4000 per tonne. While the latter category price differentiation is 
market driven, the captive ownership cost advantage comes from the 
discriminatory government action.  
•  There are also no clear cut economy wide efficiency gains from integrating 
mining and steel making businesses. If opportunities are restricted for the Indian 
mining companies, they will be deprived of the economies of scale and remain 
inefficient forever in global comparison. 
•  Since there has been a gradual increase in the consumption of pellets in India, as 
also globally, in order to make use of the fines, a common view, right or wrong, is 
that the mining industry should engage itself in the production of pellets.  
•  If iron ore exports are restricted or banned and the same is not applied on pellets 
(considering it as a value added product), there may be a natural movement to 
pellets production and their exports. This will tantamount to efficiency loss 
considering the risk, investment and pricing volatility in the pellets market and 
continued export of iron ore, albeit in a different form.  
•  The environmental issues have come out as a big concern to the policy makers. 
Since a large chunk of minerals may remain untapped because of possible 
environmental hazards, new technologies need to be brought in to minimize the 
relevant damage and help raise production of iron ore.  
•  There is a view that the government may consider imposition of an environmental 
and social cess on mining to be used fully in rehabilitation and resettlement of the 
displaced or those affected by mining in the neighbourhood and in specific 
programmes to mitigate the adversity arising out of the environmental damage. 
Credible NGOs may be engaged to monitor or even run such programmes. 
However, since the government is bringing in a rehabilitation and resettlement 
policy in a larger policy framework which will encampus the mining sector as 
well and that the mines are bound by specific closure plans, another cess may lead   xi
to confusion and procedural hassles on account of multiplicity of compliance. It is 
recommended that the specific issues related to mining are paid due attention in 
the central government policies on various related subjects.  
•  The current National Mineral Policy has been unfavourable to the large stand 
alone mines. Most of the mines are allotted to the small mining enterprises 
(SME). Such mining entities operate within a small area and are incapable of 
setting up their own infrastructure. This leads to excessive pressure on the 
existing infrastructure resulting in their damage and high transportation costs. The 
policy framework for investment in mining should be designed to support large 
scale integrated mining with required infrastructure. 
•  In the context of the review of the National Mineral Policy, one has to note that a 
lot of investments are needed over a short period of time not only to meet the 
rising domestic demand for the same but also to tap the global market 
opportunities. If private capital is to be encouraged and drawn into this sector, the 
entry barriers currently faced are to be removed first. Also, necessary operational 
and ownership based freedom have to be provided to ensure safety of investment 
and profitability to the entrepreneurs. Since these industries are no longer 
considered critical from any strategic or national security point of view, 
continuous government involvement in these businesses is not required. 
•  Security of tenure must be immediately guaranteed to investments in exploration 
at every stage – from reconnaissance to prospecting to mining, especially to 
attract foreign investment into this sector. 
   1
Introduction 
 
World economy, and especially the commodity sector, has been on an upswing in the 
recent years – with the magnitude of the upswing surprising many analysts on the upside. 
The massive economic expansion in China, and of late in India, has increased the demand 
for various commodities, resulting in multi-year high levels of prices of several 
commodities, including oil and metals and alloys like iron and steel, zinc, copper, nickel, 
aluminium, etc. The factors pushing up prices of these commodities also appear to be far 
more durable in nature, resulting in even medium-term price expectations being pushed 
into a higher trajectory. 
 
The mineral industry, that had undergone a protracted period of recession globally till the 
onset of the metals boom since the early years of this decade, has also benefited 
significantly in the recent expansion phase in terms of prices. In fact, in many industries, 
the upstream segments of the value chain are perceived to be the biggest beneficiaries of 
the recent boom, generating a lot of investor interest in these segments. Correspondingly, 
both profitability and investments in mining industry have gone up considerably. 
 
With improved valuation of natural resources in this phase, it is also somewhat natural 
that the issues related to distribution of the benefits arising from endowment of natural 
resources have gained in significance. Issues related to control of natural resources, 
policies for their utilization, pricing, etc. are being contested upon by various interested 
parties, such as national and sub-national governments, mining industries, user industries, 
traders, etc. The on-going debate in India with regard to the minerals sector in general, 
and iron ore in particular, has to be viewed against this broader context. 
 
India is one of the countries endowed with some of the richest iron ore deposits in the 
world. Currently, at 155 million tonnes of production estimated for the year 2005-06, the 
country ranks 5
th in the production of iron ore in the world accounting for about 8per cent 
of the global output. 
 
The plans of the Indian mineral industry, especially the iron ore industry, have been 
somewhat overshadowed by the uncertainty caused within the country by concerns raised 
by the user industries as also certain segments of the civil society about the sufficiency of 
our mineral resources to support the growth plans of the user industries. It is in this 
context that questions have been raised concurrently on the viability of continuation of 
exports at the current growth trends and volumes. There have also been issues raised over 
environmental and social implications of further growth in the mineral sector. There are 
widely dispersed and strongly contested views on many of the related issues of enormous 
significance to the overall development of the metal and mineral sector as also to the 
macro economy. Most such issues have strong bearing on the relevant government 
policy.  
 
The present study is concerned with the issues related to iron ore and the iron and steel 
industry. Specifically, the study examines the resource sufficiency issue – whether there 
is enough iron ore available in the country to meet the growing requirement of the   2
domestic industry, simultaneously maintaining a decent and competitive level of exports. 
In this context, attempts have also been made to assess the desirability of bringing in 
restrictions on exports of iron ore and the impact of some of the measures which are 
already in place. The current mineral policy has been extensively discussed by expert 
committees, individual researchers within and outside the government. The 
recommendations of two high level committees set up by the government of India 
recently have also been examined in this study in the context of iron ore export and 
captive mining issues.  The study assesses the issues from the perspective of the overall 
macroeconomic considerations as well as the mining and iron and steel industries. 
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Chapter - 1 
 
 
1.  Resources and Reserves of Iron Ore in India 
 
1.1  Estimates of Reserves and Resources of Iron Ore  
 
1.1.1 Since much of the policy issues have a strong bearing on the actual resource 
position of iron ore in the country, it will be useful to look at the Tables-1 to see the 
current and past estimates of reserves and resources of iron ore in the country.  
 
Table 1: Iron ore resources and production between 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005 
 








































532  25249 
(+3141) 
Figures in parenthesis indicate decrease (-)/increase (+) in resources 
Notes: (1) These resources do not include around 1000 million tones of haematite iron ore recently 
discovered by DMG, Chattisgarh in Kabirdham district. 
            (2) Above resources are with a cut-off grade +55per cent Fe and roughly upto 50 metre depth 
estimated with sparce and far-between drilling. 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 
 
1.1.2 It is interesting to note that the iron ore resources in total have increased from 
17.564 billion tonnes in 1980 to 25.249 billion tonnes over the period 1980-2005 despite 
continuous extraction for domestic consumption and exports.  While the average annual 
iron ore production during 1980-2005 was 66 million tonnes, the total resources 
increased by an average of 307 million tonnes per year.  
 
1.1.3 However, reserves, defined as economically mineable portion of the total resources, 
are only at 7 billion tonnes in the case of haematite ores and 0.207 billion tonnes for 
magnetite. A large chunk of the proven deposits did not find place in the reserves 
category on environmental considerations. Of the total reserves, 18.6per cent belong to 
the high grade category (65per cent Fe and above), 50.6per cent to the medium grade (62-
65 per cent) and 28.4 per cent to the low grade (62 per cent and lower). The remaining 
2.4 per cent have not been classified.    
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Source: National Mineral Development Corporation 
 
1.2  Technical and Commercial Issues Related to  Estimation  of  Reserves  and      
Resources of Iron Ore  
 
1.2.1 While talking about reserves and resources of iron ore, it is necessary to take note 
of a few methodological issues.  
 
1.2.2 The estimates of resources or reserves do not capture the entire iron ore deposits of 
the country, which are virtually impossible to estimate in a definitive manner. The 
available numbers are based on assessment carried out by the concerned agencies from 


















N. Goa, S. Goa, Redi 
Kudremukh, 
Bababudan, Kudachari   5
changed over time.
1 The current estimates for India have been released by the Indian 
Bureau of Mines (IBM) and are based on globally accepted United Nations Framework 
of Classification (UNFC) guidelines. While the UNFC guidelines are good parameters for 
global comparison, they do not necessarily capture the country specific or regional 
situations. 
 
1.2.3 The classification adopted as per UNFC guidelines seems to be unclear in respect of 
reserves. 
2The main basis of differentiation, economic and commercial viability, is not a 
static concept. At different price and cost configurations, there will be different figures of 
reserves.
3  At a given point of time, certain mining operations may not be commercially 
or economically viable due to specific conditions of the market. Some mining operations 
may be economically unviable on specific techno-economic considerations such as the 
forest cover, depth of the mines, significant population on the mining areas that cannot be 
moved, etc. Some others may be outright prohibited by environment related laws, in 
which case, unless the laws are changed, those mines cannot be opened up. It is obvious 
that changing economic conditions or national policies related to mining and 
development of technology may completely alter the economic viability of mining in a 
particular case with the changes in the relevant variables such as the price of the mineral, 
costs of mining, changes in laws of the land, etc.  This suggests that for any long term 
policy perspective, the distinction currently maintained between reserves and resources 
should not be rigidly followed and the dynamic nature of reserves estimates should be 
factored in.      
 
1.2.4 The official estimates of reserves and resources of iron ore in India are constrained 
by inadequate exploration so far. Knowledge about total resources may improve with 
greater exploratory efforts. Even the Ministry of Mines has accepted that the level of 
exploration carried out so far falls hugely short of the potential one sees from the 
geological data available.
4 The concerned state governments in the iron ore rich states 
such as Karnataka, Orissa, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh have categorically stated that the 
actual resources may be more than estimated so far in each of their respective states.
5 
Exploration coverage in terms of geographical area has been very low as investment in 
mining, especially in exploration or exploration related activities, has been low due to a 
variety of policy constraints. This has been noted categorically in the recently published 
                                           
1 Geological Survey of India and Mineral Exploration Corporation Ltd. (MECL) are the main two 
organizations responsible for exploration and survey activities. 
2 UNFC guidelines were meant to provide a standard guidance to international investors about resource 
position in the mineral sector. These not geared to provide an assessment of geological resource position 
of a mineral. The estimation procedures adopted by various agencies within the UNFC framework may 
itself vary from one another. There is a need for further work on the exact estimation procedure adopted 
by the concerned agencies within the broad UNFC guidelines.  The mining industry, in discussions with 
them, have expressed concern over ‘definite’ underestimation of the reserves due simply to procedural 
problems. 
3 The UNFC puts the total resources into categories based on three criteria : (1) economic and commercial 
viability, (2)  status of the field projects and feasibility and (3) geological knowledge.  
4 Noted from the presentations made by senior officials including Secretary (Mines) and Additional 
Secretary (Mines), of the Ministry of Mines, Government of India at various conferences in the recent 
period. 
5 Internet Sources, www.steelguru.com   6
report of the High Level Committee on Minerals set up by the Government of India under 
the chairmanship of Anwarul Hoda.  
 
1.2.5  It is also worth taking note of the observation made in this context by the 
Working Group on Minerals set up by the Planning Commission for the 11




“India has a total land area of 3.28 million sq. km. of which 2.42 million sq.km, 
comprises hard rock terrain ……In view of the geological possibilities, only 20-25 per 
cent of the hard rock area (approximately 571000 sq.km) holds potential for solid fuel 
and non-fuel schedule mineral resources. ….At present about 8000 sq. km is under 
mineral lease, which forms about 50 per cent of the total area of the known mineral 
prospects and deposits. Out of the leased area only a small part is under active 
exploitation and large areas under lease are still awaiting exploration. Thus, there is still a 
large area left for exploration covering the known mineralized areas and bulk of unknown 
areas having favourable geological conditions for localization of mineral prospects. 
However, considerable areas have been given for regional reconnaissance under RP 
mainly to private agencies, in some states, but these also pertain to traditionally known 
potential domains.” 
  
1.2.6 Given the inadequate nature of exploration efforts so far, it is difficult to consider 
the current assessment of resources as final. In fact, one can always expect the resource 
assessment to change with time, based on exploration efforts. In this regard, one may 
note the following observations from one of the government websites of Australia
7:  
“An assessment of a region's potential mineral resources combines knowledge of 
its geology, geophysics, geochemistry, mineral deposits and occurrences with 
current theories of mineral deposit genesis and results of mineral exploration. The 
assessment uses available geoscientific data to determine the history of geologic 
processes and environments. …. As geological knowledge of an area can never be 
complete, it is not possible to have a “final” assessment of potential mineral 
resources at any given time. Mineral resource potential needs to be monitored and 
periodically reassessed to take account of new data and advances in geological 
understanding, including new mineral discoveries. Advances in mineral 
exploration and mining technologies and market changes may also change the 
mineral resource potential of an area.”  
It further goes to say,  
“It is important to note that no area can ever be classified as unprospective and no 
assessment of potential mineral resources can ever be considered `final'. New 
information, new concepts and better understanding of geological processes 
continually change the perceived prospectivity of a region and the availability, 
usefulness and implications of these can change over time. There are also 
dynamic aspects to market information that will affect perceptions of a region’s 
                                           
6 Report of the Working Group on Minerals, Planning Commission, 2006. p2 
7 http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0005/50954/wa_res_rfatest.doc   7
prospectivity; for example, mineral prices and extraction costs may change 
substantially over time.”  
 
1.2.7 It also interesting to note the experiences in Australia with respect to the mineral 
adequacy issue. Australia, like most others, followed a conservationist policy in respect 
of minerals. The basic mineral policy of the country is reflected in the quote below: 
 
A 1951 report stated: 
 
“We have been utilizing several of our basic metals at an ever-increasing rate and, with 
The development of many of the so-called backward nations, it appears likely that that 
rate will not diminish in the future; demand is likely to increase. We have not an 
unlimited supply of these metals available to us by economic processes as known today, 
nor is there any indication that sources other than the kind of ore-deposits worked today 
will become available to us. The capacity for production of some metals cannot be 
increased indefinitely…Periods of shortage such as we have experienced will recur more 
frequently.” [Australian Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics (1951)] 
 
1.2.8 But, with the change of policy in the 1960s, with the removal of most of the 
restrictions on exploration of minerals and with general encouragement to mining, new 
discoveries raised the level of iron ore resources estimated to over 40 billion tonnes in the 
course of merely a decade. This was 100 times the level estimated prior to the policy 
changes.   
 
1.2.9 While Australia’s resource base expansion is quite spectacular, resource base has 
increased with time in several other countries too. The total iron ore resources of the 
world have been estimated at over 800 billion tonnes. 
8The global reserves base has shot 
up from 230 billion tonnes in 1994 to 370 billion tonnes 2006/7.
9 The reserves base does 
not cover the entire resources. A lot more resources have been found worldwide during 
this period. Only a few days ago, a Canadian company has announced investment in a 
Brazilian newly discovered deposit that has 159 billion tonnes – six times the total 
resources in India! 
10 Jindal Steel and Power (JSPL), an Indian steel making company, 
has recently signed an agreement with the Bolivian government to buy 50 per cent of a 
mine that has a total deposit of 40 billion tonnes. 
11 Interestingly, while reporting global 
country wise reserves position of iron ore, Bolivia did not even appear in the list of the 
US Geological Survey summary whereas countries even with deposits of 1.5 billion 
tonnes prominently appeared.  These global experiences point out that India’s current 
resource position has scope to increase significantly in future with greater exploration 
efforts. 
 
                                           
8 US Geological Survey 2006 
9 Estimated by US Geological Survey.  Assumed in the report to be 385 billion tonnes considering the 
official total resource figure for India, which is higher by about 15 billion tonnes.  
10 Steel Business Briefings May 5, 2007. 
11 Widely reported. JSPL web site.   8
1.2.10 Depth of exploration is a key dimension of the resource estimation. According to 
industry experts, the assessments made on the potential reserves of iron ore seem to be 
based on mining depth of 50 meters with a grid interval of more than 500 meters or so. 
But iron ore can be available to far greater depths as has been experienced by several 
mines in India itself. (Table 2) For example, in Karnataka, it has been contended that the 
reserves are based on a 40 meters depth only whereas mining has been carried out to a 
depth of up to 200 meters. 
12 The mining industry contends that in other countries the 
mining depth has reached more than 200 meters. Mining depth depends on the specific 
conditions and there are no uniform geophysical conditions prevailing across the world. 
But from the experience so far, there seems to be a good potential for Indian miners to 
find more resources by digging deeper. At current prices of iron ore, mining to such 
depth is viable.  
 
Table 2: Mining Experience in India: Depths Attained 
 
Sector  Depths (from top RL) 
Goa sector  +80 mtrs, few mines have gone even gone (-) 
50 mtrs below the sea level. 
NMDC +150  mtrs 
Commercial miners in Eastern sector  +60 mtrs 
Commercial miners in Bellary sector  + 70 mtrs 
Captive miners in Eastern Sector  +80 mtrs 
Source: Industry 
 
1.2.11  National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) has noted that reserves 
were augmented by a whopping 132 million tonnes in 2005 in its mine Bailadila – 
Deposit 14 which would increase the life of the mine by over 45 years at the current 
capacity. 
13 Similarly, in the case of Bailadila Deposit 5 too, greater exploratory efforts 
led to increase in the reserves by 187 million tonnes in 2005 to raise the life of the mine 
by another 43 years at the current level of capacity. 
14 Discussions with the officials of 
the mining companies in the eastern sector have also revealed that the mineral deposits in 
their mines have been far greater than those estimated when the mines were taken up for 
development. It has been so with Sesa Goa reserves. The current estimates of reserves 
assessed, post buyout of the company by Vedanta, lie at about 207 million tonnes 
whereas the same were assessed to be only 150 million tonnes sometime ago.
15 Case 
studies of few mines in Eastern India have shown that there are iron ore reserves below 
the shale band at the depth of 35-40 meters which had been ruled out by a general 
                                           
12 Iron Ore Exports At a Crossroad, Steelworld, March 2007. 
13 Presentation made by CMD, NMDC at Metal Bulletin- Metal Junction Conference in New Delhi on 14-
15 the February 2007. 
14 ibid 
15 Information informally obtained from Macquarie Research.   9
perception. 
16 It has also been seen that due to small mine holdings, the areas between the 
mines have not been explored properly. This has been widely noted in Keonjhar – Bonai 
areas. It has been further observed that out of 505 mining leases granted so far, only 261 
are operational. While some of them are being held back on environmental grounds, 
many others are either stuck in the process of renewal or the lease holders have not 
worked upon those. As more and more mining leases are operationalised, not only that 
the production of iron ore in the country will rise, but also that estimates of ore deposits 
will go up as has been witnessed almost in all cases. It has been reported in Steel 
Business Briefings recently that a Brazilian company has decided to open up a closed 
mine and to run that for another four years at an annual production of 6 million tonnes! 
17   
       
1.2.12  The mining industry has also contended that the current assessment of iron ore 
resources are based on an Fe cut off of 55 per cent, that is, the deposits with iron content 
of less than 55 per cent  have not been included for assessment of reserves or resources. 
This seems to be the case with haematite ores only as the bulk of the magnetite ores have 
low Fe – in the range of about 40 per cent.
18  
 
1.2.13  While estimating resources, it appears that the deposits below 50 meters or those 
with Fe content below 55 per cent (for haematite ores) have not been considered. The 
rationale for such exclusion could be correct when the iron ore prices were low and 
mining was carried out largely on captive basis. But continuation of the same criteria in a 
market driven economy where not only that the iron ore prices are higher today but also 
costs of mining relatively lower, may not be appropriate. 
19It is worthwhile to note that 
China’s average Fe content in their ores is only 33 per cent and they are now planning to 
beneficiate ores with Fe as low as 10 per cent. Even if one considers the additional cost of 
Rs. 1,000 or so to make concentrates and another Rs. 800 to make pellets, the total costs 
of pellets will come to only about Rs. 2,000 per tonne (considering Rs. 200 towards 
mining costs) , that is about $50 at the current exchange rate. The 2007 international 
contract price of DR grade pellets was in the order of $110-120 tonne. This, in fact, was 
low in the pellets price cycle with the high ends touching $125-130 per tonne only 
recently. 
20  The 2008 prices are expected to be higher by at least 35-50 per cent. 
21 The 
price for BF grade pellets will be somewhat lower. This shows that even the low grade 
magnetite ores can potentially have high economic and commercial value in certain 
market conditions, including the current conditions.
22  
                                           
16 Reported by the mining industry officials during discussions with them.  
17 Steel Business Briefings, May, 2007. 
18 The Fe content of the ores of KIOCL has been told to be in the range of 38-40per cent which are 
beneficiated at a cost of about Rs.1,000 per tonne to make concentrates of Fe content in the range of 67-
68 per cent.  
19 In Australia, 25-30 per cent Fe bearing ores are defined as low grades.  
20 Iron Ore manual 2006, Tex Reports Ltd.  
21 Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs and Macquarie assessment, published in a series of occasional reports in 
2007. 
22 Data published by the Indian Bureau of Mines do not show the Fe levels of ores in the case of magnetite, 
whereas the same is published in detail in the case of haematite. This made the assessment in regards to 
the effective resource position of iron ore difficult. It is learnt that most of the magenite ores have iron 
content in the range of 38-40per cent.   
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1.2.14 Further, since fines had no takers, exploration was halted as and when the 
exploration holes touched any soft or friable ore bed. There is scope to believe that size 
of resources can be enhanced with the possibility of exploration beyond these depths 
when marketability of fines improves. 
23  
 
1.2.15 The steel industry has contended that of the 22.11 billion tonnes of total iron ore 
resources estimated by the IBM in 2000, only 11.425 billion tonnes are of haematite 
grade which are suitable for competitive steel production in the country. According to the 
industry, magnetite ores involve higher costs of production of steel and the areas where 
most of these ores are available, that is, near the western coastal areas, are ecologically 
sensitive. Given this characterization of the region, the Hon. Supreme Court of India has 
already passed strictures against mining in such areas without appropriate government 
clearance and in violation of the existing environmental and forest laws. Therefore, 
according to them, the actual resources that will be available to the steel makers in the 
country will be those of haematite ores mainly. Further, even for the haematite ores, the 
industry has contended that there are areas where environmental and other societal issues 
may prevent exploitation of the minerals.   
    
1.2.16 From the technical point of view, one does not see a major problem in using 
magnetite ores for steel making. These are easier to beneficiate when compared to 
haematite ores of similar Fe content. But, given a choice between the low grade 
magnetite ores and high grade haematite, the preference has always been for haematite 
ores at the prevailing prices where the haematite grade quality premium is not reflected in 
the price differential. According to the mining industry, magnetite ores are being used 
extensively in many places and several magnetite mines are being developed in Australia 
with the Chinese steel industry being partners to the projects. 
24  Most of the US iron ore 
mines have magnetite ores.
25 Thus, the issue of haematite vs. magnetite ores needs to be 
considered in the context of the overall domestic availability and price situation. While 
currently, haematite ores are used on a preferable basis, resources of magnetite ores could 
also prove important for future.  
 
1.2.17 The concern about the possibility of the magnetite ores getting locked up on 
environmental grounds and in the process remaining inaccessible to the steel makers is a 
serious one. This concern can be addressed by deploying technologies that can minimize 
or prevent environmental damage while mining.
26 This issue is, in fact, applicable in 
                                           
23 There is a difference of opinion between the steel and the mining industries on this issue. While the steel 
industry contends that mining has been abandoned on techno-commercial grounds, the mining industry 
feels that the steel producers using captive mines and the government mining companies often have sub-
optimal practices to maximize their current earnings through selective mining.   
24 Steelguru.com  
25 US Geological Survey 2007. 
26 None of such technologies have so far been engaged in India. These are to be clearly demonstrated and 
their costs are to be clearly ascertained to be assured that they are economical too. Mining technology in 
India has remained outdated by global standards due to inadequate investment in the sector. The mining 
industry has, however, claimed that there has been significant improvement in these technologies given 
the imperatives for economies of scale and cost efficiency.    11
other mining locations globally too. Many mines all over the world in Australia as also in 
Brazil are facing similar problems.   
     
1.3  Iron Ore in the Global Context 
  
1.3.1 As stated earlier, the global iron ore reserves stand at about 386 billion tonnes while 
the total resources have been estimated at over 800 billion tonnes. (Table-3)  The 
longevity of these reserves/resources will depend on the growth of demand for iron ore, 
which in turn will be shaped by the production of iron and steel and the technology used 
in making steel.  
 
1.3.2  The country-wise resource estimates reveal that the countries that apparently do 
not have any immediate plans for large scale steel industry development, such as 
Australia, various small nations in Africa and South America and even to some extent 
Brazil,  have substantial reserves. In fact, the real resource position in case of Africa is 
highly underestimated as the level of exploration carried out so far is miniscule due to 
obvious socio-political problems there. Further, if current policies are any indication, it is 
unlikely that the countries rich with these resources will take conservationist postures and 
halt the supply of iron ore into the international market. Thus, countries that are not 
endowed with sufficient iron ore could continue to develop their steel industry on the 
basis of imported iron ore.  
 
1.3.3  In the recent years, we have witnessed increased interest in and further attention 
to mining as a profitable avenue for investment. This could lead to new finds in various 
backward and underdeveloped areas of the world including Africa, Asia and South 
America.   Fresh investments into the industry have been planned by large iron ore 
mining companies like CVRD, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto not only to raise their 
production level but also to find new resources through scientific explorations. CVRD, 
for example, has planned to raise its iron ore mining capacity worldwide from about 300 
million tonnes in 2007 to 450 million tonnes in 2011.
27 If production goes up in the same 
order, this incremental quantity will support additional 94 million tonnes of steel 
production.  They have announced plans to open a closed mine to extract another 24 
million tonnes of iron ore lying there, once considered uneconomical. As mentioned 
earlier, a Canadian company is to invest on a brand new find that is supposed to have 159 
billion tonnes of iron ore. Thus, global iron ore resources position is likely to be on a 
rising curve and shortages of iron ore at a global level are highly unlikely.  
 
1.3.4  Thus, there is hardly any possibility of iron ore availability becoming a constraint 
to further development of steel industry at the global level in the foreseeable future. In the 
Indian context specifically, the current estimate of iron ore resources (25 billion tonnes) 
could be far on the lower side considering the exploration levels attained so far, the 
mining practices adopted and the methodology used for estimation.  Thus, a more 
dynamic view of resource availability becomes imperative for discussions on policy 
alternatives. 
                                           
27 Macquarie Research : Commodities, May 2007.    12
Table 3: Global Resources of Iron Ore 
(Million tonnes) 







in the Iron 
ore 
 
per cent age 
share of Fe  in 
Global Total 
   Million 
tonnes 
 
per cent  per cent  Million tonnes  per cent 
Ukraine  68,000  30  17.64   20,400   10.66  
Brazil  61,000  67  15.82   40,870   21.36  
Russia  56,000  55  14.53   30,800   16.10  
China  46,000  33  11.93   15,180   7.93  
Australia  40,000  63  10.38   25,200   13.17  
India  25,000  55  6.49   13,750   7.19  
Kazakhstan  19,000  39  4.93   7,410   3.87  
USA  15,000  31  3.89   4,650   2.43  
Sweden  7,800  64  2.02   4,992   2.61  
Venezuela  6,000  60  1.56   3,600   1.88  
Canada  3,900  64  1.01   2,496   1.30  
Iran  2,500  60  0.65   1,500   0.78  
South Africa  2,300  65  0.60   1,495   0.78  
Mauritania  1,500  67  0.39   1,005   0.53  
Mexico  1,500  60  0.39   900   0.47  
Others  30,000  57  7.78   17,100   8.94  
Total 385,500    100  191,348   100.00  
Source:USGS and IBM (for India)  
Note: Resources are described as ‘reserve base’ by USGS.  
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Chapter - 2 
 
 
2.  Iron Ore Production and Trends of Investment in India 
 
2.1  Trend and Structure of Production of Iron Ore  
 
2.1.1 In this section, we look at the trends in production of iron ore and its classification 
in terms of geography, grade, type, etc. According to Indian Bureau of Mines, iron ore 
production in India stood at 180.9 million tonnes in the year 2006-07 growing by 9.5 per 
cent over the previous year. (Table- 4)
28  
 
Table 4: Iron Ore Production in India 
 
  Unit 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06  2006-07 
Lump MillionTonnes  48.96  58.15  68.3  81.3 
Fines MillionTonnes  67.68  82.54  96.9  99.6 
*Concentrates MillionTonnes  6.20  5.25     
Total MillionTonnes 122.84  145.  94  165.23  180.9 
Growth Rate over 
previous Year 
per cent  18.9  13.2  9.5 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines and Federation of Indian Minerals Industries (FIMI) *Included 
in fines for 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07. 
 
2.1.2 Four states, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka and Orissa, produce bulk of the 
iron ore in the country. In 2005-06, Orissa remained the largest iron ore producing State, 
accounting for 32.2per cent of the total national production, followed by Karnataka 
(21.8per cent), Chhattisgarh (16per cent), Goa (15.4per cent) and Jharkhand  (11.3 per 
cent). (Table- 5) The relative positions have not changed in 2006-07. 
 
Table 5: Production of Iron Ore by States 2005-06 
 
State  Production of Iron Ore 2005-06 
(thousand Tonnes ) 
Percent of the Total 
(per cent) 
Total   154436  100 
Andhra Pradesh  3958  2.6 
Chhattisgarh 24750  16 
Goa 23744  15.4 
Jharkhand 17435  11.3 
Karnataka 33669  21.8 
Madhya Pradesh  465  0.3 
Maharashtra 517  0.3 
Orissa 49880  32.3 
Rajasthan 18  0.0 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines 
                                           
28 Iron ore production is estimated to have risen by about 10 per cent in 2006-07. The official figures are 
not yet available.     14
2.1.3 Iron ore mines are held in the private as well as in the public sector. About 66.6 per 
cent of the total iron ore mined in the country in 2006-07 came from the units in the 
private sector.  (Table- 6) the share of the public sector has been falling over the years.  
 
Table 6: Iron Ore Production by Sectors: Public and Private 
         Qty.: Million tonnes 
 
Year  Public Sector  Private Sector  Total 
2000-2001 43.49  37.27  80.76 
2001-2002 45.10  41.13  86.23 
2002-2003 49.69  49.38  99.07 
2003-2004 57.54  65.30  122.84 
2004-2005 57.03  88.91  145.94 
2005-2006   61.22  9104  165.23 
2006-07 60.4  120.5  180.9 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur and FIMI. 
Note: p - provisional figures 
 
2.1.4 In India, iron ore is produced by stand alone mining companies as also on a captive 
basis by iron and steel plants.   The share of captive mines in total production of iron ore 
has been falling over time- from 43.4 per cent in 2002-03 to 22.4 per cent in 2005-06 to 
have reached 20.16 per cent in 2006-07.  
 
2.1.5 The share of captive mines in respect of the public sector units was  38 per cent in 
2005-06 , whereas that for the private sector mines, it was is 12 per cent. (Table- 7) What 
is important to note here is that 54.6 per cent of the total iron ore produced in India came 
from the merchant (non-captive) mines in the private sector. The figure was 49.2 per cent 
in the previous year, reflecting relatively faster growth of this segment.  
 
Table 7: Iron Ore Production by Sectors: Captive vs. Non-captive 
         Qty.: Million tonnes 
 
Sector 2004-05  2005-06(p) 
 Captive  Non-
Captive 
Total Captive  Non-
Captive 
Total 




































Source: Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur 
Figures in parenthesis indicate the percentage contribution of captive and non-captive by public 
and private sectors respectively in the total production  
Note: p - provisional figures 
 
2.1.6 As discussed in the earlier Chapter, iron ore, contrary to popular perceptions, is a 
not a homogeneous mineral, with varying chemistry and physical properties, especially in   15
the context of its ferrous (Fe) content.
29 Using the detailed production statistics for 2004-
05, around 37.5 per cent of iron ore production in India is of a very high Fe content of 65 
per cent and above. This category has a lower fines-lumps ratio than that for total iron ore 
production. Nearly 43 per cent of the production comes from Fe range of 62-65 per cent 
wherein fines-lumps ratio is higher. (Table- 8)  
 
Table 8: Production of Iron Ore by Grade (2004-05) 
  (Million tonnes) 
Grades by 
Fe Content 
Lumps Fines  Concent
-rate 







Fines within Fe 
Grade as per 






of total Iron 
ore 
>65per cent  31.672  22.007    53.679 41.0  59.0  15.42  22.19 
62 – 65 per 
cent 
20.275 41.226    61.501 67.0  32.97  28.89  14.20 
60-62 per 
cent 
2.312 --    2.312  --  100.0  --  1.62 
Below 62 
per cent  
-- 16.743    16.743 100.0  --  11.73  -- 
Below 60 
per cent 
3.331 --    3.331  --  100.0  --  2.33 
     5.145  5.145  --  --  --  -- 
Total 57.59  79.976  5.145  142.711 59.65  43.96 56.04 40.35 
Based on Indian Bureau of Mines data 
(Grade-wise break-up of revised figure of 145.94mt is not available) 
 
                                           
29 Iron ore of size more than 10 mm and up to 150 mm is being classified as lump ore which also includes 
a sub category called Calibrated Lump Ore (CLO) of size more than 10 mm but less than 40 mm  or of 
size more than 6 mm and less than 30 mm. CLO is produced either by simple screening of iron ore or by 
adopting special crushing and screening of iron ore in order to produce CLO in bulk.  Lump ores are used 
mainly in blast furnaces and sponge iron plants. The sponge iron plants prefer CLO with high Fe (usually 
above 65per cent). 
 
Iron ore of size less than 10 mm is classified as fines. These are produced either in the mines itself in the 
mining operations or in handling of lump ores in the plants or in transit.  The fines are used either in the 
production of sinter or pellets. Iron ore of size less than 10 mm and ultra fines (- 100 mesh) in the size 
range of 0.1 mm to 10 mm are utilized as sinter feeds. The ores of size less than 100 mesh obtained either 
by grinding of high grade fines to less than 100 mesh or by beneficiating low grade ores/fines followed 
by grinding to less than 100 mesh are utilized as pellet feed fines. Pellet feed fines of 64 per cent and 
above Fe are used for making BF grade pellets and those above 67per cent Fe are used to make DR grade 
pellets.  
 
There is another sub-category of fines called slimes, less than 100 mesh in size, produced during washing 
of iron ores. These are mainly rejects and wastes. They are generally low to medium grade in terms of Fe 
content and are impounded in the tailing ponds near the mines. These slimes can be used for pelletisation.    16
2.1.7  Due to variations in the specific quality of ores and also perhaps due to operating 
practices, the share of lumps in total iron ore varies from state to state and mine to mine. 
It can be seen from Table – 9 that while the lumps account for nearly 56-59 per cent of 
the iron ore produced in Orissa, the same ranges between 17-19 per cent in the case of 
Goa (concentrates excluded) and 28-34 per cent for Karnataka. This is an important 
observation in the context of an export policy for iron ore as exportability of fines will 
vary widely across states and a common national policy may not work well for all the 
states in the same way.  
 
Table 9: State-Wise Production: Ratio of Lumps, Fines and Concentrates 
Quantity : ‘000 tonnes 
  2003-04 2004-05  2005-06(p) 






















































































































































Source:  Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur and FIMI 
Figures in paranthesis indicate the per centage contribution of lumps, fines and concentrates respectively  in 
the total production  
Note: p - provisional figures 
 
 
2.1.8 The geographical distribution of high-grade iron ore is highly concentrated. While 
65.5per cent of the total iron ore production is accounted for by four districts only–
Keonjhar (Orissa), Bellary (Karnataka), Singbhum West (Jharkhand) and Dantewada 
(Chhattisgarh), their combined share comes to about 96-97per cent of the total 65 + Fe 
grade and 60-62 per cent of 62-65 per cent Fe grade. This shows that high quality ores are 
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2.2  Investment in Mining 
 
2.2.1 Mining and quarrying has not attracted sufficient investor attention in India so far.  
In last couple of years, there has been some increase in gross capital formation in the 
mining sector, which could be linked to the improvement of mineral prices. It may also 
be noted that the data available is for the mining and quarrying sector as a whole. It is 
quite likely that the bulk of the capital formation has happened in coal, while iron ore 




2.2.2 If one looks at the developmental efforts during all the previous plan periods, iron 
ore seems to have received very little attention in terms of priority development efforts. 
30  
Even in the recent period, during 2001-02 and 2005-06, out of the 1,952 total mining 
leases granted by the government, only 28 were for iron ore. 
31 In terms of area, out of 
40,944 hactares, iron ore mining leases were granted only for 892 hactares. 
32 Bulk of the 
granted leases came in the year 2005-06 only. In terms of actual execution of the leases, 
the number for iron ore leases was even lower at 18.  
 
                                           
30 Report of the Working Group on Minerals, op. cit. 
31 Ibid. Annexure-IV-7. 















































2.2.3 Lack of investment in iron ore mining can be attributed partly to a long spell of low 
iron ore prices worldwide. (Table- 10 and Chart below) During 1987-2002, i.e. a span of 
fifteen years, iron ore fines prices increased only 14.63per cent. It was only during 2002- 
2007 that the prices increased by a huge 184.4per cent in five years. Even the global 
seaborne trade in iron ore increased only 23per cent during 1996-2002, while the same 
jumped 35.34 per cent in the next three years.
33 Prospects of iron ore were also under 
cloud due to stagnation of the steel industry the world over and the low profitability in it 
due to constant pressure on prices resulting from excess capacity.
34 In India, non-captive 
iron ore market was small and with export prices not so attractive either, there were little 
incentives to invest. Most of the mining interests in the country were focused on deposits 
already well prospected and assessed. The Indian government owned exploration 
agencies like GSI and MECL were focused more on the coal sector. It has been assessed 
by the mining industry that a mere investment of only Rs. 500 crore in the last decade in 
coal exploration led to an increased proven reserves of 50 billion tonnes.  
 
                                           
33 Iron Ore Manual 2006, Tex Report Ltd.  
34 Statistics published by the International Iron and Steel Institute, Brussels, for steel production figures 
(published on their website www.worldsteel.org. For price trends, Metal Bulletin, various issues or their 
website www.metalbulletin.com.   20
Table 10: Global Iron Ore Contract Prices 
Unit: Cents\DLTU, FOB 
      2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006  2007 
Brazil  SSF - Lumps  28.34 26.92 29.32 34.78 59.65 71.0  77.8
   (South system  
Sinter Feed) 
 Sinter Fines 
25.98 25.36 27.64 32.27 55.34 65.9 72.2
   SFCJ  (Carajas 
Fines) 
26.48 25.86 28.18 32.76 56.18 66.9 73.3
   MBR (Lumps)   28.15 26.74 29.32 34.78 59.65 71.0  77.8
India   Bailadila  
(Lumps )  
36.87 35.03 38.15 45.25 77.6 92.4 101.2
   Bailadila (Fines)   27.82 27.15 29.59 35.1 60.2 71.7  78.5
   Donimalai (Fines)    -  -  -  - 74.9 89.2  97.7
      26.43 25.8 28.12 33.36 60.2 71.7  78.5
   Basic Grade  
Lumps 
34.13 33.15 36.1 42.82 73.44 87.5 95.8
   High Grade  
Fines  
35.9 34.81 37.91 44.97 77.12 91.8 100.6
   Paradeep Lumps  30.51 29.72 33.91 40.22 68.98 82.2  90.0
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2.2.4 Low world or domestic prices of iron ore also led to abandonment of mines (once 
the costs of extraction increased due to increases in mining depth or drop in the quality of 




2.2.5 It is only after the China-triggered boom in global iron ore market that huge 
opportunities came the way of the Indian merchant miners. This led to some 
improvement in investment and production. But still, bulk of the additional production 
came from the existing mines which were running at much lower and rather inefficient 
levels of capacity utilization earlier.  
 
2.2.6 Investment in such activities as iron ore mining also needs corresponding 
investment in transport and logistics infrastructure. The mining capacity can be 
developed at a relatively quick pace, but, infrastructure development takes a lot of time. 
With infrastructure development remaining largely a government responsibility, effective 
mining capacity enhancement has been low so far. Given the government’s increased 
focus on developing transport infrastructure, especially in the roads and railways sectors, 
mining capacity development is expected to gain pace.   
 
2.2.7 The other major constraint seen in raising greenfield iron ore capacity with fresh 
investment is the fact that many of the major mines are now under legal battles over 
leasing rights. Some of them pertain also to the disputes arising out of certain State 
government decisions to transfer the leases to some other parties. Such legal battles in 
many cases are expected to be long drawn if the prior experiences in India are any 
indication. 
 
2.2.8 Investment in iron ore exploration and mining is essential to realize the full 
potential of India’s rich iron ore resources. In the past, factors such as infrastructure 
constraints, depressed prices and delays in clearances had adversely affected the pace of 
investments in this sector. However, with the global boom in the market and the resultant 
increase in investor interest, there is a potential to raise the level of investment provided 
the policy and regulatory environment is considered conducive by investors.  
 
  
                                           
35 Reported by the mining industry and confirmed by various experts on the subject.   22
Chapter - 3 
 
 
3.  Domestic Consumption of Iron Ore 
 
3.1  Iron Ore Consumption by User Industries 
 
3.1.1 The iron and steel producers account for about 98 per cent of the iron ore consumed 
in the country with about 80 per cent going to independent pig iron and integrated steel 
units and 18 per cent to the sponge iron industry. The nature of specific demand for iron 
ore is dynamically driven based on technology in steel/iron making. For example, in 
India, demand for lump ore has grown strongly in the past few years due to a very rapid 
growth in the sponge iron industry.    
 
3.1.2 The total domestic consumption of iron ore was estimated to be about 35.63 million 
tonnes in 2000-01. The current position does not seem to be very clear with several 
numbers being seen. There are in fact more than one figures seen even in the official 
estimates which vary from source to source. The most commonly cited number is 65 
million tonnes. This is based on the balance left after exports at given level of production 
and stock. However, it appears that the estimates of consumption of iron ore in the 
country are on the lower side. Even if one leaves aside the almost certain case of under-
reporting of steel and sponge iron production in the country, the data collected from 
various steel producers and the estimates made on the basis of technical norms suggest 
that iron ore consumption figures should have been much larger than what the IBM or 
any other official agency puts those to be. It can be seen that as per these estimates, the 
total iron ore consumption in the country was about 78 million tonnes with 37 million 
tonnes being accounted for by lumps and 41 million tonnes by fines. (Table- 11) If the 
un-reported sponge iron production figures are to be considered, the actual lump 
consumption will be even higher. Iron ore used by the sponge iron units, especially in the 
unorganized sector, are all lumps. Considering the associated fines for this lumps 
consumption, the actual fines availability in the country should have been even higher.   
This issue is discussed further subsequently.     
 
Table 11: Consumption of Iron Ore: 2005-06 - Industry Estimates 
 
(Figures in Million tonnes) 
 
Producer/Sector Lumps  Fines  Total 
Consumption : Tata Steel  3.02  5.47  8.49 
Consumption : SAIL  7.2  16.8  24 
Consumption : Essar  1.34  3.06  4.4 
Consumption : Ispat  1.97  1.89  3.86 
Consumption : JSW  0.97  3.7  4.67   23
 
Producer/Sector Lumps  Fines  Total 
Consumption : DRI  11.52   0  11.52 
Consumption : Other Pig iron/MBF  7.552  1.8  9.352 
Consumption : RINL  2.18  4.01  6.19 
Consumption in Other Areas including 
pellets for exports 
1.5 4  5.5 
Total Consumption  37.252  40.73 77.982 
 
Source:  Report of Economic Research unit, JPC, Ministry of Steel. 
Sources : Either taken from the company directly (or estimated from the known production of crude 
steel and assuming established technical norms of consumption). Pellets have been consumed by the 
DRI industry as well but in very small quantities. However, since the exact proportion of that was not 
known, the figure has been not been shown separately and is included in lumps.    
 
3.2  Iron Ore Consumption by its Form 
 
3.2.1 Iron ore is consumed either in the form of lumps directly or as agglomerates. 
Agglomerates can be either pellets or sinters. There are newer agglomerate products like 
iron nuggets, which are yet to be ready for commercial usage.  
 
3.2.2 Lumps are consumed in the blast furnaces, sponge iron plants and Corex plants with 
or without agglomerates. Normally, except for coal based DRI plants in India, in all other 
operations of iron making, lumps are used along with agglomerates like sinters or pellets.  
 
3.2.3 Fines are used in the making of sinters or pellets. There are now technologies, such 
as Finex, in the development stages where fines will find direct use. Sinters are used in 
the blast furnaces only, whereas pellets can be used anywhere.
36  
 
3.2.4 What is interesting to note from Table – 11 is the fact that the percentage of lumps 
in total consumption of iron ore is much larger in India by global standards. As per 
information available from expert agencies, the percentage of lumps in the total 
consumption of iron ore are 20 per cent  for China, 15 per cent for Europe, 15 per cent  
for the CIS countries, 10 per cent  for North America, 20 per cent  for South America 
with the global average being only 18 per cent.
37 In fact, the figures are projected to fall 
to 16 per cent in China, 11per cent in Europe, 15per cent in the CIS, 6per cent in North 
America, 12per cent in South America with the global average of 15per cent to be 
reached by 2015. The comparative Indian figure at 47per cent plus is fairly high.  
  
3.2.5 The total sintering capacity in the country is estimated to be about 41 million 
tonnes. (Annexure-1)
38  In addition, the country has about 18 million tonnes of 
pelletising capacity.
39 Utilisation of capacity in the sintering and pelletising plants has 
been lower compared to the iron making facilities in the country. In the year 2005-06, the 
total production of agglomerates (sinter +pellets) remained only at 42.8 million tones, of 
                                           
36 The pellets for blast furnaces and sponge iron making are not the same nevertheless.  
37 Tex Report : Iron Ore Manual 2005 
38 Ministry of Steel 
39 Ministry of Steel, based on data collected from the industry.   24
which 31.3 million tonnes were accounted for sinter and the rest by pellets (11.5 million 
tonnes). Some of these capacities are new and are yet to reach stabilization and full 
capacity utilization levels. Therefore, the requirement of iron ore fines falls short of the 
current production level of iron ore fines in the country. In this context, the report of 
Working Group on Steel Industry for Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12) submitted in 
December, 2006 observes: 
 
“Bulk of the export of iron ore is in the form of fines (over 80per cent in 2004-05) for 
which adequate sintering or pelletisation capacities do not exist in the country.  Such 
capacity has to be built up through appropriate fiscal incentives.  The steel makers will 
also have to take necessary initiatives to reduce lump ore consumption and change the 
iron ore consumption mix with adequate technological changes by higher utilization of 
fines through sintering.  It will be necessary for the Indian steel producers to make larger 
use of fines and concentrates instead of remaining over dependent on lumps.  The current 
sinter and pellets usage in the Indian plants is lower than those in the best of the plants 
abroad.  Higher sinter and pellets use will help the industry reduce costs as also make 
use of the fines generated in mining iron ore.”(para 2.3.9 – page 50) 
  
3.2.6 The sinter use in the ore burden is increasing over time, although slowly for the 
SAIL plants with captive mines, and more changes are expected with the modernization 
of the plants. The new generation plants have started with technologies that enable higher 
use of sinter or pellets. Some of the smaller players have also set up smaller sinter plants 





























Sinter Production: Durgapur Steel Plant   25



































Source: Operational Statistics, 2005-06 of the respective plants. 
 































Hot Metal Production 
 
Source: Operational Statistics, Bokaro Steel Plant. 
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Hot Metal Production 
 
Source: Operational Statistics: Rourkela Steel Plant, 2005-06 
 
3.2.7 At present, several steel plants are using a mix of pellets and sinter to replace lump 
ores. Pellet sinter mix at times constitutes nearly 100 per cent of the BF feed in specific 
cases (only DRI and not integrated steel plants). This choice is based on pure economics 
of operation that takes into account the price relatives between fines, pellets and lumps 
and efficiency gains in blast furnace operation. Since the existing price configuration 
supports higher use of sinter, the steel makers in China, East Asia including Japan, South 
America and Europe have favoured sinter.  In North America, pellets are being used 
extensively – up to 70 per cent of the BF feed. The same is fairly high in the CIS (45 %) 
and Europe (30%). By 2015, pellets are expected to take increasing share in the total BF 
feed with the global average coming to about 30 per cent.
40  The same trend could be 
expected in India too, due mainly to environmental concerns about sinter plants, 
availability of fines in surplus and easier transportation of pellets produced at the mine 
head.  
 
3.2.8 In the small and medium sector, there are many (218 of them are reportedly in 
operation, with the figure expected to touch 300 soon) coal based sponge iron plant and 
they are almost totally dependent on lump ore. 
41 
 
3.2.9 As seen from above, the nature of demand for iron ore varies across producers. For 
example, while the traditional blast furnace based steel plants may need a mix of fines (as 
                                           
40 Various Tex Reports and  Conference Papers 
41 Joint Plant Committee and Sponge Iron Manufacturers Association   27
sinter feed or pellets) and lumps, the DRI units depend largely on lumps and to some 
extent on pellets depending on the specific economics involved. Importantly, the iron ore 
lumps (as also pellets) required by the DRI units are to be of high grade (preferably with 
Fe content above 65per cent).  
 
3.2.10 An estimation undertaken from the data available from industry sources suggests 
that the existing agglomeration capacity (sintering and pelletising) falls short in the South 
and the East.  The estimated production of fines (in 2005-06) in the Eastern region 
(Orissa and Jharkhand) stood at about 32.86 million tonnes while the total agglomeration 
capacity was 21 million tonnes. The actual production of agglomerates stood lower at 
16.424 million tonnes. This is the region dominated by major plants of SAIL (Bokaro, 
Durgapur, Rourkela and IISCO) and Tata Steel with captive mines. Similarly, in the other 
major iron ore exporting region, South-West (Chhattisgarh, Goa and Karnataka only), the 
total production of fines stood at 55.202 million tonnes, when the agglomeration capacity 
was only at 30 million tonnes (includes the plants in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra).  
The actual production of pellets and sinter in the year was 25.4 million tones. 
 
3.2.11 One can see from above that there were huge gaps between the production of fines 
and agglomerates in both the East and the South West regions of the country. The gaps 
leave no other option but to export fines from these regions for the time being.   
 
3.2.12 A large chunk of the high grade haematite ores is being used by the small sponge 
iron units, some of which are linked further with captive steel making through induction 
furnaces. It is being widely held and also pointed out in a recent study conducted by a  
consultancy firm that the actual production of sponge iron in the country is about 16 
million tonnes (as in 2005-06) against the official records of about 11.5 million tonnes.
42 
These units not only take away the best of the lump ores but also run inefficiently. 
Discussions with the industry experts as also the data available from the steel industry 
have shown that there is significant loss of materials in transit, in- plant storage or 
operation. For a better utilization of resources, it is imperative that the product be sold at 













                                           
42 IDS study for International Iron and Steel Institute, Brussels. Quoted by a concerned industry expert. 
Even the Ministry of Steel has now accepted 16 million tonnes as the capacity in the sector.   28
 
Chapter – 4 
 
 
4.  Exports of iron ore 
 
4.1  Trends and Structure of Exports of Iron Ore 
 
4.1.1 The policy debate on iron ore has mainly focused on the rising trend of exports of 
iron ore from India. Exports of iron ore from India have reached 93 million tonnes in 
2006-07 rising from about 48 million tonnes in 2001-02.
43  (Table- 12) 
 
 












2001-02  86.22  41.36  41.64  48.29 
2002-03  99.07  40.94  48.02  48.47 
2003-04  122.83  44.97  62.57  50.94 
2004-05  145.94  48.15  78.15  53.55 
2005-06  165.23  52.52  89.28  54 
2006-07  180.9  56.28  93  51.4 
Source: GMOEA, KIOCL, MMTC, private exporters and IBM 
 
 
4.1.2 The preliminary reports indicate that exports were at about 93 million tonnes in 
2006-07 against an expected 100 million tonnes.
44  The exports are likely to drop by 
about 5 million tonnes in 2007-08, as per preliminary reports based on the export trends 
till October 2007 and in view of infrastructure constraints at the ports and lower demand 
for iron ore from China.  
 
                                           
43 The figure excludes pellets.  
44 Bloomberg news, quoting FIMI.    29
Table 13: India’s Port-Wise Iron Ore Export 




2004-05 2005-06  2006-07  (P) 
Belekeri 8.0  12.60  41.22 
Chennai 95.45  82.60  103.50 
Ennore 5.07  5.49  17.19 
Goa 314.20  362.71  405.37 
Haldia 49.66  79.50  78.49 
Hazira --  -  3.15 
Kakinada 8.89  35.10  38.13 
Karwar 24.00  16.90  14.90 
Krishnapatnam --  --  5.50 
Mumbai Floating  0.40  1.04  -- 
New Mangalore  93.96  88.53  52.40 
Paradeep 90.50  102.70  119.48 
Redi Port  4.75  8.10  4.30 
Vizag 86.50  97.50  54.27 
Total 781.45  892.77  937.90 
 
Source: GMOEA, KIOCL, MMTC and Private exporters. Actual export figures may vary from 
those cited above to some extent. 
 
4.1.3 Table- 12 shows that the ratio of exports to domestic production rose continuously 
till 2005-06. A decline was noted in 2006-07 and the trend is likely to continue in 2007-
08. India’s share in global seaborne trade also increased from 7.44 per cent in 1996 to 
13.76 per cent in 2005. This figure dropped in 2006 and is likely to go down further in 
2007. These observations remain at the core of the questions raised on the desirability 
and sustainability of iron ore exports at the current or increased rate.   
 
4.1.4 The above ratios are based on official estimates of domestic iron ore production and 
consumption. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the actual iron ore 
consumption in the country, even on a conservative basis, should be higher than reported. 
This means, the domestic production is also proportionately higher. If such adjustments 
are accommodated, the actual export ratios will be found to be lower than those officially 
reported. 
 
4.1.5 In 2004-05, exports constituted 37.5 per cent of the total high grade iron ore 
production in the country, high grade being defined as those having Fe content above 65 
per cent. 
45  For medium grade, the corresponding figure is 56 per cent and for low grades 
it was 106 per cent. Of the total exports of 78 million tonnes, high grades constituted only 
                                           
45 It is important to note that Indian iron ore especially from the Orissa sector has high alumina content and 
with adverse alumina silica ratio reduce their quality parameters in global comparison. This is one of the 
reasons for which POSCO has sought exchange of low Fe but low alumina ores from Brazil or other 
sources with equivalent ores from India.    30
25.8 per cent, with medium and lower grades making for 43.8 per cent and 30.4 per cent 
respectively. (Table- 14) As per the existing policy, the ores of 64 per cent plus Fe are to 
be exported through a canalizing agency and, therefore, the entire high grade ores should 
have been exported by a government owned canalising agency. A good portion of that, 
about 3.5 million tonnes, was under contractual agreement and was exported directly by 
the government owned companies. It, therefore, appears that merchant exports involved 
mainly and largely medium and low grade ores with Fe content below 64 per cent.      
 
Table 14: Production and Exports of Iron Ore by Grades (2004-05) 
(Million tonnes) 
 
  Production  Production  Production  Export  per cent of 
production 
exported 






















22.386 23.77  106.2 





142.7 78.15  55 
 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines 
 
4.1.6 About 70 per cent of the total medium grade fines production were exported from 
the Eastern region (covering mainly the states of Orissa and Jharkhand). From Goa, 
exports of fines stood at about 157 per cent of the total production. This situation of 
exports exceeding the total production in the state, was mainly due to exports of mine 
head stocks of the previous years and exports of ores   mixed and enriched with the ores 
from the state of Karnataka. 
46 The corresponding figures for Chhattisgarh/ Bailadila was 
3.1 per cent and for Bellary Hospet 56.3 per cent. The figure was 82.2 per cent at the 
national level.  
 
4.2  Issues Regarding Future Exports of Iron Ore 
 
4.2.1 One key question is whether the rising trend in export of iron ore from India is 
sustainable. Iron ore exports from India in the future years will depend on a few critical 
factors. The foremost among them is the quantum of demand from China, which in turn 
will depend on the country’s steel industry growth and the preference accorded to Indian 
                                           
46 The steel industry has pointed out that due to the possible mixing of Karnataka origin iron ore with Goa 
ores, the exports of ores from Karnataka has been underestimated, which in reality is much higher than 
reported.    31
iron ore by them. While it appears that iron ore demand from China will continue to be 
strong and  rising in absolute terms for at least some more years, how much of that rising 
market will be left for the Indian iron ore mining industry will depend on a number of 
independent as also inter-related factors. One, the ability of Indian mining industry to 
expand operations to increase access to the country’s iron ore reserves. This, in turn, will 
depend on the profitability in the industry and policy certainty available to the mining 
industry. Two, the rate of growth of domestic demand for iron ore, which again is a 
function of the growth of the iron and steel industry in the country. Three, how quickly 
will the policy scenario (mineral policy) change to draw more investment into the mining 
industry and infrastructure. Four, willingness as also the compulsions on the part of the 
Chinese steel makers to buy the relatively high cost Indian ores.
47  
 
4.2.2 Many expert agencies have remained cautious on the ability of Indian miners to 
raise exports substantially to China. The Australian Commodities Report (of Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics) has noted that with increased 
consolidation in the Chinese steel industry, the steel makers will gradually move away 
from the spot to the long term contract market. Currently the Indian iron ore is sold 
largely on the spot basis for the small and medium size players.
48 With high degree of 
fragmentation and regulations, Indian miners may find it difficult to enter long term 
contracts with Chinese buyers. The report goes on to say, “The comparatively fragmented 
nature of China’s steel industry has supported imports of Indian iron ore, despite the cost 
of the ore being above those sourced from Brazil or Australia. Given that the Chinese 
steel industry is likely to remain comparatively fragmented into the medium term, and 
inability or unwillingness of alternate iron ore suppliers to substitute their iron ore for 
Indian exported iron ore, demand from China for Indian ore is expected to remain strong 
in the medium term.” 
49 
 
4.2.3 The studies conducted by Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) have forecast that the iron ore production in India can grow only at 
about 6.5 per cent annually to reach about 250 million tonnes by 2012. 
50The report says 
that if Indian government removes or significantly reduces the impediments to greenfield 
iron ore expansions, the future iron ore production growth in India could rise faster.
51  
The report, however, forecasts iron ore exports from India to grow annually only at about 
4.6 per cent a year.
52 
 
4.2.4 India’s iron ore export potential to China will also depend on the relative 
competitiveness of Indian iron ore exporters vis-à-vis suppliers from Australia and Brazil. 
The country-wise trend of imports of iron ore into China (Annexure- 2) shows that iron 
ore exports to China increased by 13.1 per cent from Australia in 2006 over the previous 
year. The corresponding figures for Brazil, India and South Africa were 39.6 per cent,    9 
                                           
47 When compared with the contract prices with Australia and Brazil. 
48 Australian Commodities, Vol 13, No. 3, September 2006. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid and also Vol. 14, March 2007 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid   32
per cent and 19 per cent respectively. There was also a record of a significant fall in the 
share of Indian origin ores in the total imports of China. It is interesting to see from the 
data that China has significantly diversified its iron ore sourcing as more and more ores 
are being imported from relatively smaller source countries like Peru, Kazakhstan, Iran, 
Venezuela, Philippines, Vietnam, Chile, , Ukraine and even Canada and Russia. Imports 
from many of these countries are in the agglomerated form (pellets).  
 
4.2.5 It is difficult to predict how exports of iron ore will grow over time from individual 
major countries like Brazil and Australia, since a lot will depend not only on the market 
conditions but also on the business plans put in place by the iron ore majors in these 
countries. Based on a detailed study, ABARE has forecast that iron ore exports from 
Australia will rise to 410 million tonnes by 2012, rising sharply from 249 million tonnes 
in 2006. 
53 Similarly, Brazil’s exports are expected to rise to 354 million tonnes by 2012 
rising sharply from 247 million tonnes in 2006. The global iron ore trade is being forecast 
to grow to from an estimated 780 million tonnes to 1107 million tonnes by 2012. 
54 In 
this trade volume, Brazil and Australia will together have a share of 69 per cent. The 
forecasts of exports from Brazil may need an upward review, considering the latest plans 
of the Brazilian iron ore behemoth CVRD. These projections suggest that Indian iron ore 
companies could find it difficult to retain their current share in a Chinese market that will 
be more competitive and far less attractive. If all the long term contracts signed and 
investment proposed by Chinese steel companies in several iron ore rich countries 
materialize, as planned, there will definitely be a reduction in the share of Indian iron ore 
in Chinese consumption or imports.  
 
4.2.6 Besides the above industry risks, there is an economic risk of slowdown. China’s 
government has taken several fiscal and monetary measures to ease the country’s growth. 
Possibility of an imminent global economic slowdown can also not be ruled out. If there 
is a hard landing of the Chinese economy, their industrial production and infrastructure 
spending could drop sharply, adversely affecting steel consumption growth trends. In 
response, if capacity expansion plans in the steel industry take a knock, iron ore demand 
will follow the same trend. Thus, there is no certainty about continuation of the robust 
trend in iron ore exports to China and one cannot simply extrapolate the current trends in 
this regard.  
 
4.2.7 Looking at the cost side, there is a strong possibility of iron ore mining costs for 
stand-alone mining companies rising more than proportionately, given the fact that to 
raise mining capacity from now on will involve significant investment. Infrastructure in 
the iron ore bearing states is also far from the desired level of development.
55 
Infrastructure development will call for sizeable investments and State governments 
could pass on a part of the burden to the miners in the form of development cess and 
duties. The state government of Orissa, for example, has proposed more than one local 
development tax, which have been challenged by the mining industry. Such burden, 
                                           
53 Ibid  
54 Ibid 
55 Report of the Working Group on Minerals for 11
th Five Year Plan, 2007  
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along with the current export tax and appreciating rupee could seriously affect the 
competitive positioning of the iron ore industry. (See Appendix- A for a comprehensive 
list of taxes, duties, levies on iron ore at different stages of its business) 
 
4.2.8 The export tax on iron ore has not been responsible for the near stagnation in 
exports experienced currently.  The current level is not significantly large to upset the 
businesses between the Chinese buyers and the Indian exporters. However, this can 
happen if the exports taxes are raised and that too at a time when the global prices do not 
rise proportionately. The current business levels are also protected by the fact that in the 
spot market, the Chinese buyers will not immediately find alternative sourcing. They will 
perhaps be ready to bear part of the tax burden to continue with the supply to the extent 
possible. However, in the longer term, once the iron ore supplies increase from other 
countries where mining capacity development is taking pace and the ocean freight market 
gains stability, the Indian iron ore will could find it difficult to compete burdened with 
significant export tax. .  
 
4.2.9 It may be noted that the merchant iron ore mining companies are also significant 
suppliers of iron ore to the domestic market. If the export avenue is closed,   the resultant 
oversupply (or overcapacity) in the domestic market will lead to a price fall, which may 
seriously hit the overall finances of this industry. Under such a scenario, fresh investment 
into the sector could also have limited scope. 
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Chapter- 5 
 
5.  Forecast of Demand for Iron Ore in India 
 
5.0 Apart from the extent of iron ore resources, another crucial issue for determining the 
adequacy of iron ore pertains to the projections of iron ore demand, which in turn depend 
upon the prospects for the steel industry in India. Demand forecasting is a considerable 
challenge here since one needs to consider demand outlook over a much longer period of 
time, spanning decades. Even for a relatively smaller time-frame of 10-15 years, different 
estimates of steel consumption have been derived by different agencies, based on 
different considerations and methodologies.  
 
5.1  Short –Period Forecast of Iron Ore Demand in India 
 
5.1.1   Demand for iron ore, fines or lumps, will depend in the first place on the 
production of iron and steel.  Production of steel does not necessarily have a one-to-one 
correspondence with domestic demand for the same, considering external trade 
possibilities. However, in the context of the steel industry, the size of the domestic 
market is important for long term viability of production. Historically speaking, most 
nations have witnessed their steel industry development being largely dependent on their 
own market.   
 
5.1.2 In the estimates of the Working Group on Iron and Steel for the 11
th Five Year Plan, 
set up by the Planning Commission, the iron ore demand in the country in total is set to 
rise to 130 million tonnes by the terminal year of the plan period, that is 2011-12. 
Consumption of scrap has been forecast at 18 million tonnes. This is based on the 
assumed production of 80.2 million tonnes of crude steel
56. Of that, 44.4 million tonnes 
are to come from the Oxygen route (BF-BOF, Corex BOF and MBF-EOF) and 23.8 
million tonnes from the electric route (EAF/IF). Technology route was unspecified for 12 
million tonnes of production.  
 
5.1.3 The production estimate is based on estimated demand for finished steel and pig 
iron in the domestic market as also the export potential. Gross demand for finished steel 
was forecast to be in the range of 66.5- 70.34 million tonnes.
57 Forecasts have been made 
using a regression model based on the correlation between steel demand and major 
macro-economic variables like GDP, GDCF, industrial production etc.. 
58  
 
5.1.4 While the above estimates provide some reference for projecting short-term 
demand, a more detailed work as discussed below has been undertaken for the purpose of 
assessing short term demand for iron ore in India. The need for a separate analysis was 
partly also because of the fact that the Working Group restricted its forecasts only up to 
2011-12 and in the context of this study, this is very short.    
                                           
56 Report of the working Group on steel for XI Five Year Plan, Ministry of Steel; 2007. 
57 Gross finished steel demand involves multiple counting of products, a problem well known in the context 
of the statistical system for the steel industry. Consumption of raw materials are derived from the 
production of crude steel.  
58 Ibid   35
5.1.5 Demand for iron ore in terms of both lumps and fines, derived from a technical 
model for a period up to 2015-16, is shown in Tables- 15, 16 and 17.  
 
Table 15: Annual Demand for Iron Ore: Up to 2015-16 
(Figures in million tonnes) 
 
Scenario -1   
FY ending 
31
st March  Iron Ore Total  Lump  Fines  Lump as per cent 
age of total 
2007 90.7  32.7  58.00  36.07 
2008 104.4  37.2  67.17  35.66 
2009 112.0  42.0  70.00  37.48 
2010 119.2  43.2  75.95  36.28 
2011 127.1  44.7 82.47  35.12 
2012 133.8  45.9  87.93  34.29 
2013 143.0  47.5  95.45  33.24 
2014 153.0  49.3  103.69  32.22 





  Iron Ore Total  Lump  Fines  Lump as per cent 
age of total 
2007 87.2  32.2  55.00  36.92 
2008 98.8  36.4  62.41  36.83 
2009 103.8  40.7  63.05  39.25 
2010 108.3  41.6  66.70  38.42 
2011 111.3  42.3 69.02  37.99 
2012 116.4  43.3  73.15  37.17 
2013 121.8  44.3  77.45  36.41 
2014 127.4  45.5  81.92  35.68 




Scenario-3             
  Iron Ore Total  Lump  Fines 
Lump as per cent 
age of total 
2007 92.12  32.93  59.19  35.75 
2008 106.68  37.57  69.11 35.21 
2009 115.30  42.47  72.83 36.83 
2010 123.76  43.93  79.83 35.50 
2011  131.34 45.28  86.05  34.48 
2012 141.37  47.02  94.35 33.26 
2013 152.45  48.94  103.51 32.10 
2014 164.57  51.03  113.54 31.01 
2015 177.93  53.34  124.59 29.98   36
5.1.6 The major assumptions on the different scenarios are as under: 
 
  Scenario-I Scenario-II  Scenario-III 
Crude Steel 
Production 
To grow from 45 
million tonnes in 
2005-06 to 92 million 
tonnes in 2015-16 
To grow from 45 
million tonnes in 
2005-06 to 71 million 
tonnes in 2015-16 
To grow from 45 
million tonnes in 
2005-06 to 101 
million tonnes in 
2015-16 
Steel Scrap 
Generation in the 
Economy 
To grow from 4.05 
million tonnes to 8.35 
million tonnes  
To grow from 4.05 
million tonnes to 6.43 
million tonnes  
To grow from 4.05 
million tonnes to 9.15 
million tonnes  
Steel Scrap Imports  To grow from 3.5 
million tonnes to 9.08 
million tonnes 
To grow from 3.5 
million tonnes to 6.89 
million tonnes 
To grow from 3.5 
million tonnes to 9.08 
million tonnes 
DRI production  To rise from 11 
million tonnes to 20 
million tonnes 
To rise from 11 
million tonnes to 20 
million tonnes 
To rise from 11 
million tonnes to 20 
million tonnes 
Crude Steel from 
DRI/Scrap  
To rise from 15.77 to 
31.81 million tonnes 
To rise from 15.77 to 
28.32 million tonnes 
To rise from 15.77 to 




To rise from 29 
million tonnes to 60 
million tonnes 
To rise from 29 
million tonnes to 42 
million tonnes 
To rise from 29 
million tonnes to 68 
million tonnes 
Crude steel from 
Corex iron making 
route  
To rise from 1.6 to 5.6 
million tonnes 
To rise from 1.6 to 5.6 
million tonnes 
To rise from 1.6 to 5.6 
million tonnes 
Iron ore consumption 
per tonne of Hot 
Metal 
1.55 tonne  1.55 tonne  1.55 tonne 
Hot Metal Required 
per tonne of crude 
steel 
1.015 tonnes  1.015 tonnes  1.015 tonnes 
Iron Ore required per 
tonne of DRI 
1.6 tonne  1.6 tonne  1.6 tonne 
Handling loss of iron 
ore at plant/in 
transit/mines 
10 %  10 %  10% 
Lump ore use 
percentage in BF 
15 %  15%  15% 
Lump ore use in DRI  80 %  80%  80% 
Merchant Pig Iron 
Production 
To rise from 3.5 
million tonnes to 8.6 
million tonnes 
To rise from 3.5 
million tonnes to 8.6 
million tonnes 
To rise from 3.5 
million tonnes to 8.6 
million tonnes 
Iron Ore Requirement 
per tonne of Pig iron 
1.6 tonne  1.6 tonne  1.6 tonne 
 
5.1.7 The production levels of crude steel and pig iron are based on a detailed study 
conducted on the future of finished steel demand and the pattern of trade.
59 
                                           
59 A.S. Firoz : Indian Steel: Critical Details, Evolving Structure and Strategic Options, A Multi-Client 
Study, Steel Business Briefings, London, 2007   37
 
5.1.8 One reason for taking 2015-16 as the terminal point in the projections here is that 
the Hoda Committee has made a specific recommendation that the issue of sufficiency of 
iron ore can be revisited after ten years, that is, after 2015-16. By then, it could become 
far more clear as to how the steel industry will have developed and what will be the iron 
ore supply and security position then.  
 
5.1.9 Going by the best case scenario (Scenario-III), the cumulative iron ore consumption 
between the years 2007 and 2015, will be 1.37 billion tonnes, out of which 0.46 billion 
tonnes will be lumps and the rest fines. In the second best case (Scenario-I), the 
corresponding numbers for total iron ore and lumps are 1.31 billion tonnes and 0.45 
billion tonnes respectively. The same drops to 1.17 and 0.43 billion tonnes respectively in 
the worst case scenario (Scenario-II). These numbers suggest that the cumulative iron ore 
consumption for domestic use in the next ten years is likely to be around 5 per cent of the 
current estimate of iron ore resources in India. 
     
5.2  Long Term Demand for Iron Ore 
 
5.2.1 In the context of iron ore sufficiency, the scenario till around 2020 is not adequate 
for any conclusion. The steel consumption and production scenarios will have to be 
looked at for a much longer period, say, up to 2080 or so. A forecast till that period will 
be excessively speculative if the current trend is assumed to continue till then. To arrive 
at any kind of an idea of future growth, the best alternative will be to see the nature of 
growth in steel consumption in the developed nations in the first place and then assume 
specific conditions for the growth scenario for India considering also the techno- 
economic conditions of making steel and the substitution possibilities.       
 
5.2.2 The estimation of demand for iron ore can be on the basis of the following. 
 
A. As per steel industry expansion plans, annual growth rate could be 12 per cent till 
2020.
60 This will, however, take one to only 2020, beyond which the industry has no firm 
plans. After that, one can assume a production growth rate of about 4 per cent till 2040, 
2.5 per cent between 2041-2060 and 1.5 per cent thereafter till 2080. These assumptions 
are based on the observed trend in steel consumption in the developed nations since 1950 
till 2000.  (The relevant observations have been made for a few representative developed 
nations only in Appendix- A1).  
 
The future capacity planning, as per announcement of projects made by the industry and 
their schedule of completion, however, remain tentative beyond 2011. The figures in this 
case have been accepted as they are till 2020 without applying any value judgment on 
them. (The future capacity planning in the industry can be seen from Annexure- 3.) The 
projection of steel industry growth has been based on the perception of growth in the 
steel consumption demand in the country and the emerging export opportunities. 
                                           
60 Capacity expansion plans and the potential of realization of these plans are to be seen dynamically and 
the same have changed over the last few months. However, these changes do not alter the basic scenario 
forecast and hence the arguments derived out of those remain valid.    38
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B. An alternate approach could be based on the National Steel Policy, which assumes a 
7.3 per cent growth rate of steel production till 2020. Assumptions on the period beyond 
can be held same as in the first approach.   
















































C. In the third scenario, steel production growth rate has been assumed at 10 per cent till 
2020 (a scenario which lies somewhere in-between the first two scenarios), 4 per cent 
after that till 2035, 1.5 per cent after that till 2060 and 0.5 per cent afterwards till 2080.  
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5.2.3 The scenarios of steel production and iron ore consumption discussed above are 
based on standard technical norms. The estimates also assume that the current technology 
mix in steel production in India will not undergo any drastic change over the years. This 
is somewhat a difficult assumption to make, but, in the absence of any credible 
technology alternative at present, it may be safer to assume the well tested parameters for 
this exercise. However, one may keep in mind that the increase in global reservoir of 
steel scrap (also iron scrap) will increasingly make scrap based steel production more 
attractive. It is also possible that scrap dependence in India may rise since much of the 
iron ore fines are not quite good for sinterisation and sintering will involve higher costs. 
With this, the assumption made in the model that scrap will continue to account for 29 
per cent of the steel production globally may turn out to be fairly on the lower side. If this 
happens, the global as also the domestic demand for iron ore will proportionately shrink. 
On the other hand, iron ore consumption will critically depend on the quality and the 
ferrous content of the ore. One believes that there will be a gradual decline in the ferrous 
content of the ore as the better of the ores are getting used up faster. In our estimation 
above, this factor has been somewhat taken care of by assuming the average Fe content of 
the ore at 55 per cent globally and 60 per cent in India.  
 
5.2.4 The results from all the scenarios discussed above can be seen from the Table -18. 
 
Table 18 : Cumulative Iron Ore Demand for Future Years Under Different 
Scenarios 
(Billion tonnes)  
 
Year Scenario-1  Scenario-2  Scenario-3 
 
2040 10.86  6.49  7.08 
2045 14.13  8.33  8.84 
2050 17.83  10.41  10.74 
2055 22.01  12.77  12.78 
2060 26.73  15.42  14.98 
2065 31.91  18.33  17.29 
2070 37.49  21.46  19.66 
2075 43.5  24.84  22.1 
2080 50  28.48  24.61 
 
5.2.5 Under these growth assumptions related to the steel industry, cumulative iron ore 
consumption in the country will rise to 26.73 billion tonnes by 2060 in Scenario-1. This 
means, the existing estimated resources of iron ore will be all exhausted by then. In 
Scenario-2, the industry will find the currently estimated domestic iron ore backing them 
up till about 2075 and in Scenario -3, similar comfort will be available till 2080.  
 
5.2.6 If exports are to be included, the life of the existing reserves will be proportionately 
shortened. In the previous chapter on export of iron ore, the factors determining India’s 
export potential have been discussed and it appears that continuation of exports of iron 
ore at high levels is difficult to be sustained for a long time.    41
5.2.7 Currently, India exports about 90-100 million tonnes of iron ore.  Assuming that the 
exports are retained at 100 million tonnes ( as also considered by the government in the 
National Steel Policy ), which itself is a fairly ambitious assumption over a longer time-
frame, the cumulative demand for iron ore looks as shown in Table- 19.  
 
Table 19 : Cumulative Iron Ore Demand for Future Years Under Different 
Scenarios with 100 million tonnes of Exports 
(Billion tonnes) 
  
Year  Scenario-1 Scenario-2 Scenario-3 
 
2040 14.36  9.99  10.58 
2045 18.1  12.33  12.84 
2050 22.3  14.92  15.24 
2055  27.0  17.8 17.8 
2060 32.2  20.9  20.48 
2065 37.9  24.3  23.3 
2070 43.99  27.96 26.16 
2075 50.5  31.84  29.1 
2080 57.5  35.98  32.7 
 
5.2.8  It may be seen from the Table above that the iron ore resources as per current 
estimates will be exhausted by 2055 if the industry expansion plans are considered and by 
2070 or so if other projections as per Scenarios-2 and 3 are  taken into account with 100 
million tonnes of exports every year during the entire period. 
 
5.2.9 Thus, 100 million tonnes of annual exports of iron ore is not shortening the life of 
the iron ore reserves for the domestic steel industry significantly. Further, in the best 
possible conditions for growth of the Indian steel industry, the iron ore resources, if are 
safely stored up for all the announced ventures of credible nature, the same will last till 
2070 if exports of 100 million tonnes are allowed simultaneously and till 2085 if exports 
are not considered.  It may be noted here that the steel industry has sought iron ore 
security for 50 years, which seems to be certainly available under any scenario.  
 
5.2.10 In all the exercises in this chapter, the current resource position of iron ore has 
been considered as given and constant. As discussed in an earlier chapter, this view is 
static, which does not seem to be valid given the global experiences in mining.  




6.  Iron Ore Issues in Steel Industry Perspectives 
 
6.1  Raw Materials and Costs 
 
6.1.1   There is a strong perception that steel demand in India as also worldwide is slated 
for a massive increase. This view has encouraged investment into the industry for 
capacity growth worldwide, including announcement of aggressive plans in India. The 
viability of these plans needs to be examined by considering, inter -alia, factors 
influencing competitiveness of steel production. While China is adding capacity with the 
advantage of a large captive market and low costs of local coking coal and low capital 
costs, the Middle East capacity additions have been driven by very competitively 
available  energy. Brazil’s ambitions have been shaped by its iron ore and the strong 
markets in the neighbourhood, including in the US. The Indian steel makers look at iron 
ore as the most dominant factor for competitive steel production. India also has the 
advantages of chromite, manganese ore, ferro-alloys etc.  
 
6.1.2 In general, steel industry’s competitive advantages are prominently seen in the areas 
of raw materials and energy; and then in other factors such as labour and managerial 
costs, infrastructure and capital costs.  The mother raw material for the industry is iron 
ore, which is converted into iron of different forms through various technological 
processes using energy and reductant inputs like coking coal, non-coking coal, natural 
gas, etc. Steel is also produced by recycling scrap of steel through the process of melting 
in electric furnaces. Today, scrap constitutes a significant percentage of the total metallics 
requirement of the industry globally. Production of steel through electric steel making 
process accounts for about 31 per cent of the total global production. In fact, the 
proportion used to be much higher in the past years. With China’s blast furnace based 
steel growing at phenomenal pace, the share of electric steel making has fallen, despite 
the fact that about 100 million tonnes of crude steel production has been added globally 
in the last ten years. With only about 50 million tonnes of sponge iron (DRI/HBI) being 
produced globally, the bulk of the steel made through this process route is accounted for 
by scrap. Scrap is also used in the Basic Oxygen Furnaces (BOF) although not so 
extensively. The in-house (return) scrap is generally used for recycling as also to act as a 
coolant. Therefore, scrap supply and its price hold an important position in the 
competitive growth of the steel industry as a whole.   
 
6.1.3 To understand the importance of raw materials in the costs of production of steel, 
one may see the percentage share of each major input in the total cost. For plants with 
captive iron ore mines, iron ore accounts for not more than 10 per cent of the finished 
steel costs. For some, it is as low as 4 per cent in India.
61 For those without captive iron 
ore and largely dependent on iron ore lumps or pellets, the costs are higher compared to 
                                           
61 A.S. Firoz, op. cit. 2007    43
captive source of iron ore. Part of this cost rise is accounted for by freight costs.
62 Against 
this, coking coal constitutes as high as 20 per cent of the total costs of finished steel. 
63  
 
6.1.4 In the recent times, the prices of both coking coal and iron ore have risen sharply on 
the back of strong steel demand and rise in prices of steel. Although the coking coal 
prices have dropped in the last two annual contracts from about $125 per tonne in 2005 to 
about $95 per tonne in 2007 on fob export basis, the iron ore prices have continued to 
increase,  although at a reduced pace.
64   
 
6.1.5 If one assumes that local scrap generation will be limited, the steel industry growth 
will be based on the primary iron ore route – either in the BF/Corex etc. or DRI, with 
predominance of the BF.  The Indian steel industry views that the country has no coking 
coal to support the future capacity additions and will have to depend on expensive 
imports in an uncertain world where the bargaining power will remain with the mining 
companies. There is, therefore, a feeling that this disadvantage along with those added by 
poor infrastructure can be compensated for only if domestic iron ore is available to the 
industry at low prices and below the global benchmark prices. Further, the industry is 
looking at 50 years of iron ore security at the minimum and the freedom to operate on 
mines as per its own specific requirement of iron ore. For that, they have sought long 
term captive mining rights/leases. The concerned central government ministry has also 
strongly advocated the idea of captive mining and the state governments have gone to the 
extent of luring steel industry investment to their respective States by promising 
recommendation for captive mining leases only to those who set up plans in their 
respective states.    
 
6.1.6 The above argument hinges on an implicit assumption that iron ore will remain an 
attractive business worldwide for years and decades to come. However, there can be 
doubts about the validity of this assumption. According to a Credit Suisse report
65, iron 
ore prices are expected to remain strong in the medium term till around 2012 after which 
a decline is expected.  Iron ore prices may continue to rise up to a benchmark level of 
91.6 US cents per unit of Fe from the current level of about 77.35 cents and then drop 
gradually to 56.86 cents by 2014. 
66 Another report of UNCTAD projects iron ore prices 
to start sobering in 2009. Further, with the rising volatility in the freight cost with spot 
rates shooting up to uncomfortable levels very often, an uncertainty looms large over the 
seaborne iron ore trade business for the Indian miners.  
 
6.1.7 Secondly, the steel makers want iron ore security as a pre-condition for investment. 
This indicates the possible non-viability of the projects at economic value of iron ore. If 
so, the competitiveness of India in steel manufacturing does not appear to be based on a 
                                           
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid 
64 The iron ore prices in global contracts increased by 71 % in 2005, 19.5 % in 2006 and 9.5 % in 2007. It is 
expected to rise by another 65% in 2008 contracts. The coking coal prices are also expected to by about 
100% in 2008. All these are taking place in the context of unprecendented rise in steel prices.  
65 Credit Suisse Report , 26
th February 2007.  
66 Ibid   44
solid footing. If iron ore is available to Indian steel makers only at the international price, 
their growth ambitions could be significantly curtailed especially when the import 
protection on their finished products is being reduced to almost nothing. 
67 
Competitiveness of the industry vis-à-vis producers like China could then be seriously 
threatened.   
 
6.1.8 The concern of the steel industry can be seen from the following scenario. If iron 
ore is to be available at the corresponding fob price of it, that is, about $58 per tonne as 
on date for fines and $70 per tonne for lumps, assuming a mix of 80 per cent fines and 20 
per cent lumps, the cost of iron ore per tonne of crude steel will be about $100. This will 
be about 20 per cent of the average price of HR coils today.  
  
6.1.9 The grim competitiveness scenario portrayed above need not, however, be entirely 
true. It may be noted here that steel production was considered globally competitive even 
when the global iron ore prices were as low as $15-18 a tonne. The steel industry made 
profits and continued to grow in India despite the iron ore price differential between 
domestic and international markets being very low.  
 
6.1.10 The rise in both iron ore and coking coal prices can also been seen in the context 
of inability of these industries to rise quickly to the surge in demand from the rapidly 
growing steel industry. The mining capacity remained in a limbo due to lack of 
investment there. The slump in steel prices and stagnation in production for a protracted 
period from the mid 1990s till the beginning of the current decade had almost brought in 
a crisis within the mining industry worldwide. The mining industry capacity was 
significantly raised in the earlier period on the strong forecasts made for steel demand. 
With the steel market turning away from the expected line, the mining industry developed 
excess capacity everywhere. The industry, with excess and fragmented capacity, could 
not be sustained without adequate restructuring. This happened during the period prior to 
the start of the steel price boom worldwide. Over the period, the industry got restructured 
with consolidation and precisely at that time came the steel industry boom. The 
immediate rise in steel demand could be met from the existing surplus capacity in the 
industry. However, the rise in demand from the steel industry worldwide in particular 
from China, was so high that the global iron ore and coking coal capacity came under 
tremendous stress. This was more in the case of iron ore. Apart from pure capacity 
constraints, the supply of both iron ore and coking coal faced infrastructure bottlenecks, 
including transportation from the mines to the ports, shortages of ships and port and 
railway facilities at unloading points. The industry faced some of the most unexpected 
problems – shortage of machinery and equipment and manpower. In effect, the mining 
industry was completely unprepared for the huge and sudden economic upsurge. In a 
sense, what the mining industry is getting in terms of prices is what it was deprived of for 
years earlier.  
 
6.1.11  While coking coal is extremely critical in the life of the steel industry, the position 
in the case of iron ore is somewhat different. Substitution possibility lies in the use of 
                                           
67 The current import duty rate on steel is 5 per cent and there are talks that the same may drop further in 
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steel scrap. Over a period of time, steel scrap use in the steel industry in India as well as 
globally, has risen substantially and more and more steel is now being produced using 
scrap rather than going through the virgin route from iron  ore. Recycled scrap is 
estimated to have contributed to about 330 million tonnes of the crude steel produced 
globally in 2005 out of a total estimated production of 1240 million tonnes.
68  
  
6.1.12 The steel industry’s concerns and perspective on the issue of iron ore adequacy has 
been discussed in a recent study conducted by the National Council for Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) at the behest of POSCO.
69   The main conclusions of the 
study have been drawn based on computation of depletion premium of iron ore. The main 
feature of a depletable resource is that it exists at the start in a finite stock and the stock is 
reduced along its use. It is assumed that there is no process that increases the stock or that 
the rate of its use exceeds the rate of replenishment.  While estimating depletion premium 
for iron ore on a standard formula, the NCAER has assumed a given stock at the start 
which itself is doubtful as the estimates of reserves of iron ore in India as also globally 
have only been increasing. This makes the period of exhaustion somewhat speculative. 
The price of substitute at the time of so called complete exhaustion of the resource has 
been taken as the price of iron ore extrapolated based on the historical pattern of its 
prices. This could also be misleading since the only substitute of iron ore is steel scrap in 
the context of steel production. It may be mentioned that about 97 per cent of the scrap 
can be recycled. 
70 It could be difficult to rely on the conclusions of this study, also 
because of certain other factual and methodological drawbacks, which are discussed in 
Appendix - B.   
 
6.1.13 Our analysis so far suggests that the concerns of steel industry regarding the 
adequacy of iron ore are not serious, considering the resource position as well as demand 
forecasts developed in the previous chapters. However, Indian steel industry’s concerns 
about loss of competitiveness at market prices of iron ore may be valid to some extent, 
especially with regard to profitability of the industry.  
 
6.2  Agglomeration of Fines 
 
6.2.1 The generation of fines in India currently exceeds the domestic demand for the 
same, resulting in exportable surplus. From this perspective, it needs to examined 
whether there are adequate options to use the fines which are currently being exported 
within the country itself for further value addition.  
 
6.2.2 The relative use of iron ore fines, lumps or concentrates will depend on the 
technology in operation and the price relatives existing among fines, lumps and pellets. It 
will also depend on the regional balance in demand and supply. Although the choice of 
technology is not very sensitive to the short-term fluctuations in price relatives, it does 
depend on the long term prices of these, the cost savings from higher use of sinter, 
operational convenience, etc.   
                                           
68 Estimated from the statistics available from the International Iron and Steel Institute. 
69 Social Cost Benefit Analysis of the POSCO Steel Project in Orissa, October 2006, NCAER. 
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6.2.3 In India, the integrated steel plants in the past used more of lumps due to inadequate 
sintering capacity. Also, with the steel producers like SAIL and Tata Steel being given 
captive iron ore mines, and the costs of mining for both fines and lumps being the same, 
there was no incentive to invest in sinter plants as the lumps generated in mining has to 
be used up in any case. Further, Indian steel plants were set up when investment 
resources were scarce. The overall economics supported technology choice that reduced 
immediate capital costs. The long term economics of using the available resources was 
not on the agenda. Also, when the steel prices were regulated, it mattered little to the 
plants what the iron ore or steel would actually cost. The typical cost plus method of 
pricing left no incentive for efficiency gains and therefore the steel producers paid very 
little attention to the use of fines. Mountains of fines got accumulated and lay without 
their market value being realized. This also led to environmental hazards and increased 
maintenance costs.    
 
6.2.4 Tata Steel could control their resource position better by exporting some quantities 
of fines at times and largely by carefully balancing their facilities with necessary 
technology processes. Their sinter use percentage as a whole lies at about 65 and they 
make use of lump ores at their associated pig iron and sponge iron plants such as Tata 
Metallics Ltd.  and Tata Sponge Ltd. SAIL also does not seem to be facing any major 
imbalance at present as they frequently adjust their feed stock based on the iron ore 
supply position from their own mines. This, however, does not mean that they do not 
have accumulated fines with them. The company carries as per market intelligence over 
35 million tonnes of fines in their mines.
71 While some of these are being sold 
occasionally, they still have the tendency to build stock of fines. This is due to the fact 
that even today their sintering facilities in operation are inadequate in terms of capacity.   
 
6.2.5 Over a period of time, the plants with captive mines will have tight technology 
leverage if they are prohibited from selling their excess lump/fines in the market. As it is 
unlikely that such a grant will be given, there is a reason to look at the economics of 
captive mining and their implications on technology choice in the larger national 
perspectives.  
 
6.2.6 There is a view that the iron ore fines which are being exported today can instead be 
used for value addition to make products like pellets which are transportable and are 
globally traded. This effectively means that the iron ore mining industry may shift to 
production of pellets to the extent possible and if necessary export the same.  
 
6.2.7 There has been a gradual increase in the consumption of pellets in India as also 
globally.  Traditionally, pellets were seen to be used only in the production of DRI in 
India and the integrated plants paid no attention to them. Now, the economics of use of 
pellets along with sinter is well appreciated and even the traditional integrated plants are 
planning to add pelletisation capacity in their expansion plans. Globally, pellets are 
extensively used in the blast furnaces, especially so in the USA and Canada. In India, it 
has not been so, largely because of low cost lumps and fines available in the country 
                                           
71 The mining industry has asserted that over 60 million tonnes of fines are lying in SAIL mines.   47
which have made sintering a better alternative. As the country’s pellets capacity is being 
raised, even the DRI plants will use more pellets than they are doing now. The point to 
note here is that the Indian steel industry so far has not gone into the relatively high cost 
options and have been using the best inputs at least costs. The low Fe magnetite ores 
which require pelletisation have barely been tapped so far.  While there is no harm in it in 
the current context, the future plans should consider the high cost raw materials 
alternatives as well especially if one is so concerned about supply security.  
 
6.2.8 Currently, Essar Steel ( 8 million tonne ) and JSW ( 4 million tonnes, being raised 
to 5 million tonnes) are the only two major pellets plants in the country in the private 
sector apart from Kudremukh Ltd (KIOCL)  in the public sector    ( 3.5 million tonne ). 
Till recently, the Indian integrated steel makers were more focused on only raising the 
intensity of sinter use. As a result, the concentrates and fines remained more or less 
dumped at the mine head. 
 
6.2.9 Use of pellets elsewhere was higher by design, characteristics of resources and 
practices. This was responsible for higher investment in pelletising capacity. This is why 
the rate of growth of agglomeration capacity world wide has been much faster than in 
India.  Further, most of the countries with significant pelletising capacities were not 
endowed with high quality iron ore (especially haematite) and beneficiation and 
pelletisation were considered as necessary to utlilise to the maximum whatever resources 
were available with them. The global pellets production in 2004 was about 303 million 
tonnes which was higher by 7.1 per cent from the previous year according to UNCTAD 
estimates.
72 Estimated production of Pellet for 2006 as reported by UNCTAD is 347.7 
million ton. This amounted to more than 21 per cent of the iron ore production 
worldwide. The Americas (North and South) and the CIS nations are the largest 
producers of pellets in the world. Except for in Latin America and the Middle East, bulk 
of the pellets produced are for the Blast Furnace (BF) grade. In India both BF and DRI 
grades of pellets are produced with the bulk of them being in the DRI grade. BF grade 
pellets production in the countries/regions mentioned is also a technical necessity 
considering the poor quality of their ores with Fe content as low as 27 per cent (say for 
China). In China, capacity is rising very fast as they have strong need to make use of their 
poor quality iron ore available with them.  
 
6.2.10 In India, pelletisation came to become popular only after the HBI/DRI based 
plants were set up in the western part of the country. Initially, Kudremukh and Mandovi 
Pellets were the only two major pellets plants. Mandovi was closed down for some time 
and currently is in operation with limited capacity.  Kudremukh was also developed as an 
export oriented unit.   
 
6.2.11 On the flip side, however, pelletisation could not grow in the past as a stable 
business globally due to the inherent uncertainty over pellets prices on the world market 
vis-à-vis iron ore prices. A drop in the prices of fines lead to increased use in sinter or a 
drop in lumps prices lead to raised levels of lump use in the blast furnaces, and, in both 
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cases, it can be at the cost of pellets. Pellets are being seen as a technical requirement in 
certain processes of production and that is the reason why the prices of pellets remain 
high in a relatively non-expanding small market. It is a good business proposition in 
places where the Fe content of the ores is low. Investment potential in pellets is therefore 
restricted and is fraught with some sort of market risk. One may see from the news item 
below how and why one of the largest pellets project in Brazil has been dropped. 
   
“MMX shelves pellet plant project in Brazil 
 
Brazilian mining company MMX has given up its project to build a 7m  tonnes/  year  iron  ore 
pelletizingplant in São João da Barra city in Rio de Janeiro state, which was announced as part of the 
company’s larger Minas-Rio project to produce 26.6m t/y of iron ore from 2008.  
….. 
The project has been shelved because “a MMX client does not want pellets anymore, but pellet 
feed,” MMX’s president Rodolfo Landim as quoted to have said in a local news report. ---- 
Recently MMX secured a contract to supply an additional 6.5m t/y of pellet feed to that 
company, as reported. 
 
MMX is also going to ship some 9m t/y of iron ore fines to the Japanese trader Sojitz. Overall, 
almost all its 26.6m t/y of production is already committed on long term contracts, so there will 
be no production excess to be used to produce pellets, Landim said. 
 
As previously reported, MMX’s project involves mining iron ore in Minas Gerais state in 
southern Brazil, and transporting it via a new slurry pipeline to the coast of Rio de Janeiro state, 
where a new shiploading terminal capable of handling Capesize vessels is to be developed. 
 
Works are expected to start by the beginning of the last quarter this year, with total investments 
estimated in R$2.3bn. Mining group Anglo American has a 49per cent stake in the project.” 
73 
 
Although this does not mean that all investments in pellets are unattractive as much of it 
will depend on the price of pellets, the experiences of the type mentioned above leave a 
lot to uncertainty.  
 
6.2.12 Recently, in the tight iron ore market, pellets demand shot up sharply and prices 
rose to extraordinary levels of about $130 per tonne on fob basis compared to the fines 
prices of about $50 per tonne on fob basis.  This premium has fallen subsequently to 
some extent as pellets prices have weakened.  Interestingly, despite this high premium, 
the pellets capacity has not been growing significantly enough as most of the experts 
expect this premium to evaporate as availability of iron ore improves in the world market. 
It is generally held that pellets business is good with self mined ores and not for those 
who have to buy the ores from others. This is one of the reasons why sintering has been 
preferred over pelletisation in China as the country imports most of its iron ore.  
 
6.2.13 The other option is to export the iron ore fines in the form of higher value added 
products such as pig iron, sponge iron (HBI or DRI) or even steel, where specific market 
issues will come into the picture. It is not necessary that value added products can be 
automatically sold in the world market with identical profits. Unless there are clear and 
profitable opportunities for value addition, it may not make sense for the mining industry 
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to venture into such value addition. In general, such issues may be best left to the market, 
instead of pushing them through administrative or regulatory fiats.    
 
6.3  Export of Steel 
 
6.3.1 The steel industry has contended that the country should export value-added 
products like steel rather than exporting minerals. While it may be relatively possible to 
forecast steel demand in India (as also in most other economies) due to their strong 
correlation with the macro-variables like the GDP, industrial production, investment etc.,   
it is not so when it comes to forecasting export of steel.  
 
6.3.2 Steel exports growth has been reasonable till now, rising from about 0.3 million 
tonnes in the early 1990s to over 5 million tonnes a year now (as in the last three years). 
The sustainability of such growth in future will depend critically on the emerging 
competitive strength of the industry in the country and the actual capacity growth that 
takes place to be able to maintain a competitive surplus production over domestic 
demand. Competitive strength will have to be seen in terms of own costs as also the 
prevailing international prices in an industry well known for volatility in prices and raw 
materials costs.  
 
6.3.3 Based on the emerging trends, it has been estimated that the global steel demand 
will rise to about 1700-1800 million tonnes in crude equivalent by 2020.
74 The 
production in 2006 was 1225 million tonnes and it is believed that the capacity 
worldwide is in the range of 1500 million tonnes.
75 If one goes by the progress made 
elsewhere such as in China, Middle East, Latin America and the CIS in setting up steel 
capacities, the Indian steel industry faces a challenging task here. As against the slow 
pace of execution of the Indian enterprises, investments in China for fresh capacity 
continue extensively. This brings in the fear that the Indian steel makers may have to take 
the curse of late entry in a business that remains strongly volatile and unpredictable with 
periodic downturns encountered so often. While at one level, it has been seen that with 
the ongoing consolidation in the industry through increased mergers and acquisitions, the 
steel prices will see some degree of stability, the fear of oversupply cannot be ruled out 
altogether. Despite the competitive advantage expected from captive mining, the merit of 
investment in large capacity plants and that too with so many of them coming in such a 
volatile global market has its own market risk.   
 
6.3.4  It may also be worthwhile to take note of the observations made by certain industry 
segments within and outside the steel industry that much of the exports today especially 
of HR coils have been undertaken to see that there is no domestic glut and in the process 
to maintain a high price of them here.
76 The import price parity in the domestic market 
can be maintained only when there is no oversupply of the product in the market. To the 
                                           
74 Based on several widely varying estimates of institutional and individual studies. 
75 Annual Statistics and other publications : International Iron and Steel Institute, Brussels and World Steel 
Dynamics, New Jersy. 
76 This point has very often being raised by the Cold Rolled Steel Manufacturers’ Association.    50




6.3.5   Further, the full impact of Chinese entry into the global export market has not yet 
been felt on the Indian market. It is mainly because the Chinese producers have focused 
more on the markets in the neighbouring South East Asia, US and the EU. However, with 
the US and EU expressing strong concerns over the rising imports from China, Chinese 
producers may become more attentive to the Indian market in future. This may 
completely change the balance in Indian external trade in steel.
78 
 
6.3.6   Thus, exports of steel out of India are unlikely to move into a substantially higher 
trajectory than at present. The implication of this for the iron ore policy is that it is 
difficult to have a strategy based on encouraging exports of steel to leverage India’s iron 








                                           
77 In fact, the export growth has slowed down and India is expected to turn into a net importer of steel in 
2007-08. 
78 Imports of steel from China have increased sharply in 2007-08 and the steel industry has expressed its 
concern through representations to the government. Based on newspaper reports and the data available on 




7.  Policy Issues 
 
7.1  Export 
 
7.1.1 The most important policy issue today in the context of iron ore is whether there 
should be a move towards conservation of these resources for the maximum use of the 
domestic industry as against letting the same go out of the country to feed foreign steel 
mills whose growth can only be at the cost of potential growth of the industry here in the 
country. That is, if it is possible or desirable to have any quantitative restrictions on the 
exports of iron ore. Alternatively, if it is also possible to have a system of fiscal 
disincentive to be brought in to have the same desired effect.  
 
7.1.2 Iron ore exports are not totally free. The specific provisions of the export policy are 
as under:  
 
•  Free export of iron ore from Goa and Redi sector to all destinations by the iron 
ore producers; irrespective of the iron content. 
•  KIOCL is the canalizing agency for its own products (iron ore concentrates and 
iron ore pellets) since it is a 100 per cent E.O.U. (export oriented unit). 
•  The export of iron ore with Fe content 64 per cent and above is canalized through 
MMTC. 
•  There are quantitative restrictions on certain types of high-grade iron ore (Fe 
content above 64 per cent) from specific areas like Bailadila in Chattisgarh to 
meet the domestic demand on priority.  
•  Present quantitative ceiling of iron ore fixed by the Govt. are as under :- 
 
   AREA ANNUAL  QUANTITY  (in 
Million Tonnes) 
a)  Bailadila Lumps  Not Exceeding 3.00 MT 
b)  Bailadila Fines  Not Exceeding 3.80 MT 
c)  High Grade Lumps (Bellary-Hospet 
Sector) 
No limit 




•  An Export Tax of Rs. 300 per tonne has been introduced in the Union Budget 
2007-08. Later on, however, the export tax was reduced to Rs 50 per tonne for 
fines with Fe content below 62 per cent. 
 
7.1.3 While there have been certain regulations on export of iron ore as mentioned above, 
the latest editions of the Minerals Policy documents in respect of iron ore do not take a   52
conservationist stance.
79  The rationale for quantitative restrictions on certain grades of 
iron ore exports was stated to be “that export of such material should take place only to 
the extent of exportable surplus, retaining thereby quantity required for domestic 
industry”.
80  This, in fact, is not really a conservationist position. It is merely an advocacy 
to accord priority to domestic users in the case of certain not ‘so abundantly available’ 
high grade ores.
81 It is worth noting that the same plan document goes to state, “In 
principle, for betterment of country’s mining industry as well as conservation point of 
view, there should be no restriction on the export of iron ore since it is a widely occurring 
commodity and there is plenty of competition internationally.”
82 
 
7.1.4 From the point of view of conservation, it is important to have a clear view on the 
sufficiency issues. Our analysis shows that even at the current levels of resources and the 
steel industry capacity growth based on the assumption that the entire domestic demand 
growth will be met from production within the country, there seems to be no major threat 
of India’s iron ore resources getting totally depleted in another sixty to seventy years. Our 
findings do not support the contentions of the steel industry that iron ore is available to 
the industry only for a couple of decades. Therefore, if there is no immediate threat at 
least to the plants which have been planned now (over 200 million tonnes of annual 
capacity), there is no need to panic and take a protectionist view on this matter. It is also 
important to take note of the fact that iron ore exports cannot be maintained at higher 
levels from now even if one wishes to do so, considering the changing dynamics of the 
global iron ore market, especially as the global market moves towards long term contract 
sales, more and more steel scrap is recycled and there is a gradual tapering of the growth 
of steel consumption. If market forces are allowed to work efficiently within India, higher 
internal demand and better prices will correspondingly lower attractiveness of exports.  
 
7.1.5 It is important to examine the reserves position carefully before taking view on 
sufficiency of iron ore. Further, it may also be noted that the distinction brought between 
reserves and other resources is also dependent on specific policy at a given point of time 
and one can hope that a lot will change in future along with technological progress in 
mining. It is not, therefore, recommended that a static view is taken on a subject, which 
has to be necessarily seen in a dynamic framework. Increased exploratory efforts will, in 
the first place, raise the position of total resources from the current level of about 25 
billion tonnes. The same will also work to shift large chunks from resources to reserves 
category. Although greater exploration and investment on such activities may make more 
resources available for the steel industry, there are still questions whether it will be 
possible to convert the entire resources into reserves due to environmental and social 
constraints. Much of the resources/reserves are lying in thick forest areas with some of 
them in declared ecologically sensitive areas. However, a solution to this problem needs 
                                           
79 Although conservation of minerals in general has been stated as a part of the objectives in the 2020 
vision document of the Ministry of Mines, the position in respect of iron ore has been considered 
differently in the policy as iron ore has been under the category of abundantly available mineral.  
80 The Report of the Working Group on Minerals Exploration and Development for 10
th Five Year Plan, 
Planning Commission, 2001. 
81 Iron ore, otherwise, is classified as an abundantly available mineral. 
82 Ibid. p.85   53
to be explored in terms of improvement in methods of mining from an environmental 
point of view, rather than formulating policies based on an assumption that such issues 
will permanently block development of certain portion of resources. (Incidentally, despite 
being highly ecologically fragile and environmentally sensitive, SAIL has been granted 
lease in Rowghat area. This proves that there are technologies and methods of mining 
available where the impact on environment and ecology can be minimized.)   
 
7.1.6 As noted earlier, the global iron ore resource base is estimated at about 386 billion 
tones (as per US geological survey report 2007, estimated deposit of iron ore is more than 
800 Billion tonnes).  If one assumes the global steel production growth rate to be 
sustained at the current rate of about 5 per cent annually till 2010, 4 per cent till 2020, 3 
per cent till 2030and at 1.5 per cent thereafter, and assume further that 29 per cent of the 
total Fe (iron) to have come from scrap, the cumulative consumption of iron ore till 2080 
will be as shown below. The production growth for merchant pig iron production has 
been assumed at 1.5 per cent annually.  
 
Table 20 : Global Iron Ore Consumption Forecast (Billion tonnes) 
 











7.1.7 Thus, at the current rate, the current resources should last beyond 2080.   With new 
finds from more intensive exploration, the resource position would improve even further, 
lengthening the life of the iron ore resources. 
 
7.1.8 While talking about possible shortages of iron ore, one will have to see if it is only 
in the domestic national resources or there is a global context to it. As one can see from 
the estimates above, there seems to be no immediate fear of iron ore getting exhausted 
very soon to cripple the investments made in the steel industry at a global level. This 
factor should give a comfort to the steel industry, considering the strengthening of the 
forces of globalization and the greater integration of the national markets into the global 
market. Several major steel producing nations in the world, such as Japan, Korea, China 
and Taiwan, are almost completely dependent on imported iron ore. It may be noted that 
dependence on imported iron ore has not deterred the development of steel industry in 
these nations. Japan is fully dependent on imported ores i.e coal and iron ore.      
 
7.1.9 Analysis of the resource position at the national as well as global level suggests that 
iron ore availability is not likely to be a constraining factor for the growth of steel   54
industry for several decades to come. Therefore, there is not enough justification for 
obstructing the market mechanism by imposing restrictions on trade of iron ore. As has 
been the experience of India and several other countries in various sectors, restrictions on 
trade can result in loss of efficiency, and can have potentially adverse effect on capital 
formation and investment into mining technology and exploration. Trade restrictions are 
also known to distort market mechanism, resulting in rent-seeking by certain segments of 
the value chain at the cost of the other segments. In this particular case, distortions can 
affect the economics of steel industry’s downstream segments as also the mining 
segment. 
 
7.1.10 While our analysis so far pertained mostly to the national level resource position 
of iron ore, the steel industry has also pointed to the emerging imbalance between 
reserves, production and exports of iron ore from different regions or states of India. For 
example, it has been pointed out, citing the basic statistics of the Indian Bureau of Mines, 
that Karnataka will see a depletion of its resources faster than the other states and the 
steel plants there will face a severe iron ore crunch. (Incidentally, there is no clarity yet 
on when the development of steel plants in this region would actually materialize since 
implementation of projects has been tardy on account of various local issues.) This is 
being argued with the fact that the reserves of haematite ores in the state are only 1148 
million tones; and with the iron ore production at 41 million tonnes annually, the state 
records a mining rate of 3.57 per cent, standing next only to Goa. Although the industry 
statistics of production do not tally with the IBM numbers, even considering the lower 
IBM figure of 33.7 million tonnes of annual production, the mining rate at 2.93 retains 
the same relative position for Karnataka among the states. 
83  Export ratio for the state is 
also among the highest in the country. The steel industry, in particular the plants in 
Karnataka, have argued that while the state accounts for 10 per cent of the total reserves 
of haematite ores and 21.8 per cent of the country’s production, makes up for nearly 36 
per cent of the total exports from the country. Therefore, the industry shows concern over 
future iron ore security for the plants in the regions in particular.  The concern is based on 
the projection of 34.5 million tonnes of iron and steel capacity in the state by 2015 
 
7.1.11 The mining industry, however, contends that the reserves position in Karnataka 
could be higher as the estimation of reserves are based on only 40 meters depth, whereas 
mining is possible up to 200 meters.  It further says that with appropriate mining 
technology, the State can use up its huge magnetite resources paying full respect to the 
environmental concerns as well. In fact, the issue of exportability of the ores from 
Karnataka has been seen quite differently by the Working Group on Minerals. The group 
has expressed concern over poor infrastructure, especially shortage of power and water 
leading to insufficient domestic consumption locally. 
84  While it may be possible to raise 
the power supply to the region through adequate investment, but, without sufficient 
water, development of the steel projects will be a challenging task. This is specifically the 
case with the Bellary Hospet area which accounts for the bulk of the iron ore of 
Karnataka.  
                                           
83 The steel industry production figure for iron ore in Karnataka seems to have taken into account the illegal 
mining as well.  
84 Report of the Working Group on Minerals for 11
th Five Year Plan, 2007.   55
7.1.12 while the regional demand-supply situation can be sometimes significantly 
different from the national level situation, formulation of the national trade policy on the 
basis of such regional issues has severe limitations. The regional concerns are better 
tackled through policies other than those of international trade.  
 
7.1.13 In fact, one natural way of tackling regional demand-supply imbalances could be 
inter-regional trade and movement. For example, iron ore can be shipped from the West 
coast to the East coast, if economic considerations demand. This option of tackling 
regional imbalances should not be lost sight of, especially when inter-country trade of 
iron ore is already happening over large distances through the sea route.  
 
7.2  On-Homegeneity of Iron Ore and Supply and Demand Mismatch 
 
7.2.1 Iron ore comes in the form of lumps and fines – distinguished by their size. This 
heterogeneity needs to be considered explicitly in any policy debates. Relative shares of 
lumps and fines in production depend on the type of deposit as also on the technology 
engaged in mining. The miner at the mine head itself needs to further crush or calibrate to 
bring the final products to a desired mix. As discussed earlier, for years, the experience in 
India has been that lumps have been in greater demand with fines being in a situation of 
excess supply. It came to the point that huge deposits (mountains of it, some say) of fines 
came up, with some of them being exported at the prevailing throwaway prices.
85  The 
global prices were so low that iron ore exports were never so attractive. This was not a 
case only with India but with other iron ore producing nations as well. Investments were 
low globally and mining companies were going bankrupt which in turn facilitated 
consolidation in the industry. The companies like CVRD, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton etc., 
the merged entities, could not have operated in single nation economies. While there was 
supply side restructuring and consolidation on a global basis, the demand for iron ore 
shot up with China raising steel output at breakneck speed driven by the country’s 
surging demand for steel. The creation of a global market and the rise in demand for iron 
ore from China created the unprecedented opportunities for Indian iron ore mining 
companies. 
  
7.2.2 However, if one looks at the projections of demand for iron ore in terms of fines 
and lumps, (Tables 15, 16, 17 and 20) the relative situation is likely to reverse in future 
and will leave compulsions to export lumps and import fines if the current ratio of fines 
to lumps are maintained in total production. For example, in Model-3 of Table-17, if 178 
million tonnes of iron ore is to be produced, total lumps generation will be 71.2 million 
tonnes whereas the demand for it will be a little over 53 million tonnes. In the case of 
fines, whereas 125 million tonnes will be the demand, production will be 107 million 
tonnes. It may be noted that fines to lumps ratio has been increasing on an average of one 
                                           
85 The mining industry maintains that about 60 million tonnes of fines and concentrates are lying unused in 
the mines of SAIL alone. While the figure could be an exaggerated one, there is no dispute that huge 
deposits are present there. Fines are also lying at TISCO mines, claim some industry sources which till 
recently was selling the surplus production in market. It has been reported by a sponge iron unit in the 
organized sector that they were selling waste iron ore fines with about 62% iron content at about US$6 
per tonne in the late nineties, whereas the product fetched a price of about $135 per tonne recently.    56
percent each year. Further, as we go deep in mining there is more generation of fines. 
One possible implication of this trend will be crushing of high value lumps into fines to 
trade in both fines and lumps in both directions. Alternatively, if the demand for fines is 
to be met exactly from domestic sources, the total iron ore production will have to be 
raised to at least 208 million tonnes and the production of lumps in that case will be 83 
million tones, leading to a minimum level of export of 30 million tonnes. This is only a 
hypothetical issue as in a market economy with both State and private players in the 
market, it will be impossible to manage supply volume exactly equal to the domestic 
demand. Further, there are already certain long term contractual export commitments as 
also the fact that exports from Goa/Redi region are not bound by usual quality based 
restrictions. Given the geographical location of mines and the regional balance in demand 
and supply of iron ore, it may not be possible to adjust these 30 million tonnes from 
Goa/Redi or the committed export quantities may have to be produced additionally. This 
suggests that the actual export compulsions will remain larger than this figure.      
 
7.2.3 Under the above scenario, the requirement of export of iron ore will have to be 
raised or maintained out of pure market compulsions. Any options to avoid such an 
outcome have other pitfalls. For instance, a change in technology favouring higher use of 
lumps will raise the costs of production of steel. Alternatively, if the lumps are crushed to 
meet the shortage of fines, it will deprive the steel or the iron ore industry a premium that 
the lumps command on the world market over fines. 
 
7.2.4 Over 84 per cent of the iron ore that is being exported today are fines. Thus, exports 
are not depriving the local industry of its inputs or leading to higher prices in the home 
market by creating artificial shortages. Exports have taken place to seize the emerging 
global opportunities in the recent past and to get rid of the residual surplus that has no 
domestic takers. Our demand projections suggest that the country may need to export 
lumps in future due to lack of adequate domestic demand. Thus, any export restrictions 
based on the perceived scarcity of either fines or lumps actually create further distortions 
in the other segment that is under the condition of excess supply. This factor again 
underscores the potential loss of efficiency that trade distortions can cause.    
 
7.3  Trade, Competition and Efficiency Issues 
 
7.3.1 It will be necessary to examine the implications of a forced reduction in exports of 
iron ore on the rest of the economy especially the balance of payment, trade balance with 
China, employment, investments already made in mining as also on developing 
infrastructure to support iron ore mining exports etc. 
 
7.3.2 India’s iron ore exports were valued at US$3860.3 million in 2005. This constituted 
3.76 per cent of the total value of exports from India that year. In terms of relative 
ranking, iron ore was among the top ten exporting items. Bulk of the iron ore was 
exported to China and exports to that country made for 86.4 per cent of the total value of 
the iron ore exported. Iron ore exports accounted for 49.6 per cent of the total export 
value to China. 
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7.3.3. India’s iron ore prospects remain mainly with China. While China has started tying 
up a lot more supply through long term deals and through investment in mining projects, 
they have continued to import India’s iron ore, which could be on account of a few 
strategic reasons. One, this will give them a bargaining strength for their contract 
purchases. Two, lower freight costs from India provide them with another advantage. 
However, as we noted in a previous chapter, China’s demand for Indian iron ore is 
unlikely to be sustained at the current level for a long time due to increased supply from 
Australia and Brazil.        
 
7.3.4 A phased reduction of iron ore, by administrative fiats or otherwise, may not have 
any major implication on the overall balance of payment position of the country. 
However, the implications may be significant in the trade balance between India and 
China. China ran a trade surplus of over $4 billion in 2005 and if exports of iron ore is 
restricted this will increase further to raise complicated bilateral issues.  
 
7.3.5 The steel industry has argued that while China imports cheap iron ore from India, it 
floods the Indian market with steel that is produced from that. This argument is, however, 
not supported by facts. Firstly, China’s imports of iron ore are not at a cheap price. In 
fact, the quantum of Chinese demand has pushed up iron ore prices quite dramatically. 
China’s own iron ore cost is high too because of high costs of mining and beneficiations 
due to poor quality of their ores. Secondly, concerns about Chinese steel flooding Indian 
market are not evident in data yet. India’s exports to China in terms of value stood higher 
than what was imported from the country. A scenario where Chinese steel plants can 
actually buy iron ore and export back steel despite freight cost and duty protection to 
steel industry, would indicate a large degree of inefficiency in real terms associated with 
the Indian steel industry, which is not the case.  
 
7.3.6 At a macro level, trade restriction leads to inefficiency in resource allocation. An 
artificial trade barrier may lead to price distortion and subsidization of an inefficient 
industry at the cost of an efficient one competing for the same factor resources like raw 
materials, capital or land. In fact, the near stagnation of the steel industry in India in the 
past and complete absence of competitive strength at global level  were observed at a 
time when prices were regulated and raw materials were provided to the industry on 
captive basis having no regard to their economic or financial costs. The iron ore 
utilization efficiency in the traditional plants of SAIL has been very low as can be seen 
from the figures worked out from their annual reports itself - 1.8 tonne, 1.71 tonne and 
1.82 tonne of iron ore per tonne of crude steel produced in the years 2004, 2005 and 
2006. These figures are much higher not merely in global comparison but also when 
some of the efficient domestic private mills are considered. This points to the existence of 
very high degree of inefficiency in resource utilization.
86  The statistics mainly reflect the 
inefficiency brought in by the complacence generated by captive mines. The situation 
was no different for Tata Steel. It is only when the steel prices were deregulated and the 
new efficient players came in  buying iron ore resources at market prices  that the 
competitive face of the Indian steel production came to be noticed. Absence of an open 
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market did not allow for the discovery of the efficient prices for investment to be drawn 
into iron ore mining.  In fact, today, the steel industry paid the most for this through 
higher prices and resultant current shortages holding down its own growth.  
 
7.3.7 Further, the government’s preference for allocation of mines on captive basis, the 
number of steel producers of significant size dependent on the merchant iron ore market 
will remain relatively small. This will not only restrict growth opportunities to the 
merchant iron ore miners, as discussed earlier, but also bring hurdles before them in their 
efforts to reach economies of scale and upgrade technology for more efficient production 
and resource utilization. Such conditions will make merchant iron ore mining industry 
unattractive for new investment.  
 
7.4  Agglomeration and Incentives 
 
7.4.1 In order to take care of the imbalance in fines market at present, there is a 
suggestion that the government should provide incentives for agglomeration. It is 
suggested that pellets can be produced at the mine head and transported to the customers.  
This will also be an environmentally better option. 
 
7.4.2  The issue of economics of pellets projects has already been discussed in an earlier 
chapter. If merchant pellet plants are to be set up, their iron ore sourcing will have to be 
from non-captive sources.  If one owns a mine, the entrepreneur will have security over 
supply of iron ore and will also enjoy cost stability.  However, buying iron ore fines from 
the market and making pellets for merchant sales is a risky business. One is also not sure 
whether there will be enough takers in the DRI sector considering the costs of conversion 
of about Rs.800-900 per tonne from concentrates to pellets.  As far as the integrated 
plants with blast furnaces are concerned, agglomeration is economically a more attractive 
proposition and whether there is any incentive or not they will make use of fines to the 
maximum extent as long as they are merchant buyers of iron ore in any form.  The 
smaller merchant miners will also find it hard to have the economies of scale required for 
a pellets plant if they have to merely utilize the fines generated in the process.    
 
7.4.3 To encourage mine owners to set up pellets plant, the government may help them 
with various incentives like higher level of depreciation on plants and equipment, income 
tax benefits, reduced or zero royalty rate etc. However, the issues related to export of iron 
ore may not change much by converting iron ore into pellets. If merchant pellet plants are 
still restricted from exporting (pellets), investment could remain thin despite the 
incentives.  On the other hand, if iron ore exports are restricted or banned and the same is 
not applied on pellets (considering it as a value added product), there may be a natural 
movement to pellets production and exports up to the point the world market absorbs. 
But, incentives may be necessary for merchant miners to ensure economic viability of 
such projects, considering the uncertainty of the world market and conversion costs. For 
steel mills with captive mines, the decision should be left to them whether they set up a 
pellets plant or not. There may not be any need for any incentive for captive mine owners 
for pellets or sinter plants. 
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7.5  National Mineral Policy  
 
7.5.1 National Mineral Policy (NMP) of 1993 was introduced with an aim of extending 
the operational field of private and foreign players and also to enhance technology in 
order to promote rapid growth in this sector. It has been now over a decade since this new 
policy has been in practice, but as a matter of fact, neither the growth nor the private-
foreign participation in this sector has been satisfactory till now.  
 
7.5.2 The current policy regime has been critically and extensively discussed in various 
forums. The issues, more specifically those related to the regulatory framework in the 
sector, have large acceptance and a general consensus is building on the need to bring in 
the necessary changes. Instead of going afresh into all these matters, the best reference 
point for any discussion would be the observations made by the recently constituted Hoda 
Committee on mineral policy. It is relevant to bring out some of the major 
recommendations and have a critical view on those especially in the context of ownership 
and leasing relationship of mines and domestic use and export of iron ore.  
 
7.5.3 On the issues related to exploration, the Committee was strongly critical of the 
existing provisions in the policy and has blamed the regulatory framework for bulk of the 
problems in the sector. The committee found that the NMP did not provide adequate 
security of tenure to the Reconnaissance License (RL) and Prospecting License (PL) 
holders at each stage of the progress.  Though it acknowledges that the holder of a PL has 
a preferential right to obtain a Mining License (ML) over any other party, but it does not 
provide them with the actual right of obtaining an ML. The existing mineral policy and 
the law accommodates  state organizations to undertake mining and provide them with 
preferential treatment in  prospecting and mining which eventually brings down private 
investors’ confidence level. This, in fact, raises a significant competition policy issue in 
respect of unfair use of the authority of the state. MCR gives the state government the 
right to pre-empt a miner’s minerals at any time subject to the fair market price being 
paid to the lessee. This right can be exercised at any stage of the ongoing operation, 
regardless of miner’s marketing commitments. Provision of this kind, eventually 
increases uncertainty surrounding the project and dissuades private and foreign investors. 
Rule 27(3) of MCR allows state government to impose some obligations on the applicant 
which are unknown to them till they get the mining lease. Thus the applicant comes to 
face unexpected additional obligations, which they may not have been prepared for. To 
encourage FDI and also private investment to quickly raise iron ore mining capacity in 
the country, the government will have to provide adequate security to investment and 
continuity of tenur so that the exploratory investments are raised significantly. There are 
several other inter-related issues in the same context as discussed below. 
 
7.5.4 The Committee also found the division of power and responsibility between the 
state and the central government as confusing. The NMP states that the centre and the 
states will play their regulatory roles in their respective domains. There is a confusion 
among the investors, relating to the relative role of the state vis-à-vis the centre. There is 
no transparency in delineating respective functional areas of the state and the centre. 
NMP, MMDR or MCR - none of these rules contained there or the Acts specify   60
guidelines for allocation of mines prospected by the public agencies. This vests the state 
government with an opportunity of arbitrary practice. For both notified and non-notified 
areas, the state government regulates the process at its own discretion, without paying 
any attention to the principle of “first-come-first served”. 
  
7.5.5 There are a few other technical issues related to size and transfer restrictions. The 
size of the areas stipulated for exploration activities especially PL, RP is insufficient to 
undertake the necessary exploratory operations considering the massive initial 
investments required and the potential risks inherent in such businesses. The Rule 34, 
MCR, empowers state governments to reduce or exclude any area specified in the license. 
This again contributes to uncertainty arising out of the arbitrary powers endowed with the 
state. Also, sometimes transfer of PL and ML becomes necessary for the development of 
the mining sector. There are some companies which are totally devoted to prospecting 
and they transfer their interest involving the use of the mining leases to some mining 
companies for royalty, cash payment etc. Similarly large mining companies very often 
transfer their rights to some small mining companies (who have qualified all pre-
requirements) on sub-leasing basis unable to gain economies of scale from their own 
fixed costs and the smallness of the operation. Unfortunately, the actual process of 
transfer of PL and ML is not transparent. Hence the provision of transfer of PL in 
MMDR Act can not be utilized effectively. 
 
 7.5.6 This study fully agrees with the observations made by the Hoda Committee and 
considers that these should be the basis for further thinking and reforms in the country's 
mineral sector. The main observations are as follows.  
 
A.  Insufficient Exploration:  
 
•  Exploration efforts have not been satisfactory and up to the mark. It has been widely 
believed that the country’s mineral potential is far above what has been explored so 
far. There are both institutional failure and also technological backwardness involved 
in it. 
•  Given incompetent and obsolete technology, Geological Survey of India (GSI) is 
incapable of taking up even a preliminary (regional) exploration activity which in turn 
inhibits the whole process of development. GSI conducts regional exploration on four 
phases, namely P1, P2, E1, E2. Each of these phases involves huge cost, long 
gestation period and therefore high risk
87. Domestic and foreign investors thus don’t 
want to get involved in such high risk ventures unless there are adequate and 
appropriate incentives for them for the same. 
•  Since the work done by GSI is continued to be the main basis for investment in 
mining, the actual exploration so far, has been unpleasant. 
 
                                           
87 After spending considerable amount in different activity therein, it might well turn out that the area does 
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B.  Procedural Delay: 
 
Since the whole procedure of mining operation, right from the beginning of applying 
for reconnaissance permit to the end of getting mining lease, incorporates a series of 
unavoidable lengthy bureaucratic procedure. The whole process eventually leads to 
massive delay to commence mining operation. This acts as a major deterrent to the 
investors.  
 
C.  Lack of Supportive Infrastructure: 
 
There are also some genuine difficulties related to infrastructure, which need to be 
focused on. The sector still lacks in modern technology, proper transportation 
facilities etc. which in turn is dissuading private and foreign investment. For example, 
the possibility of many more large integrated steel plants coming up in the south 
western region is limited mainly because of inadequate of power and water. The 
states like Goa and Karnataka have failed to attract steel mills in a significant way 
due to lack of power, water and other infrastructural bottlenecks. 
 
7.5.7 As far as national mineral policy issues are concerned, the main problem in India is 
that a lot of investments are needed over a short period of time, not only to meet the 
rising domestic demand but also to tap the global opportunities in each area. With the 
kind of developments in these industries globally as also in the industries based on them, 
continuous government involvement in these businesses does not make sense. These 
industries are no longer considered critical from any strategic or national security point of 
view for which the government involvement could be necessary. Iron ore can be an 
exhaustible resource but not iron. Almost the entire quantity of iron can be recycled. 
Therefore, leaving aside the so called strategic resource conservation argument,  if private 
capital is to be encouraged and drawn  into this sector, not only that the entry barriers are 
to be removed but also necessary operational and ownership based freedom have to be 
provided to ensure safety of investment and profitability in the business.   
 
7.5.8 Insufficient exploration in mining sector also has been seen as a consequence of 
lack of investment in this sector. Since the restrictive mineral policy does not provide full 
exposure to the private and foreign players to operate and does not provide adequate 
incentives to initiate the project, the actual progress in exploration has been extremely 
low. Over reliance on government, so far has been proved expensive viewing at the 
insignificant exploration and limited public investment in mining by PSUs like GSI and 
MECL. Moreover, exploration activity involves a long gestation period and risky 
investment. In the absence of an investment-friendly atmosphere and adequate 
remuneration, no investment is going to come in this sector.  
 
7.5.9 Poor infrastructure in mining sector is an outcome of low investment. 
Infrastructural facilities are to be improved in order to draw private investment. Given 
government’s inability to provide adequate infrastructural facilities, it is necessary to 
attune mineral policy to seek investment in infrastructure through private initiatives.  
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7.5.10 National Mineral Policy is biased against large stand alone mines. Most of the 
mines are allotted to the small mining enterprises (SME). SME confines their operation 
within a small area and are completely dependent on the existing infrastructure built by 
the government agencies. Due to obvious reasons, the SMEs cannot set up their own 
infrastructure. This drawback in turn results in over utilization of existing infrastructure 
leading to higher transportation costs. It also at the same time leads to significant 
economic costs to the nation as government resources are sucked into continuous 
maintenance of the infrastructure for them. The iron ore industry in India remains highly 
fragmented with very few large players operating in it. Further, a very large chunk of the 
mines and iron ore deposits are lying as captive to the steel makers. Whereas there was 
potential in many such mines to grow to global size and technology levels, the captive 
mining has restricted such growth potential. This is, however, not to say that the captive 
mining has been worse than the highly fragmented small mines. There is also a point 
raised that since the captive mine owners do not have to haul their materials to a 
regionally dispersed wide customer base, they do not see sufficient incentive to build 
their own infrastructure on a wider scale which results in poor infrastructure development 
in and around the mines under captive allocation. This could be true although this study 
did not undertake any field survey to establish such a point. There is a need to scale up 
the mining operations and, therefore, to allot mining leases to large players with 
significant financial strength to be able to capitalize on the economies of scale as also to 
bring in modern technology and infrastructure. Mining operations in India should follow 
the Australian or Brazilian model to remain globally competitive and efficient.
88     
 
7.5.11 In the previous phase of the commodity cycle, the low world prices of most of the 
major minerals led to lowering of investor confidence keeping the sector starved of 
investment funds. Most of the major minerals, especially those related to metals like, 
coking coal, iron ore, manganese ores etc. gave very little profits to the owners. Unable to 
run the businesses, the mining companies, one after another, put themselves on the block 
which led to huge consolidation in the mining industry globally through mergers and 
acquisitions. The process of consolidation of the mining industry globally was backed 
strongly by the favourable conditions in the world market following Chinese economic 
and metals boom which helped longer term stabilization of the metal and minerals prices 
globally. So strong was the recovery that within a few years the related industries came to 
be seen as good prospects for further investment. In India too, much of the growth has 
been achieved in response to this change in the global market. Production improved 
initially from the existing capacities and then from the incremental capacities added with 
minimal investments in the existing mines itself. However, large scale projects are yet to 
take shape. Major problems here are the policy based restrictions. 
  
7.5.12 The motivation of the government in relation to mining sector is to achieve a 
sustained development through proper utilization of mineral resources to enable social 
wealth augmentation and employment generation. These objectives are achievable only 
when there is sufficient investment coming into this sector. Mining was a less profitable 
business in India, barring a few areas like iron ore recently, due to a number of factors. 
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These include high transportation cost, lack of infrastructural facility and modern 
technology, and the over all huge costs incurred in exploration and prospecting operation. 
In this light, mining industry has contended that it is essential to provide some fiscal 
incentives to the investors in the form of creating favourable conditions in respect of dead 
rent, reduction of income tax liability by allowing for higher level of depreciation of 
plants and equipment, allowing the costs of reforestation and other restoration costs of the 
mining areas after mining is over to be adjusted as current costs on a proportionate basis, 
etc.  This will make the business of mining economically attractive and help integrate this 
sector with the global economy with improved competitive strength.  
 
7.5.13 There have been certain questions over the prevailing system of royalty in the 
country. The current royalty rates on most minerals especially iron ore in India are low, 
in comparison to other mineral rich countries. Canada, Chile, South Africa do not levy 
any royalty. China charges 2.5 per cent to 5 per cent on ad-valorem basis. The royalty 
rate in India varies in the range of Rs.4 to Rs.27 per tonne. These rates are abysmally low 
considering the price of iron ore either in domestic merchant sales or for exports.  The 
rates can be increased to about 5 -10 per cent ad valorem of the selling price. The selling 
price may be defined as the value of the first transaction in the case of domestic merchant 
sales, fob export value for exports and a constructed price based on the average of the 
two for captively mined iron ore. In the case of captive mines of the steel makers, since 
there are not merchant sales involved, a constructed value based on the market price of 
iron ore, based on the prices announced by a public sector company and the export price, 
can be taken as a reference. The merits of an ad-valorem royalty rate notwithstanding in 
terms stability and transparency to the system, with so many different prices, the deciding 
on the reference price will be an administrative nightmare. This may also bring in 
unnecessary governmental interventions leading to obvious negative outcomes. The 
government will have to make effort to build a stable and a transparent system. 
 
7.5.14 Another big constraint to growth in the Indian mineral sector is the long time it 
takes for procedural clearances due both to inefficiency at the administrative levels and 
the nature of the procedures itself. The procedures emanate from the policy framework 
and also a mind set. The government has already seen those to be restrictive and obsolete. 
It consumes a considerable length of time out of a stipulated time period to commence 
mining operations. Delays bring in uncertainty into the business and raise intensity of the 
risk element to hold investment interests down. This whole cumbersome process of 
attaining mining lease needs to be streamlined to create an investment friendly 
atmosphere. The forthcoming changes in the Mineral Policy are expected to address 
many of these issues.  
    
7.5.15 With a few exceptions namely, iron ore, manganese etc. the domestic demand for 
minerals is not so high. This domestic demand is incapable of grabbing the whole 
domestic production. The major driving force for such minerals comes from export. 
Again, the technology usually used by the domestic firms is not good enough to explore 
and work on joint ores that is found in different forms. Export, therefore, is the unique 
solution to deal with these problems.  
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7.5.16 Significant low skill employment that the mining industry generates is also 
important from a larger policy perspective in the context of the massive socio-economic 
backwardness in the states (or regions) where mineral deposits are high. Even from this 
perspective that growth of investment in mining sector and the associated infrastructure 
should be encouraged. Trade restrictions on mining are at variance to these socio-
economic interests.   
  
7.6  Captive Mining 
 
7.6.1 This subject has been discussed in other contexts above.  The whole issue of 
prioritizing allocation of iron ore mines to steel makers is to be seen not only in the 
context of profitability of and benefits to the steel industry but in the larger perspective of 
the overall efficiency gains for the economy at large, especially looking at comparatively 
with the option of running the business of mining independently with vertical linkages 
with an independent steel industry.  
 
7.6.2 In India, the steel industry development, for a long time remained associated with 
captive mining. Tata Steel, the erstwhile Indian Iron and Steel Company and SAIL- all of 
them were provided with required mining licenses in designated mines. This all 
integrated operation served certain purpose when there were no other independent mining 
interests and steel prices were controlled by the government on cost basis. While captive 
mining was not seen as a very significant profitable proposition when the iron ore prices 
worldwide were low, today, with the same going over the roof, the steel industry 
perceives significant competitive advantage in owning iron ore mines themselves over 
those who are dependent on purchased ores. 
 
7.6.3 The steel producers, especially Tata Steel and SAIL, argued citing the 
recommendations of the Dang Committee, set up by Ministry of Steel in 2005 for 
framing guidelines on preferential allocation of leases for iron ore mines that iron ore 
mines should be allotted on captive basis to the steel makers for following reasons: 
 
•  Iron ore is a limited resource and hence should be restricted to captive use only. 
•  Steel mills do not enjoy any comparative advantage in the market because of high 
freight, high cost of coking coal and energy, poor infrastructure; hence for the 
sake of viability steel makers should get benefit at the extraction cost of iron ore. 
•  The “value addition” generated by steel company to the economy is enormous and 
outweigh the ‘cost favor’ that steel makers enjoy when allowed to have captive 
mines.  
•  The countries, other than India, which are rich in iron ore, do not pursue captive 
mining policy because per capita availability of iron ore is very high in these 
countries.
89 
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•  Tata Steel, SAIL use modern technology in mining operation and therefore are 
efficient. 
•  Currently, several large integrated plants are heavily dependent on NMDC for 
iron ore supplies. Once these plants expand their capacities as per their ongoing 
programmes, given the limited resources, NMDC may not be able to meet their 
growing demands. This will put them in at the mercy of the merchant iron market. 
•  Stand alone mine owners serve requirement of various steel producers like 
Sponge, Mini Blast furnance, Sinter and Pellet plants. As different plants need 
different type of feed, stand alone miner supply their requirement as well utilize 
the resource optimally. For example one large scale commercial mining company 
(NMDC) has resulted in large investment in steel sector in various locations in 
India by players such as Hygrade Pellet, ESSAR Steel, JSW, Ispat Industries, 
RINL and Vikram Ispat.  
 
7.6.4 Iron ore producers were opposed to preferential access to captive mines for steel 
owners on the following grounds: 
 
•  There is enough iron ore available in the world and is accessible at international 
price. Again being a part of Gondwanaland, India possesses huge reserves of iron 
ore which is yet to be explored. Australia, for instance, being a part of 
Gondwanaland, has been able to increase its resource manifold owing to extensive 
exploration and excavation.  
•  With few exceptions, mainly in the US, CIS and China, which use captive mines 
partly for their operation, stand alone mining model is followed all over the 
world. 
•  Allowance of captive mines to the steel makers would have a detrimental effect 
on the overall growth of the sector. The implicit subsidy that steel makers get 
through lower price of extraction reduces the scope of the free market and 
therefore impairs competitive growth of the industry.  
•  Captive mines owners do not mine efficiently. Since the grade required for steel 
plants only matters to them, most of the time they extract that grade from easily 
extractable ore leaving the low ores to go waste. 
•  Stand alone mining owners, as opposed to captive mine owners, mine efficiently 
and can potentially undertake value addition activities like beneficiation, 
pelletisation, calibration, blending etc. they also invest in resource augmentation 
and create their own infrastructure. 
•  In captive mining there is no location specificity. Only the linkage between 
supply and unit is required. This in turn does away with the state’s requirement of 
concession. Since captive mine owners obtain ore at the extraction cost rather that 
market price, the claim of value addition is not solely justified. 
 
7.6.5 The current trends indicate that the government seems to have, in practice, already 
been giving a higher priority for captive mining. If all the steel making capacities are to 
come up in the way planned, iron ore reserves in future will be largely held by steel 
makers on captive basis. As per the MoUs signed and the steel project profiles 
announced, by 2012, out of a total national demand of 186.6 million tonnes of iron ore   66
demand, 120.7 will come from captive sources. By 2020, the corresponding numbers will 
be 380 and 267 million tonnes respectively. This means the domestic merchant iron ore 
market may not grow and the share of the merchant producers could drop significantly in 
the domestic market. The informal preference given in mining leases for captive purposes 
is also borne out by the data in Table-21  and the chart below. In fact, more recent 
information show a further tilt to captive leases or leases to iron and steel companies in 
allocation of  mining leases or in recommending for mining/prospecting leases by the 
state governments.  Since the leases are of larger size on the average, in terms of mining 
area (naturally leading to larger size of deposits), the control over iron ore resources are 
coming increasingly under the user industries.   
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7.6.6 There is a significant competition policy issue related to the captive mining. In fact, 
there are three different kinds of costs/prices the user industries are faced with  in respect 
of iron ore. First, the cost of iron ore for those who have captive mines fall in the range of 
Rs.300-600 per tonne at plant. Then the iron ore sold by the government owned 
companies to large customers on a longer term basis is about Rs. 2000-2500 per tonne on 
comparable basis. The last, iron ore sold by the merchant iron ore companies to small and 
medium companies – falling in the range of Rs. 2500-3000 per tonne.  While the latter 
category price differentiation is market driven, the captive ownership cost advantage 
comes from the discriminatory allocation of captive mines.  
 
7.6.7 Although there seems to be some sort of restrictions on merchant sales of iron ore 
from those who have been endowed with mining leases for captive purposes only, there 
are instances of merchant sales, including exports, by companies including SAIL 
(merchant sales only) and Tata Steel. Without going into the legal and regulatory aspects 
of this issue, it has serious implications on the entire policy framework that is under 
discussion currently. If a steel producer with captive mining license can actually work 
also as a merchant seller of iron ore, the entire basis on which the desirability of 
providing raw materials security lies falls apart.  
 
7.6.9 The recent policy adopted by the state governments to recommend mining leases 
only to those setting up steel plants within the states needs thorough review. The policies 
followed by the state governments may not be in congruence with the larger economic 
interests of the nation as it tends to distort the nature of competition in the market. This 
will create exclusivity of mining rights only to steel mills in a significant way. Hoda 
committee has recommended that captive mines and stand-alone mines should be allowed 
to co-exist.  
 








7.6.10  From an efficiency and competition policy perspective, preference to steel makers 
in allocation of captive mines does not have solid economic footing. It may be, therefore, 
desirable to leave this issue to the market forces. Existing untapped mines (already 
explored and prospected) should be given for mining to the highest bidder, irrespective of 





The frequently encountered argument that the country’s steel industry will run out of  
iron ore resources within a couple of decades or so does not stand vindicated on scrutiny 
of the facts. There are strong reasons to expect from international experiences that 
increased investment in the mineral sector, especially in exploration, will lead to new 
reserves and resources. Further, the country will still have a lot of haematite iron ore 
below 55 per cent or iron (Fe), not accounted for currently. These resources may be 
relatively costly but need not to be written off and ignored. At current prices of iron ore, 
these assets offer highly attractive conditions for extraction and merchant business 
involving them. At higher scarcity value, they will gain importance further in future.  
 
At present, fines are being exported because there is no domestic demand for the same. 
This structural imbalance currently experienced in the Indian iron ore market will perhaps 
go away if the steel industry plans are to be considered. But plans indicate that we may 
have a problem exactly of the opposite kind with lumps turning surplus with shortages of 
fines. Of course, this situation will emerge only if the steel projects shape up as per plans. 
At present, the progress in almost all the major greenfield projects has been insignificant.  
 
The estimates made in the study even under the most optimistic scenarios do not 
corroborate the rationality of the threat perception regarding iron ore availability. Exports 
will also be necessary to maintain a structural balance in the market between production 
and consumption of lumps and fines. Also, considering the specific problems of 
Goa/Redi region, exports from there will have to be continued. The bilateral agreements 
with countries like Japan and Korea would necessitate that such exports at the existing 
levels may be continued. Exports, thus, cannot be wished away. Exports of iron ore have 
been undertaken largely by merchant miners in the private sector. Any stoppage to 
exports could lead to closure of significant mining capacity as the volumes cannot be 
diverted to domestic use easily.  
 
Closure of mines will involve naturally expected consequences involving loss of 
economic activities including jobs. A lot of investments made by the mining industry will 
also get into a jam. Further, at reduced domestic prices, the mining industry will not be 
able to mobilize enough resources for investment into this sector. This will not only leave 
the mining capacity constrained but also outdated with modernization backlogs kept 
unattended. The move to export restrictions and encouragement to captive mining will 
also lead to several competition issues in the market. The small and medium size steel 
makers will have to pay higher prices for iron ore compared to those who will reap the   69
full benefits of low costs and supply security associated with captive mines. It needs to be 
recognized that captive mining rights are not available at market prices and freely. Also, 
any benefits from integrating mining and steel making businesses are valid only when the 
iron ore prices are high in the market. Globally, despite the huge interests of the steel 
industry to acquire iron ore or coal mines, the mining industry is getting more and more 
specialized with high degree of technological advances. They have also been able to 
effectively lower costs of mining with their investments in modernizing mining 
operations and developing infrastructure. This has provided significant economic 
efficiency to the system. If opportunities are restricted for the Indian mining companies, 
they will be deprived of the economies of scale and remain inefficient forever in global 
comparison. 
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Annexure – 1 
 
Sinter Plant/Pellet Plant Capacity 
 












BSP 6.5  6.5  6.5      8.5 
BSL 6.2  6.2  6.2      8.5 
RSP 3  3  3      4.5 
DSP 3  3  3      4.5 
IISCO 0  0  0      4 
SAIL 18.7  18.7  18.7  24  24  30 
RINL 5.2  5.2  5.2  8  8  12 
TATA  STEEL(Jamshedpur)  6.3 6.3 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
Jharkhand        4.5 
Orissa        3.5 
Chattisgarh        6.5 
JSW Steel ( Bellary)  4.2  6.5  7.5  10  10  13 
JSW Steel ( Jharkhand)            6.5 
JSW Steel ( West Bengal)            3.5 
Ispat Industries (Dolvi)  2.24  2.24  2.24  2.24  5.3  5.3 
Essar Steels (Vizag)  8  8  8  8  8  8 
Essar Steel , Orissa            4 
Essar Steel, Jharkhand            4 
Essar  Steel,  Chattisgarh        4 
Essar  Steel,Hazira      1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
JSPL    2.3 2.3 6.8 6.8 6.8 
Bhusan Steel and Strips Ltd. Orissa    1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6 
Bhusan  Steel,  Orissa      1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
NINL  1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Mesco  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
KIOCL  3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Mandovi Pellets Ltd  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8 
Chowgule and Company  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55 
Stemcore     4  4  4  4 
Mittal  Steel        
Others 1  1  2  5  5  7.5 
TOTAL  Sinter+Pellets  53.89 60.09 70.69 88.79 91.85  143.85 
TOTAL Sinter   35.84  41.24  45.54  63.64  66.7  79.2 
Total  pellets  18.05 18.85 25.15 25.15 25.15 64.65 
          
East Total  20.7  20.7  23.5      82.8 
          
South West Total   30.25          61.05   71
Annexure-2  
 
China’s Import of Iron Ore 2005 and 2006 
 
   China's 2006 
Iron Ore Imports 
By Sources 
 
                 






                 
      CY2006        CY 2005     per cent 
change 
   tons US$1,000  US$/tons  tons US$1,000  US$/tons 
 
  
Australia  126821366  7220683  56.9 112178506  6114863  54.5 13.1  per  cent 
Brazil  76421150  5510482  72.1 54743477  3874464  70.8 39.6  per  cent 
India  74752656  4832191  64.6 68575550  5233802  76.3 9.0  per  cent 
S.Africa  12558661  818602 65.2 10552910  704625 66.8 19.0  per  cent 
Peru  4681529  300300 64.1 3360048  297157 88.4 39.3  per  cent 
Kazakhastan  4411397  319032 72.3 2251757  190718 84.7 95.9  per  cent 
Canada  3873251  368474  95.1  2785131  332363  119.3  39.1 per cent 
Iran  3545270  215544 60.8 2121124  147145 69.4 67.1  per  cent 
Russia 2725335  212482  78  4282539  416245  97.2  -36.4  per 
cent 
Venezuela  2622323  194454 74.2 2524357  204027 80.8 3.9  per  cent 
Chile  2351057  173945  74  1608598  135411  84.2  46.2 per cent 
Indonesia  1987338  105458 53.1 991578 56233  56.7 100.4  per 
cent 
Ukraine  1898464  154130  81.2  1476921  152461  103.2  28.5 per cent 
N.Korea  1592277  76421  48  1290349  65675  50.9  23.4 per cent 
Vietnam  1556516  65844  42.3  1150556  46063  40  35.3 per cent 
Philippines  1178502  69445  58.9 550973 40322  73.2 113.9  per 
cent 
Myanmar  701021  8800  12.6 322807 5973  18.5 117.2  per 
cent 
Mexico  667513  49265  73.8 1569201  123030 78.4 -57.5  per 
cent 
New  Zealand 410427  13427  32.7 862590 26846  31.1 -52.4  per 
cent 
Malaysia  332311  19135  57.6 397154 26485  66.7 -16.3  per 
cent 
Mongol  317766  16615  52.3 162996 8409  51.6 95.0  per  cent 
USA  298271  25704  86.2 654215 56381  86.2 -54.4  per 
cent 
Mozambique 176233  12808  72.7 309315 22615  73.1 -43.0  per 
cent 
Thailand  170828  11250  65.9 44006  3103  70.5 288.2  per 
cent 
Saudi  Arabia 99252  7289  73.4 189300 16362  86.4 -47.6  per 
cent 
Mauritania 75674  5465 72.2  20  0  0    - 
Argentina  57692  3490  60.5   -   -   -   - 
Libya  32572  2281  70   -   -  83.3  -63.7 per 
cent 
Japan  6650  102  15.3 5456  443  81.2 21.9  per  cent 
Liberia  0   -   -  180404  13860  76.8   - 
T.& Tobago  0   -   -  51490  4154  80.7   - 
Bahrain  0   -   -  19832  3366  169.7   - 
Others  42  6  142.9 1312  258  196.6 -96.8  per 
cent 
Total 326,323,344  20,813,124  63.8  275,214,472  ########  67  18.6  per 
cent   72
Annexure-3 
Steel Capacity Planned 
(million tonnes) 
Source:   Industry 
 
   2006-07  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10  2010-11 2012 2015 2016 2017 2018 2020 
SAIL  13.9  14.6  15.5  17.7  19.7  20.7 27.1 24.1 27.1 27.1 27.1 
RINL  3.6  3.6  6.3  6.3  6.3 6.3  6.3  9 9 9 9 
TATA STEEL (Jharkhand, 
Brownfield) 
5  6.8  6.8  7.5  6.8  7.5  7.5 10 10 10 10 
Tata SteelJharkhand (Greenfield)            3  6  6  10  10  20 
Tata  Steel  Orissa            3 6 6 6 6 6 
Tata  Steel  Chattisgarh            0 6 3 5 5 5 
JSW  Steel  (Bellary)  3.8  4.2  7  7  10  10 13 13 16 16 16 
JSW  Steel  (Jharkhand)            3 10 6 10  10  10 
JSW  Steel  (West  Bengal)            0 6 6 6 6 6 
Ispat  Industries  (Dolvi)  3.6  3.6  3.6  5.6  5.6  5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 7.5 
Ispat  Industries  (Paradweep)            0 5 3 5 5 5 
Ispat  Industries  (Karnataka)            0 3 3 3 3 3 
Essar  Steels  (Hazira)  4.6  4.6  8.5  8.5  8.5  8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Essar  Steel  ,  Orissa            0 6 3 6 6 6 
Essar  Steel,  Jharkhand            3 6 6 8 6  10 
Essar  Steel,  Chattisgarh            0 3.2 0 3.2  3.2  3.2 
JSPL  2  2  2  2  2  2 2 2 2 2 5 
JSPL,Orissa    1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2 4.8  4.8  6 6 6 6 
JSPL,  Chhatisgarh          0   5  0  0  
Bhusan Steel and Strips Ltd.Orissa  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  3  1.5  1.5  6 
Bhusan  Steel,Orissa  1  1  1  1  1  1.2 1 2.5 1  1  3 
NINL  1  1  1  1  1  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lloyds  Steel  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Mittal  Steel            3 12 6 12  12  12 
Posco        3    6  12 12 12 12 12 
Small Players through EAF / IF 
route 
17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5  20 




Global Iron Ore Reserves and Fe Content Estimates 
 
 
Country Reserve  Base  Fe 
Content 





in the Iron 
ore 
per cent 
age share of 




   Million 
tonnes 
 
per cent  per cent  Million tonnes  per cent 
Ukraine 68,000  30  17.64  20,400  10.66 
Brazil 61,000  67  15.82  40,870  21.36 
Russia 56,000  55  14.53  30,800  16.10 
China 46,000  33  11.93  15,180  7.93 
Australia 40,000 63 10.38 25,200 13.17 
India 25,000  55  6.49  13,750  7.19 
Kazakhstan 19,000  39  4.93  7,410  3.87 
USA 15,000  31  3.89  4,650  2.43 
Sweden 7,800  64  2.02  4,992  2.61 
Venezuela 6,000  60  1.56  3,600  1.88 
Canada 3,900  64  1.01  2,496  1.30 
Iran 2,500  60  0.65  1,500  0.78 
South Africa  2,300  65  0.60  1,495  0.78 
Mauritania 1,500  67  0.39  1,005  0.53 
Mexico 1,500  60  0.39  900  0.47 
Others 30,000  57  7.78  17,100  8.94 
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Annexure-5 
 
Global Iron and Exports and Steel Production 
 








( Million tonnes ) 
Ratio of IO 
exports to Steel 
Production (per 
cent) 
1985  375.80  0.91    718.9  52.27 
1986  370.00  -1.54    714.0  51.82 
1987  367.80  -0.59    735.5  50.01 
1988  400.90  9.00    780.1  51.39 
1989  424.30  5.84    785.9  53.99 
1990  397.10  -6.41    770.1  51.56 
1991  398.90  0.45    736.2  54.18 
1992  334.00  -16.27    719.6  46.42 
1993  354.00  5.99    727.6  48.66 
1994  383.00  8.19    725.1  52.82 
1995  459.78  20.05    752.3  61.12 
1996  455.07  -1.02    750.0  60.67 
1997  481.48  5.80    798.9  60.26 
1998  461.90  -4.07    777.3  59.42 
1999  444.79  -3.70    789.0  56.38 
2000  505.06  13.55    847.7  59.58 
2001  501.92  -0.62    850.3  59.03 
2002  533.49  6.29    903.8  59.03 
2003  590.45  10.68    969.1  60.93 
2004 646.04 9.41  1058.5  61.03 
2005 718.95  11.29  1129.4  63.66 
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Annexure – 6 
 
Expansion Plans of NMDC 
(lakh tonnes) 
 
Project  2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
Dep-14  &  11C  75.00 80.00 85.00 85.00 90.00 
Dep-5  65.00 70.00 70.00 75.00 80.00 
Dep-10/11A  45.00 45.00 50.00 55.00 63.00 
Dep-11B  10.00 10.00 10.00 15.00 25.00 
Dep-3*  -  4.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 
Slimes    15.00 16.00 16.00 17.00 18.00 
Total - BAILADILA 
Sector  210.00 225.00 241.00 262.00 296.00 
DNM  55.00 55.00 45.00 36.00 25.00 




65.00 65.00 55.00 56.00 61.00 
Total  -  NMDC  275.00 290.00 296.00 318.00 357.00 
Project  2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
Dep-14  &  11C  90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 80.00 
De-5  80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Dep-10/11A  63.00 63.00 63.00 63.00 63.00 
Dep-11B  35.00 45.00 57.00 66.00 66.00 
Dep-3  20.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 
Dep-13*  20.00 40.00 63.00 63.00 75.00 
Dep - 4*  -  -  0.90  0.90  13.50 
Slimes    19.00 21.00 21.00 22.00 20.00 
Total - BAILADILA 
Sector  327.00 366.00 401.90 411.90 424.50 
Donimalai  16.00 - - - - 




61.00 63.00 63.00 63.00 63.00 
Total  -  NMDC  388.00 429.00 464.90 474.90 487.50 
 
* Subject to grant of Mining Lease   76
Annexure-7 
 






1/9/2006 50  -  51  66  -  68 
1/16/2006 49  -  51  65  -  67 
1/23/2006 49  -  50  66  -  67 
1/27/2006 48  -  49  65  -  66 
2/6/2006 49  -  50  65  -  66 
2/13/2006 49  -  50  66  -  67 
2/20/2006 52  -  53  68  -  69 
2/27/2006 53  -  53  68  -  69 
3/6/2006 53  -  54  69  -  70 
3/13/2006 53  -  54  70  -  71 
3/20/2006 53  -  54  70  -  71 
3/27/2006 53  -  54  71  -  72 
4/3/2006 53  -  54  71  -  72 
4/10/2006 53  -  54  71  -  72 
4/17/2006 53  -  54  70  -  71 
4/24/2006 52  -  53  69  -  70 
5/8/2006 51  -  52  67  -  68 
5/15/2006 49  -  50  65  -  66 
5/22/2006 50  -  51  66  -  67 
5/29/2006 52  -  53  67  -  68 
6/5/2006 53  -  54  68  -  69 
6/12/2006 54  -  55  69  -  70 
6/19/2006 54  -  55  70  -  71 
6/26/2006 54  -  55  71  -  72 
7/3/2006 54  -  55  71  -  72 
7/10/2006 54  -  55  71  -  72 
7/17/2006 54  -  55  71  -  72 
7/24/2006 53  -  54  69  -  70 
7/31/2006 53  -  54  69  -  71 
8/7/2006 52  -  53  68  -  70 
8/14/2006 52  -  53  68  -  70 
8/21/2006 53  -  54  69  -  70 
8/28/2006 52  -  54  69  -  71 
9/4/2006 53  -  54  71  -  72 
9/11/2006 53  -  54  71  -  72 
9/18/2006 53  -  54  72  -  73 
9/25/2006 53  -  54  71  -  72 




10/9/2006 N/A  N/A 
10/16/2006 52  -  54  71  -  73 
10/23/2006 53  -  54  72  -  73 
10/30/2006 53  -  55  72  -  73 
11/6/2006 53  -  54  72  -  73 
11/13/2006 53  -  54  72  -  73 
11/20/2006 53  -  54  72  -  73 
11/27/2006 53  -  55  72  -  74 
12/4/2006 53  -  55  73  -  75 
12/11/2006 53  -  55  73  -  75 
12/18/2006 54  -  56  74  -  76 
12/25/2006 55  -  56  75  -  76 
1/1/2007 N/A  N/A 
1/8/2007 56  -  57  76  -  77 
1/15/2007 58  -  59  78  -  79 
1/22/2007 58  -  59  79  -  80 
1/29/2007 59  -  60  80  -  81 
2/5/2007 59  -  60  81  -  82 
2/12/2007 59  -  60  81  -  82 
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Annexure- 8 
 
FOB Prices Indian Fines Ore for Fiscal 2006 
 
                                                                                                                              (per DMT) 
 
Loading Facility  Barge   Transfer  Vessel  for 
below 100,000 DWT 
No. 9 Berth  Transfer  Vessel  for 
above 100,000 DWT 
Apr-  Mar  2005  2006 2005  2006 2005  2006 2005 2006 
Fe  63/63  $25.54  $30.39 $30.36  $36.13 $30.89  $36.76 $34.08 $40.56 
Fe  62/62  $24.61  $29.29 $29.46  $35.06 $29.98  $35.68 $33.12 $39.41 
Fe  62/60    $24.39  $29.02 $29.26  $34.82 $29.81  $35.47 $32.93 $39.19 
Fe  61/61  $23.74  $28.25 $28.50  $33.92 $29.10  $34.63 $32.16 $38.27 





Fe  59/59  $21.33  $25.39 $26.03  $30.98 $26.62  $31.68 $29.65 $35.28 
 
Loading Facility  Barge   Transfer Vessel for  No. 9 Berth  Transfer Vessel for 
Apr-  Mar  2005  2006 2005 2006 2005  2006 2005 2006 
Fe  63/63  $29.84  $35.51 $34.83 $41.45 $35.38  $42.10 $38.60 $45.93 
Fe  62/62  $28.69  $34.14 $33.56 $39.94 $34.13  $40.61 $37.40 $44.51 
Fe  61/61  $27.17  $32.33 $32.02 $38.10 $32.57  $38.76 $35.62 $42.39 
Fe  60/60  $25.93  $30.86 $30.78 $36.63 $31.32  $37.27 $34.40 $40.94 
Fe  60/59  $24.59  $29.26 $29.31 $34.88 $29.84  $35.51 $33.07 $39.35 





Fe  58/57  $22.60  $26.89 $27.35 $32.55 $27.94  $33.25 $30.94 $36.82 
Note: With fines tolerance above 20per cent and max 25per cent below 10mm & 20per cent max below 6mm. 
Source: Iron Ore Manual 2006, Tex Report   79
Annexure- 9 
 
Iron Ore Production and Consumption for Tata Steel 
 
 
Crude Steel (in '000 tonnes)  4104 4731 
Steel Saleable ( in 000 tonnes)  4074 4551 
Iron ore Consumed ( in tonnes)  5986753 8486755 




Balance Iron ore   3816247  2347245 
 
Sponge Iron produced by 
Tata Sponge Iron  223686  205552 
Tata Metaliks Limited  163000  315000 
 
Iron Ore Consumed 
Tata Sponge Iron  345137  320415 
Tata Metaliks Limited  260800  504000 
Total Iron ore Consumed  605937  824415 
Remaining iron ore  ( After non captive 
sale and captive transfer) 
3210310 1522830 
per cent of the total production  32.75  14.06 
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Appendix-A 
 
LEVIES AND TAXES ON MINERALS UNDER VARIOUS ACTS AND RULES 
 
I – Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation (MMDR) Act 1957 : various 
charges/levies 
 
(a)  Permit fee :  This is applicable to reconnaissance permits and   is to be paid annually 
at the rates fixed by the State Government being not less than Rs. 5/-  and not more than 
Rs. 20/- per sq.km.  Application for a reconnaissance permit is to be accompanied by a 
non-refundable fee at the rate of Rs. 5/- per sq.km. 
 
(b)  Prospecting fee:  This is applicable to prospecting licences and is payable in advance 
at the rates fixed by the State Government being not less than Re. 0.50 and not more than 
Rs. 5/- per hectare.  Application fee for a prospecting licence is to be paid as per 
Schedule - II of MMDR Act 1957 and is payable at Rs. 50/- for first square km. and to 
Rs. 10/- for each additional sq.km.  
 
(c)  Fees in connection with mining lease: Application fee for a mining lease is Rs. 500/-
. In addition, a deposit of Rs. 1000/- is required to be made to meet preliminary expenses 
in connection with the grant. 
 
(d)  Surface rent  : This is  payable  at a rate not exceeding the land revenue, as may be 
specified by the State Government and may vary from state to state.  The rate of surface 
rent in West Bengal is Rs. 45/- per acre per annum whereas it is Rs. 2 per acre in Madhya 
Pradesh.  In Maharastra, the rate varies in villages from 1 paisa to 2 paisa per sq. m. of 
non-agricultural area (NAA)  used  for mining and 20 paise per sq. m. in municipal areas. 
 
(e)  Security deposit :  This deposit  for the observance of terms and conditions is 
required to be made before execution of the reconnaissance permit/prospecting 
licence/mining lease at the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. km for a reconnaissance permit, Rs. 
500 per sq.km for a  prospecting licence and Rs. 10,000/- for a mining lease.  
 
(f)  Dead rent:  The rates of dead rent are as specified in the Third Schedule to the 
MMDR.  It varies from nil to Rs. 300 per hectare per annum depending on the area of the 
lease and the number of years. 
 
(g)  Royalty: Rates of royalty on minerals are specified in the Second Schedule to the 
MMDR Act.  In India, royalty on major minerals is charged on both unit-of-production 
basis and on ad valorem basis.  The unit of production rates are applicable to 30 minerals 
(excluding coal, lignite and sand for stowing) and ad valorem rates on the rest of the 
major minerals.   At present, the unit of production rates are varying from Rs. 2.50  to Rs. 
726 per tonne while the ad velorem rates are varying from 0.7 - 11.0 per cent.  
 
(h)  Mine Closure Charges: Scheme of mine closure was promulgated by the Central 
Government on 10 April, 2003 under the Mineral Conservation   and   Development   81
(Amendment)   Rules,   2003.  According  to  this,  every  mining  unit  has  to  submit   a 
progressive  mine  closure plan and final mine  closure  plan.  The former plan has to be 
submitted within 180 days from the date of commencement of such rules and the latter 
one year prior to the proposed closure of the mine.   . 
 
Financial assurance has to be furnished by every lease holder as follows: 
 
II.  A category mines  :Rs. 25000/- per hectare  and minimum Rs. 2 lakhs 
III.  B category mines  :Rs. 15000/- per hectare  and minimum Rs. 1 lakhs 
 
The financial assurance shall be submitted in one of the following forms to Regional 
Controller of Mines or the officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf, as 
the case may be, or any amendment to it:  
 
II.  Letter of Credit from any Scheduled Bank;  
III.  Performance  or surety bond; 
IV.  Trust fund build up through annual contributions from  the revenue generated 
by mine and based on expected amount sum required for abandonment of mine; 
or 
(d) Any other form of security or any other guarantees acceptable to the authority;" 
 
(i)  Stamp duty: (or transaction fee) : The rates of Stamp  Duty for mining leases for a 
period of 20 to 100 years for selected states are given in table below : 
 




Amount  (Rs)  Rate (%) 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
20-30  First Rs. 1000 
Next every Rs. 500 and 
part thereof 
5 % 
25 % of amount considered or 3 times of 
the amount as average annual rent 
reserved 
 30-100  First  1000 
Next every Rs. 500 and 
part thereof 
5 % 
25% of amount considered or 4 times of 




20-30 Rs.  5000-Rs  50,000 
 
 
More than  50000 and 
part thereof 
5 % of amount considered or 5 times of 
the amount as average annual rent 
received. 
 
7 % of amount considered or 5 times of 
the amount as average annual rent 
reserved 




More than 50000  
5 % of amount of amount considered or 8 
times of the amount as average annual 
rent reserved. 
 
7 % of amount considered or 8 times of   82
State Period 
(Years) 
Amount  (Rs)  Rate (%) 








  8 % for Rs. 100 or part thereof of amount 
considered or two times of the amount as 
average annual rent reserved. 
 
Same as above for 1/5
th of the whole 
amount of rents which would be paid or 
delivered in respect of the first 50 years of 
the lease. 
Karnataka  10-30  First Rs. 1000 
Next every Rs. 500 and 
part thereof. 
10 % 
Rs. 50 for every Rs. 500 or 3 times of the 
amount as average annual rent reserved.  
 Indefinite 
term 
First Rs. 1000- 
Next every Rs. 500 and 
part thereof 
10 % 
Rs. 50 for every Rs. 500 or 3 times of the 
amount as average annual rent to be paid  








  7.5 % of amount considered or 5 times of 
the amount as average annual rent 
reserved. 
7.5 % of amount considered or 8 times of 










More than 50000 
30 % for Rs. 500 or part thereof amount 
considered or equal to the amount of 
every annual rent paid for the first 10 
years. 
50 % of every 500 or part thereof of 
amount considered or 1/5
th of the whole 
amount of rent to be paid in respect of the 
first 50 years of the lease. 
 In   
perpetuity 
Rs.  1,000  -  Rs.  50,000  30 % for every Rs. 500 or part thereof 
amount considered or 1/5
th of the whole 
amount of rent to be paid in respect of the 
first 50 years of the lease 
    More than 50000  50 % for every Rs. 500 or part thereof of 
amount considered or 1/5
th of the whole 
amount of rent to be paid in respect of the 
first 50 years of the lease. 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
20-30  Rs. 900-Rs. 1000 
More than Rs. 1000 
125 % 
62.5 % of amount considered or 6 times 
of the amount as average annual rent 
reserved. 
  30-100  Rs. 900-Rs. 1000 
More than Rs. 1000 
125 % 
62.5 % of amount considered or 10 times 
of the amount as average annual rent 
reserved. 
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II.  Forest (Conservation) Act 1980 and/or Indian Forest Act: various 
 charges/levies  under 
 
(a)  Forest Produce tax and Forest passes/taxes: Tax levied on forest produce 
removed from forest areas and rate of forest passes, varies from State to State. For 
example, it is generally Rs. 5/- per trip and 8 to 12% of royalty in Dandeli area of 
Karnataka. 
 
(b)  Compensatory taxes/levies: Compensatory afforestation charges differ from State 
to State and range from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 60,000/- per hectare of forest land 
diverted for mining.   In the State of Bihar/Jharkhand, the Bihar Restoration and 
Improvement of Degraded Forest Land Taxation Ordinance, 1992 is in force.     
The rates vary with respect to mechanised, non-mechanised and underground 
mines and range upto Rs.  55 lakh per hectare.  Rates also differ on the basis of 
forest density and range from Rs. 6 lakh to Rs. 125 lakh per hectare. 
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25000/-  Cost of forest land  in form 
of “pratyasha shulk” is being 
charged at the rate of Rs. 
900000/- to Rs.1300000/- 
 
 
In other states the rate of Compensatory Afforestation Charges ranges between 
Rs.35,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- per hectare for forest land diverted for mining 
 
(a) Transit fees  Rs. 18.68 per trip in Karnataka (other states also impose similar 
charges 
Rs. 7/- per tonne for transit pass to forest department  (Madhya 
Pradesh) 
 
(b) Clearing of jungle :Rs.100/- per hectare 
 
(c) Land development work: Rs. 500/- per hectare 
 
(d) No of plants to be planted: 400 per hectare (Cost of each plant: Rs. 10/-) 
 
(e) Fire protection works  outer line  Rs. 250/- per km 
  inner line  Rs. 100/- per km 
 
(f) Other miscellaneous charges: Rs. 300/- per km 
 
(g) Security guard charges for safety zone area: Rs 2000/- per guard for each 60     
hectares of safety zone 
 
(h) Payment of extra-legal charges  
 
For diversion of land for mining purposes, there is a provision of paying 
compensatory afforestation charges which have to be paid to the State Government 
once the Central Government gives in principle approval or stage-I clearance under 
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Although these funds are themselves not fully 
utilised for on raising the forests, even then the State Governments are insisting for 
payment, apart from compensatory afforestation charges, many extra-legal charges 
such as provision of jeep, petrol and salary of the driver, etc. by the lessee for the 
period for which the forest clarance has been granted.  Since this will not form part 
of the Consolidated Fund of the State government, it cannot legally charge for jeep, 
petrol and salary of the driver etc. Moreover, these extra-legal charges have a   85
tendency to make mining unviable.  It is therefore suggested that these extra-legal 
charges should not be taken from the lessees.  
 
(k)  Net Present Value (NPV) 
 
In its judgment dated 30 October, 2002 the Supreme Court had directed that in addition to 
the payment of compensatory afforestation charges, "the user agency shall also pay the 
net present value of forest land diverted for non-forest purposes.   The present value is to 
be recovered at the rate of Rs.5.80 lakhs per hectare to Rs.9.20 lakhs per hectare of forest 
land depending upon the quantity and density of the land in question converted for non-
forest use.  This will be subject to upward revision by the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests in consultation with the Central Empowered Committee as and when necessary. 
 
Subsequent to this decision, the Ministry of Environment and Forests constituted a 
Committee to propose an institutional framework for the management of Compensatory 
Afforestation (FCA).  Based on the recommendations of this Committee, the Central 
Government in an affidavit filed on 17 April, 2003 had suggested that "for mining 
projects, there has to be a difference in approach for mineral of high volume and low 
value and minerals of high value and low volume.  The levying of flat rates of NPV on 
per hectare basis will therefore not be rational. Therefore, the Committee recommended 
that in case of mining, NPV should be calculated @10% for the major minerals and 5% 
for the minor minerals to be levied on the annual royalty.  This should be charged and 
paid in advance for a period of 3 years as royalty is revised after every three years.  The 
calculation for this should be based on annual production, projections on a prevalent rate. 
This has the added advantage as if the market is buoyant, the state governments will get 
more. Further, the royalty is revised every three years and therefore the NPV will 
accordingly increase. 
  
This order of the Supreme Court has been circulated by the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests to all the State Governments for compliance.  The order, if implemented, will 
result in the payment of, in addition to the compensatory afforestation charges, the net 
present value ranging from Rs.5.80 lakhs per hectare to Rs.9.20 lakhs per hectare of 
forest land depending upon the quantity and density of the land in question converted for 
non-forest use.  It may be submitted that the payment of such a huge cost at one time will 
result in the closure of most of the mining units.   
 
The blanket fixation of NPV of Rs.5.80 lakhs to Rs.9.20 lakhs per hectare is also not 
reasonable and justifiable because of the fact that deposits of a mineral are not uniform in 
grade and density (quality and quantity).  Further the quality and quantity of a deposit in 
an area will determine the level of production (which again depends on the market or an 
outlet).  If demand of a mineral is less, there will be less production and a mining unit 
will have no alternative but to close its operations if the payment of NPV as directed by 
the Supreme Court is asked. Minerals are low value bulk commodities and therefore one 
time payment of such a huge amount would simply make their working unviable and 
uneconomic.    86
 
III.   Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: various charge/levies 
 
 
i) The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 
 
ii) The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 
 
 
State Water/Air Pollution Consent Fee:  It is the fee payable for obtaining consent to 
establish an industry.  The fees are 'once off' costs and present minimal expenditure in 
terms of project costs. However, determination of the fees at prospecting stage poses 
problems as expenditure on project will increase with the project nearing the mining 
stage.   In Rajasthan the Water Pollution Consent Fee is charged at Rs. 2000 at 
prospecting stage (Rs. 3000 at mining stage) on a project with investment upto Rs. 65 
lakh.   The rates increase in stages and projects of Rs. 200 crore and above are levied at 
Rs. 50,000 at prospecting stage and Rs. 75,000 at mining stage.   Similar rates are levied 
as Air Pollution Consent Fee as well.  To start operations, 50% of fees at prospecting 
stage are charged additionally.  In the state of Bihar/Jharkhand, the rates of Water 
Pollution Consent Fees vary from Rs. 1,500 to 7500 and that of Air Pollution Consent 
Fee vary from Rs. 1,000 to 10,000. 
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IV – Labour Welfare Fund Act / Labour Welfare Cess ACT: IRON ore, manganese 
ore and chrome, limestone, dolomite and mica 
 
The prevailing rates  in the respective welfare Cess Acts in  respect of  the six minerals, 
namely  mica, limestone, dolomite, iron ore, manganese ore and chorme ore  are as 
detailed below: 
 
Mineral  Mode of collection and rate of cess 
 
Mica          :  On all exports of mica, the cess is prescribed as customs duty not 
exceeding 4.5%.  At present this rate has been fixed at 3.5%.   
 
Iron ore      :  Duty of customs where iron ore is exported or duty of excise where 
iron ore is sold/otherwise disposed of to metallurgical industry, etc. 
from a mine at the rate not exceeding Re. 1 per tonne.  The cess 
collected at Re 1 per tonne. 
 
  
Manganese:  Duty of customs where manganese ore is exported or duty of 
excise where ore is sold to metallurgical industry, etc. from a mine 
at such rate not exceeding Rs. 6 per tonne.   The cess is presently 
collected at Rs. 2 per tonne. 
 
Chromite    :  Duty  of  customs  where  chromite is exported or duty of excise 
where ore is sold from a mine to metallurgical industry at such rate 
not exceeding Rs. 6 per tonne.  The cess is presently collected at 
Rs. 4 per tonne. 
 
  Duty of Export where chromium ores and concentrates, of all sorts 





Duty of excise (i) as is sold or otherwise disposed of, (ii) as is 
used by the owner of such mine for any purpose for 
manufacture of cement, iron & steel, ferro-allows, alloy steel, 
chemicals, sugar, paper, fertilizers, refractories, etc.  or other 
articles or goods, at the rate not exceeding Re.  1per tonne.  
The cess is at present collected at Re. 0.50 per tonne. 
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V – Income Tax Act, 1961: various taxes 
 
(a)  Direct Taxes 
 
The taxes and incentives under the Income Tax Act applicable to industries in general 
and to mineral specific sectors are as under: 
 
(a)  Corporate tax :  The current rates of  corporate income  tax are: 
(i)  Indian Company :  @ 35% of taxable income plus a surchage of 
10% of the tax is levied 
(ii)  Foreign company: @ 48% of taxable income.   Foreign companies 
are exempt from payment of surcharge. 
 
(b)   Withholding tax:  The current rate is 20% in respect of dividends and 
interest while rate is 30% on fees and salaries paid to foreign consultants.  
The rates agreed upon in the bilateral treaties prevail over those in the Act.     
 
(c)   Taxes on Capital Gains: Long term capital gains attract concessional tax 
liabilities at a flat rate of 20% with indexation or 10% without indexation 
for Indian companies and 10% for foreign companies. This concessional 
tax rate does not apply to short term capital gains. 
 
(d)    Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT):  Where the total taxable income of a 
company is less than 30% of its book profits, the company is liable to pay 
income tax on 7.5% of its book profits.    
 
(e)   Service tax:  Service tax is leviable on certain taxable services at 5% rate. 
 
(b)  Indirect Taxes 
 
(a)  Customs duty:  Basic customs duty is levied on most minerals at 25%.  It is 5% 
on phosphatic minerals, 35% on natural graphite, granite and marble and 
magnesite. It is 5% on most ores and concentrates of metals. 
 
Additional Duty of Customs is equal to the excise duty leviable. Special duty is 
leviable at 5% of the value of goods and is presently exempted.  Special 
Additional Duty is chargeable at 4% ad valorem.   The surcharge is levied at 10% 
of the duty chargeable as specified in the First Schedule and notifications in force.   
It is in addition to any duties of customs. Capital goods for mining attract a basic 
duty of 25%, 10% surcharge, 4% special additional duty and 16% countervailing 
duty.  
 
(b)  Excise duty:  Excise duty is now replaced with a single rate of Central Value 
Added Tax (CENVAT) of 16% ad valorem in addition to Special Excise Duty.  
Minerals are exempted from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon, their 
finished form being excisable items.  However, marble slabs and tiles attract   89
excise duty at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. metre subject to a maximum of 16% ad 
valorem. 
 
Beneficiated/intermediate products are subjected to levying to central excise duty 
when they are marketed.  The intermediate products include mineral concentrates, 
cement clinkers, etc.  The central excise rates for these intermediate products  
namely concentrates of iron ore, manganese ore(including ferruginous 
concentrates) , copper ore, nickel ore, cobalt ores, aluminium ores, lead and zinc 
ores, tin ores, chromium ore, tungsten ores, uranium or thorium ores, niobium, 
tantalum, vanadium and zirconium ores, and precious metals are replaced by a 
single rate of CENVAT at 16% .  
 
(c)  Sales Tax:  The Central sales tax is charged at the rate of 4% for goods covered 
by declaration in Form ‘C’.   In other cases General Sales Tax of the State is 
charged.   The State Sales Tax rate varies from 5% to 16% with or without 
surcharge on sales tax, turnover tax, additional tax etc. The sales tax rates of 
selected states (as in December 1999) are given in table below.  However, 
Standing Monitoring Committee of Seven State Finance Ministers recently set out 
that all the states fully implement the uniform minimum floor rate of 4% for 
minerals and discontinue sales tax based incentives.  
 
(d)  Export Duty: The export duty is being levied on: 
 
1)  Iron ores and concentrates Fe content 62% and above fines and lumps (all 
grades) @ Rs. 300 per tonne. 
 
2)  Iron ore fines of Fe content and below @ Rs. 50 per tonne. 
 
3)  Chromium ores and concentrates, of all sorts @ Rs. 2000 per tonne. 
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VI     Other Taxes 
 
 
(a)  Municipal/Octroi/Toll tax/Entry tax:  The rates vary even within a state. 
 
(b)  Real Estate Tax:  Rates vary from state to state. 
 
(c)  Road tax:  This tax varies from State to State. It is generally Rs. 5000/- per 
year per truck and Rs. 35000 for truck trailor of 35 tonne capacity. 
 
(d)  Village Panchayat Levies: The rates vary widely. 
 
(e)  Taxes on change in land use:   The rates vary from state to state under 
surface rent. 
 
(f)  Water rate:  Water rate is charged at the rate as may be specified by the 




Corporate Social Responsibility charges 
 
Recently the State of Orissa has started leveying 5% of the turnover as CSR charges for 
the development of local areas in addition to what the mining industry has been doing of 
its own. 
 
Supreme Court Judgment in the State of West Bengal vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd. 
and others 
 
In the Judgment delivered on  15 January, 2004 the Supreme Court has upheld levying of 
cess of coal and other minerals in addition to royalty.  This will open flood gate to other 








Total royalty   :  Labour Welfare Cess @ Rs. 1 per tonne:   
    Rs. 1427 lakhs 
 
Total iron ore production  :   142711000 tonnes 
Profit per tonne  :   Rs. 600/- 
Total profit  :   600x142711000 =  Rs. 856266 lakhs 
Income tax @ 30% plus   :   256880 + 25688 =  Rs. 282568 lakhs 
10% surcharge of tax 
 
Excise duty on  :   Rs. 823200  
concentrates 
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Revenue earnings from iron ore 
 
Royalty   :  Rs.  25/-  per tonne (approximately) 
Total royalty       :  25x142711000 =  Rs. 3567775000 
 
Labour Welfare Cess    :  Rs. 1/- per tonne  
Total  cess    :  Rs.  142711000/- 
 
Excise duty on inputs   :  Rs. 10/- per tonne (approximately) 
(plants, machineries, etc.) 
Total duty on inputs    :  Rs. 1427110000/- 
 
Social welfare cess    :  Rs. 40/- per tonne 
Total     :  142711000x40  =  Rs.  5708440000/- 
 
Railway freight/road freight  :  Rs. 650/- per tonne (approximate) 
Total freight earning     :  from exports:650x79312000 = Rs. 51552800000 
        :  from domestic sales: 300x45493000 =  
Rs. 13647900000/- 
 
Sale/purchase (domestic sales tax):  Rs. 100/- per tonne 
Total     :  100x45493000=Rs.  4549300000 
 
Forest permit      :  Rs. 18/- per tonne 
    :  Rs.  2568798000/- 
 
Profit per tonne    : Rs.  300/- 
Total profit      :  300x142711000 = Rs. 42813300000 
Income tax @ 30% plus   : Rs.  12843990000 
10% surcharge of tax    :  Rs. 1284399000 
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BELLARY-HOSPET INDUSTRY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STATE & 




Royalty & dead rent     :  Rs. 67.5 crores (approximately) 
 
Labour Welfare Cess    :  Rs. 5.4 crores 
 
Excise duty on inputs   :  Rs. 27 crores 
(plants, machineries, etc.) 
 
Social welfare cess    :  Rs. 108 crores 
 
Railway freight/road freight  :  Rs. 650/- per tonne  
Total freight earning     :  from exports: 650x20000000=Rs. 1300 crores 
        :  from domestic sales: 200x7000000= 140 crores 
Rs. 1440 crores 
 
Sale/purchase    :  Rs.  270  crores 
(domestic sales tax) 
 
Forest permit      :  Rs. 48.6 crores 
 
Income tax      :  Rs. 810 crores 
 
Port Charges      :  Rs. 300 crores 
 
Compensatory afforestation   :  Rs. 25 crores 
 
NPV       :  Rs.  375  crores 
 
 
TOTAL    :  Rs.  3476.5  crores 
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CHITRADURGA – KUDREMUKH INDUSTRY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE 





Royalty and dead rent   :  Rs. 25 crores(approximately) 
 
Labour Welfare Cess    :  Rs. 2 crores 
 
Excise duty on inputs   :  Rs. 10 crores 
(plants, machineries, etc.) 
 
Social welfare cess    :  Rs. 40 crores 
 
Railway freight/road freight  :  Rs. 400 crores 
 
Sale/purchase    :  Rs.  100  crores 
(domestic sales tax) 
 
Forest permit      :  Rs. 18 crores 
 
Income tax      :  Rs. 300 crores 
 
Port Charges      :  Rs. 150 crores 
 
Compensatory afforestation   :  Rs. 8 crores 
 
NPV       :  Rs.  125  crores 
 
 
TOTAL    :  Rs.  1178  crores 
 
   95
 
 
GOAN MINING IINDUSTRY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STATE & CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT BY WAY OF TAXES AND OTHER CHARGES 
 
 
Royalty on minerals, dead rent & Surface rent  :    Rs. 21 Crs. 
 
Barge  Tax       :   Rs.  3.2  Crs. 
 
Road tax on mining machineries & Trucks    :    Rs. 2.2 Crs. 
 
Sales tax on fuel & lubricants used for 
Barges, transhippers, excise duty on fuel  
& lubricants and for mining machineries    :    Rs. 70.80 Crs. 
 
TOTAL DIRECT TAXES (A)      :    Rs. 97,20 Crs. 
 
Indirect corporate tax on mining 
industry  in  Goa  (Estimate)     :   Rs.  469  Crs. 
 
T D S         :    R s .     5 0   C r s .  
 
Port charges at Mormugao & Panjim     :    Rs. 230 Crs. 
 
Service Tax on port services        :    Rs. 23 Crs. 
 
Compensatory Afforestation charges     :    Rs. 15 Crs. 
 
Net Present Value (estimate) 
out of which Rs.30 Crs. has already been paid  :    Rs. 175 Crs. 
 
Other taxes i.e., octroi, land revenue, stamp duty 
etc. where no data is available, however is  
estimated  to  be     :   Rs.  7.5  crs. 
 
 
  TOTAL INDIRECT TAXES (B)    :    Rs. 969.5 Crs. 
 
 GRAND  TOTAL  (A+B)    :   Rs.  1066.7  crs.   96
 
 
JHARKHAND - ORISSA INDUSTRY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STATE & 




Royalty and dead rent   :  Rs. 140 crores (approximately) 
 
Labour Welfare Cess    :  Rs. 11.2 crores 
 
Excise duty on inputs   :  Rs. 56 crores 
(plants, machineries, etc.) 
 
Social welfare cess    :  Rs. 112 crores 
 
Railway freight/road freight  :  Rs. 2400 crores 
 
Sale/purchase    :  Rs.  560  crores 
(domestic sales tax) 
 
Forest permit      :  Rs. 100.8 crores 
 
Income tax      :  Rs. 1680 crores 
 
Port Charges      :  Rs. 225 crores 
 
Compensatory afforestation   :  Rs. 50 crores 
 
NPV       :  Rs.  750  crores 
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CHATTISGARH INDUSTRY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STATE & CENTRAL  
GOVERNMENT BY WAY OF TAXES AND OTHER CHARGES 
 
 
Royalty& dead rent     :  Rs. 57.5 crores (approximately) 
 
Labour Welfare Cess    :  Rs. 4.6 crores 
 
Excise duty on inputs   :  Rs. 23 crores 
(plants, machineries, etc.) 
 
Social welfare cess    :  Rs. 92 crores 
 
Railway freight/road freight  :    
Total freight earning     :  from exports:500x8 million=Rs. 400 crores 
        :  from domestic sales: 300x 15 million= 450 crores 
Rs. 850 crores 
 
Sale/purchase    :  Rs.  230  crores 
(domestic sales tax) 
 
Forest permit      :  Rs. 41.4 crores 
 
Income tax      :  Rs. 690 crores 
 
Port Charges      :  Rs. 120 crores 
 
Compensatory afforestation   :  Rs. 22 crores 
 
NPV       :  Rs.  300  crores 
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Forest (Conservation) Act 1980 and/or 
Indian Forest Act: various charges/levies under 
 
 
(a)  Forest Produce tax and Forest passes/taxes: Tax levied on forest produce 
removed from forest areas and rate of forest passes, varies from State to State. For 
example, it is generally Rs. 5/- per trip and 8 to 12% of royalty in Dandeli area of 
Karnataka. 
 
(b)  Compensatory taxes/levies: Compensatory afforestation charges differ from State 
to State and range from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 60,000/- per hectare of forest land 
diverted for mining.   In the State of Bihar/Jharkhand, the Bihar Restoration and 
Improvement of Degraded Forest Land Taxation Ordinance, 1992 is in force.     
The rates vary with respect to mechanised, non-mechanised and underground 
mines and range upto Rs.  55 lakh per hectare.  Rates also differ on the basis of 
forest density and range from Rs. 6 lakh to Rs. 125 lakh per hectare. 
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Global Steel Production (Consumption) Scenario 
 
  The global steel production (consumption) grew at an annual average growth rate 
of 2.98per cent during 1900-1946. Then came the post war boom till 1994 when the 
industry maintained a phenomenal 6.16per cent annual average growth rate. The oil crisis 
brought in a long-term stagnation in the steel industry with the same leading to a growth 
rate of only 0.28per cent annually till 1986. There was some recovery thereafter and till 
2000, the industry maintained a growth rate of about 1.5per cent. The recent boom has 
once again taken the figure to about 6per cent. 
 
Table 1:    Steel Production in USA and Japan Since 1950 
(in million tonnes of crude steel) 
 
Years USA  Japan 
 
1950 87.8  4.8 
1955 106.1  9.4 
1960 90.1  22.1 
1965 119.3  41.2 
1973 136.8  119.3 
1980 101.4  111.4 
1985 80.1  105.2 
2000 101.8  106.4 
2006 98.48  116.2 
 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute and International Iron and Steel Institute, Various 
publications 
 
It may be seen from the Table above that the steel production in the USA has fallen from 
its peaks in 1973, although there have been year to year fluctuations, the overall trend 
does not seem to indicate the possibility of any significant rise in the same in future. The 
same is the case with Japan, a country of exemplary development that took the country's 
production level from a mere 4.8 million tonnes to over 119 million tonnes in 1973, has 
witnessed a clear stagnation in the industry. While production stagnation in both Japan 
and the USA can be attributed to many different reasons, consumption of steel there also 
stagnated, in fact, at levels much lower than their respective peaks. 
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Table 2: Steel Consumption in the USA and Japan 
                                               (million tonnes in crude equivalent) 
 
Years USA  Japan 
 
1960 90.11  19.46 
1970 127.16 71.54 
1973 151.03 91.67 
1980 117.98 85.88 
1985 113.30  84.9 
 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute and International Iron and Steel Institute 
 
Consumption growth rates have slowed down even in the countries like Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand etc. after having reached certain level of economic prosperity. 
Considering these trends in steel consumption and production in the developed nations, 
one cannot expect the same to grow continuously at the current high rates for India. 
Hence, the long-term scenarios for steel consumption forecasts considered for this study 
assume tapering of growth rates gradually. 




Comments on NCAER Study 
 
National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) has prepared a report titled 
‘Social Cost Benefit Analysis of the POSCO Steel Project in Orissa’. The report 
concludes “… it would be beneficial for the state economy to offer incentives to lure 
investments to set up steel plants over the alternative of collecting the depletion premium 
of US $ 27 per tonne of ore exported from the state for processing elsewhere”. 
 
There are, however, some serious lacunae in the report, in the form of errors of facts 
and interpretation, that affect the validity of the conclusions. There are also few points 
where the methodological aspects have been dealt with in a vague manner; and hence 
need further clarifications.  
 
(1)  The report uses the technique of Input-Output (I-O) Table to compute output 
multiplier and employment multiplier. The Central Statistical Organisation 
(CSO), which computes I-O table for the Indian economy, mentions a rider in its 
report that, “… the analysis technique is useful only under the assumption of 
consistency of technical coefficients”. In any industry featuring significant 
technological changes, the technique has to be used with caution. But the 
complexities of the technique are not reflected in the manner in which it is used in 
this report for deriving conclusions. 
(2)  The report uses the I-O technique to make some overly simplistic statements. 
For example, the executive summary notes that: “Every Rs 1 lakh worth of output 
in the iron ore sector would result in Rs 1.4 lakh of output in the economy. 
Similarly for each Rs 1 lakh output in the iron and steel sector, the economy 
would derive an output of Rs 2.36 lakh”. With all its technical limitations, I-O 
table based multipliers only suggest that a particular level of output in the 
user industry would generate a particular amount of requirement of inputs in 
the economy. There is no guarantee that the said amount of requirement of inputs 
would translate entirely into additional output in the economy. In the particular 
case of iron and steel sector, the output multiplier simply suggests the need for 
inputs of raw materials and infrastructural services from various upstream 
industries. The actual resultant growth in the economy would depend upon its 
capacity to supply these inputs. If certain inputs were ‘imported’ either from 
outside the country or from other States of India, the output and employment 
multipliers for the local economy would diminish to that extent.  
(3)  The report’s simplistic interpretation of the output multipliers can hardly be used 
to derive superiority of any particular kind of project. It may be reasonable to 
expect that the output multiplier, calculated using the report’s methodology, 
would be even larger for some hypothetical project that uses steel to produce 
some downstream products, say, automobiles. Thus, the output mutliplier can 
then be used to prove that an automobile project is superior to a steel project! 
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output multipliers then one would prefer only projects that are the most vertically 
integrated, denying to the economy the benefits of trade and resultant productivity 
gains. 
(4)  The report bases its conclusions with regard to output and employment multipliers 
on the basis of a specially created State-level I-O table for Orissa. The 
methodology for creation of such a table is not detailed out in the report. There is 
scope to believe that the inherent limitations of the I-O technique could be 
magnified when such tables are constructed for smaller geographies due to 
paucity of State-level data, difficulty in capturing inter-State trade flows and 
wider definitions of industry / sector.  
(5)  While applying the output multiplier to the iron ore project, the report applies 
FOB port value of Bailadilla iron ore of $16.32 per tonne. The number is based on 
a McKinsey study in 2005. This value is much lower than the export realization 
for Orissa ore (around $55 per tonne). It is unclear why the report uses a past 
value for Bailadilla iron ore when it is examining project involving Orissa 
ore.  
(6)  However, when the report talks about computation of depletion premium (page 
30), it uses a value of $60.02 for Bailadilla ore corresponding to the year 2006-07, 
which is then used to derive value of Orissa ore for the POSCO project. Using 
two widely different iron ore price numbers for two different purposes in the 
same report has accentuated the results of the NCAER study. This is a serious 
inconsistency in the report.  
(7)  The report has not stated very clearly its assumptions for computation of the 
depletion premium. Especially, there is ambiguity regarding the difference in 
assumptions that drives the difference in the depletion premium computed in 
two scenarios – for steel producer located within the State and for raw material 
exporter.  
(8)  It appears that the report has assumed useful life of high and medium-grade iron 
ore at 19 years for the computation of depletion premium for iron ore. It is heroic 
on the part of the report’s authors to make an assumption on life of iron ore 
reserves when the issue is far from settled among experts. The various 
estimates of the life of iron ore reserves in India, including the official estimates, 
are ranging between 50-200 years. It is now also well recognized that iron ore 
reserves issues needs to be viewed dynamically, by considering the possible new 
exploration that can be achieved with suitable policy changes. Against this 
backdrop, an assumption of 19 years of reserves life seems to have inflated the 
estimates of depletion premium.  
(9)  The report does not make any computation of depletion premium for coking coal, 
“as its prices did not exhibit any trend prior to the recent steep price hike”. This 
does not seem to be an adequate explanation for not computing the depletion 
premium in case of coking coal. When the report proceeds with computation 
of depletion premium for iron ore despite the lack of clarity on the life of iron 
ore reserves, it is surprising that it does not compute depletion premium for 
coking coal because of lack of any trend in past prices.   104
Appendix- C  
 
(Excerpts from Hoda Committee Report: Chapter 8; Conclusions and 
Recommendations) 
 
Allocation of Captive Mines to Steel Makers 
 
•  On the basis of current assumptions of demand and supply of iron ore in the 
country and of the growth in both, India would have enough resources to last until 
the end of the twenty-first century and there is no basis for basing policy changes 
on the exhaustion of these resources in the near future. However, the position 
would need to be kept under review and adjustments made in it in light of the 
emerging situation from time to time. The first review should take place after a 
period of 10 years, i.e. in 2016–17. [7.34] 
•  Stand alone mining and captive mining should continue to co-exist in the country. 
The position should be reviewed in 2016–17 in light of the emerging situation of 
establishment of steel capacity in the country, on the one hand, and accretions to 
the level of iron ore resources in the country, on the other. A view can be taken at 
that time on whether the balance of advantage in the grant of LAPL/PL/ML 
should be changed in favour of steel mills. [7.47]  
•  Through appropriate changes in Section 11(3) (d) it should be clarified that in a 
situation of multiple applications for grant of iron ore LAPL/PL/ML, the existing 
investment in steel plants that have exhausted their current captive mines should 
be a consideration. However, the applicant must independently qualify under 
other criteria, including Section 11(3) (a) relating to prior experience. This is 
necessary to ensure efficient mining. [7.47] 
•  Existing captive mines should be renewed if they have complied with the 
conditions of the lease and the life of the steel plant so warrants taking into 
account existing and planned capacities. In the case of new capacities, the 
recommendations of Chapter 5 will apply. [7.47] 
•  Steel making capacities already in existence on 1 July 2006 that do not have 
captive mines may also be given preferential allocation of adequate iron ore 
reserves within the state without the need to go through the process of 
tender/auction, as a one-time measure to provide a level playing field. These 
existing steel companies would have to enter into tie-ups with experienced mining 
companies so that they become eligible in terms of Section 11(3) (a) of the 
MMDR Act. Due regard should be given to the size of the steel making capacity 
when considering allocation of a specific ore body. [7.47] 
•  Scientific and vigorous prospecting in the country should be encouraged. LAPLs 
and PLs for magnetite may be freely given to both stand alone and captive miners, 
whether Indian or foreign. LAPLs for haematite may be given only after strictly 
ensuring that GSI or another state agency has not already done the requisite 
exploration. [7.47] 
•  Captive iron ore mines allotted to steel makers should use the ore from these 
mines for their own steel and should not sell the same either in India or abroad. 
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Restrictions on the Export of Iron Ore 
 
•  The Committee finds it anomalous that exports are regulated through a dual 
mechanism of canalisation as well as export licensing. [7.61] 
•  The export regime for iron ore of higher grade does not make any distinction 
between fines and lumps although, as noted earlier, fines are particularly in 
surplus in the country. The rationale for the 64 per cent cut-off of Fe content is 
also not clear, as the cut-off in IBM classification is 65 per cent. [7.62] 
•  In light of the assessment regarding availability of iron ore resources in relation to 
current domestic production, and the appraisal of the impact of export controls on 
the health of the mining industry and its attractiveness for investment, the 
Committee has concluded that there is no need to impose any quantitative 
restrictions on exports but that the position should be revisited after 10 years. 
However, by way of abundant precaution, the Committee recommends that an 
export duty may be levied on exports of iron ore in lump form with Fe content 
above 65 per cent. The system of licensing and canalisation currently in operation 
should be discontinued. Also captive miners should not be allowed to export 
either fines or lumps. They should sinter the former and use the latter in their own 
blast furnaces. [7.63] 
 




An Overview of the Current Global Iron Ore Market 
 
It may be necessary to have quick overview of the conditions in the global iron ore 
market to examine the implications of the same on the Indian iron ore business and the 
impact of any possible withdrawal from it by the Indian iron ore producers.  
 
The iron ore boom continued at full force in 2005 and well into 2006.  This year’s price 
negotiations was, unlike in the previous years, a short affair with the Chinese mills 
leading the show and agreeing to a quick 9.5 per cent rise. Increase in pellets prices has 
been agreed at 3 per cent in most cases. Iron ore spot prices are still higher than contract 
prices, in spite of the announced rise. The reference price for Indian origin iron ore fines 
for China has been pegged at about $58-59 per tonne fob. What is striking here is the way 
the Chinese steel makers have concluded this year’s price negotiations giving a price rise 
far less than expected. This shows the increasing market power of the Chinese mills. 
 
Iron ore miners continue to upgrade their plans for capacity expansions.  In 2005, fewer 
large projects were brought to completion and taken into operation, but the market was 
nevertheless supplied by incremental capacity additions from virtually all producers.  The 
total iron ore capacity expansion pipeline has grown during 2005 and contained 340 
million tonnes of new projects planned to come on stream between 2006 and 2008.  Of 
this total, around 225 million tonnes fall into the “certain” category, 70 into the 
“probable” and 95 into the “possible”.  In the period 2009-2012, another 150 million 
tonne of capacity are planned and more projects have been planned, although their 
planned capacities have not yet been announced.  In China, iron ore mine capacity has 
increased much more than thought earlier, since there appears to be considerable iron ore 
production that has not been included in official statistics.  The resourcefulness of miners 
in China and India has been underestimated in the past and it now seems safe to assume 
that they will be able to increase production substantially also in years to come.  The 
UNCTAD has viewed that iron ore producers are convinced that the boom will continue 
and that there will be room for significant additional capacity.  With continuously 
growing demand for iron ore, the pressure for additional capacity increases will continue 
also in the next few years.  However, UNCTAD in its annual report feared if the volume 
of ore entering the market will not be too large, leading to an oversupply situation 
beginning in 2008. 
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Appendix-E 
 
Mineral Resources in India 
 
The following table shows growth rates of some of the major components and their 
respective shares in India’s GDP. 
  
Table -1:      Percentage Growth of different Sector and Their Respective Shares in 
GDP (at constant prices) 
 
  2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 
 























































Source: Compiled from Economic Intelligence Service (CMIE); National Income Statistics; Oct. 
2006. *Figures in the parenthesis represent per cent share in GDP. 
 
The formidable growth rate of GDP in recent years significantly owes to the tremendous 
growth in industry and service sectors. Industry and service sectors, being two major 
economic sectors, are driving the growth of the economy. These sectors grew at the rates 
of 8.75per cent and 10.5per cent in 2005-06 holding shares of 26.08per cent and 54.01per 
cent in GDP respectively.  
 
In contrast, the growth rate in Mining and Quarrying sector has been quite low and it is 
on a declining trend over the past few years. The sector accounts for a very low share in 
GDP, which is also exhibiting a rather downward trend falling from 2.32per cent in 1999-
00 to 2.05 per cent in 2005-06. Given the fact that the mining sector remains the driving 
force for the metal based industries growth, there are reasons to be concerned over this 
stagnation in this industry.  
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The country is endowed with cast mineral resources of diverse kind. However, the 
sector’s growth as shown above has not kept pace with the rest in the industrial sector and 
is lying far below expected levels. Much of it is due to the restrictive and regulated policy 
that has been followed till now.  
 
With an increased industrial production, the demand for essential minerals like coal, iron 
ore, steel etc. will also grow. If mineral resources are available, what is required to raise 
the capacity of mineral production is investment especially when the mineral sector has 
been generally known to have hit a capacity barrier. Investments will be required to start 
with exploration to end with mining and creating infrastructure for transportation of 
minerals to the end use centres or exports.  
 
Mineral Production in India 
 
India produces as many as 90 minerals
90 from 3,168 working mines including small 
operational mines. Among them 562 mines belong to coal and lignite minerals, 615 
mines to metallic minerals and 1,991 mines to non-metallic minerals. There were 790 
mines in the public sector and the remaining 2378 mines in private sectors. Table-2 
shows the current position for the years 2003-04 and 2004-05. 
 
Table 2: Number of Operating Mines (2003-04 and 2004-05) 
      
Sector 2003-04  2004-05 
All minerals  3132  3168 
Coal (incld. Lignite)  562  562 
Metallic minerals  612  615 
Non-metallic minerals  1958  1991 
 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines, govt. of India, Ministry of mines. 
 
Except for a few, most of the mineral have grown only slowly in the past few years. The 
considerable growth, observed in metallic minerals is largely led by exports and partly by 
domestic demand owing to the recent spurt in metallic industry like iron and steel. The 
following table (Table- 3) exhibits production and growth of some of the major minerals 
obtained in the year 2004-05.  
 
                                           
90 It includes four fuel mineral, 10 metallic minerals, 50 nonmetallic minerals, 3 atomic minerals, and 23 
minor minerals (as of 2004-05).   109
Table 3 : Production and Growth of Some of the Minerals 
 
Commodity  Production  per cent growth 
in 2004-05 
  2003-04 2004-05   
 
Mineral fuel('000t) 
Coal   361156  382137  5.81 
Lignite 27958  30341  8.52 
Petroleum 
(crude) 
33373 34015 1.92 
 
Metallic minerals 
Bauxite(tonnes) 10924786  11696773  7.07 
Chromite 
(tonnes) 
2904809 3639848  25.30 
Iron ore('000t)  122838  142711  16.18 
Manganese ore 
(tonnes) 
1776153 2378543  33.92 
 
Metals(tonnes) 
Aluminium 810282  883960  9 
Copper(cathode) 395967  406316  2.6 
Lead(primary) 24737 15657  -36.7 
 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines 
 
This apparent stagnation in mineral sector has emerged not because of resource paucity 
but due to lack of adequate initiatives, infrastructure, modern technology, and most 
importantly a supportive policy framework. The mining industry is bullish on the future 
growth prospects and is sees even a growth of 12 per cent in the years to come as shown 
in Table- 4 below in a favourable economic atmosphere. 
   
Table 4 : Mining Industry Turnover Projected Growth (in per cent) 
 










Source: Industry Estimates and Federation of Indian Mining Industries (FIMI). 
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Interestingly, India continues to maintain a net import status in minerals despite 
significant improvement in exports of certain minerals like iron ore, manganese ores 
chromite and granite. However, this trade deficit has to be seen in the context of each 
mineral separately for a better understanding of the situation more concretely.  
 
Table 5 : Import and Export of Ores and Minerals (in crore) 
 
Years   Export  Import  Trade Balance 
2000-01 34411  96522  -62111 
2001-02 35136  92797  -57661 
2002-03 46618  117294  -70676 
2003-04 49926  130060  -80134 
2004-05 70468  184758  -114290 
2005-06 79790  243839  -164049 
 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines 
 
While India runs a significant net export position in minerals like  iron ore, manganese 
ore, etc, it is a huge net importer of gold, rough diamond, coking coal, copper, lead, zinc, 
rock phosphate, asbestos etc. which accounts for almost 50per cent of the total value of 
all merchandise imported.  
 
Table 6 : Degree of Self-Sufficiency in Principal Minerals and Metals 
 






Order of self 
sufficiency (%) 
Minerals     
Asbestos  86 1 1 
Barytes  135 723 100 
Bauxite 7718  10925  100 
Chromite 762  2905  100 
Dolomite 3829  4051  100 
Fluorspar    62 12 19 
Iron ore  41276  122838  100 
Llmenite  161 465 100 
Kyanite 12  9  75 
Manganese ore  815  1776  100 
Rock phosphate  2693  1446  54 
Sulphur 1500  425  28 
Metals     
Aluminium 845  810 96 
Copper(refined)  337 396 100 
Lead(primary)  191 25 13 
Zinc 399  252  63 
 
Source: Indian Bureau of Mines   111
India holds a good prospect in the world mineral market. India's ranking in 2003-04 in 
the world production was 2
nd in barytes and chromite, 3
rd in coal and lignite and talc\ 
steatite\pyrophylite, 4
th in Iron ore and kyanite\sillimanite\andalusite, 6
th in bauxite and 
8
th in manganese ore, mica, aluminium and steel (crude). The statistics on world 
production of principal minerals are given below.   
 
Table 7 : Contribution and Rank of India in World Production of  
Principal Mineral & Metals, (2003) 
 
Commodity    Contribution  per cent  India’s rank in order of 
quantum of production 
Mineral fuel     
Coal & lignite  7.65  3
rd 
Petroleum 0.93  26
th 
Metallic minerals     
Bauxite 7.04  6
th 
Chromite 17.71  2
nd 
Iron ore  9.92  4
th 
Manganese ore  7.30  8
th 
Metals    
Aluminium 2.90  8
th 
Copper 2.60  14
th 
Steel 3.29  8
th 
Lead 0.37  26
th 
Zinc 2.74  9
th 
 
Source:  World Mineral Production, 1999-2003, compiled from Indian Bureau of Mines, Govt. of 
India; Ministry of Mines. 
 
Looking at the growth rates of mineral and quarrying industry of previous years, it can be 
easily assessed that the sector is still lagging far behind despite having huge potential. On 
the other hand, as opposed to the mineral industry, manufacturing is still maintaining a 
stable growth path. Table below shows a comparative picture of manufacturing and 
mining and quarrying industry. 
 
Table 8: Percentage growth rate in Manufacturing and Mines and Quarrying sector 
 
  Mining and Quarrying  Manufacturing 
  Growth (per cent)  Growth (per cent) 
1999-00 -  - 
2000-01 2.54  7.75 
2001-02 1.83  2.54 
2002-03 8.71  6.81 
2003-04 5.30  7.11 
2004-05 5.79  8.08 
2005-06 0.94  8.97 
 
Source: Compiled from Economic Intelligence Service (CMIE); National Income Statistics; Oct. 
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Mining industry plays a significant role in the economies of certain States of India. 
Whereas in the case of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and even Orissa, the mining industry has 
a major share in the state GDP, the same is insignificant in the case of Karnataka. 
Karnataka being an industrial state and also a leading IT hub, the share of the mining 
industry is very low there. 
 
The performance of the states, which are endowed with mineral resources have not been 
compatible with their known potential. The growth in mineral sector in these states has 
also been irregular and inconsistent from year to year. Although the shares of mining in 
the state GDP of the states has not exhibited any clearly increasing trend, the higher 
growth states in the GDPs of the respective states in the past few years compared to those 
in the mid nineties have been clearly on account of the contribution of the mineral 
industries, especially iron ore, in those states. The relatively lower shares of mining in the 
states in the state GDP in also due to the fact that the value of the minerals has been taken 
at the mine head price and the entire chain of value addition that it has created through a 
multiplier effect in the allied activities like transportation and services have gone hidden 
under the respective item heads and thereby not showing the full impact of the iron ore 
industries growth in these state economies. There is no doubt that the growth registered 
by states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Goa and also to a large extent Karnataka has 
been shaped by the huge contribution from the iron ore mining industries.  
 
Table 9 : Percentage growth in minerals across different states. 
(In terms of values) 
 












Chhattisgarh 37.9  3.2  17.8 17.1  7.6  -  - 
Goa -17.0  8.7  -2.8  18.2  22.9  -  - 
Gujarat 14.2  30.9  5.4  66.0  15.0  13.9  - 
Jharkhand  -18.0 25.9 -3.0 21.3 7.2  7.0  - 
Karnataka  12.0 2.6 21.7 5.8 33.3  26.2 - 
Maharashtra 7.8 12.9 9.9  2.7 15.6 5.5 - 
Orissa 0.0  14.8  6.4  19.5  16.1  23.5  4.2 
Rajasthan 14.5  2.0  -0.1  -0.1  19.2  12.8  13.2 
 
Source: Compiled from Economic Intelligence Service (CMIE); National Income Statistics; Oct. 
2006. 
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Since government or the public sector endeavors have been proved insufficient to meet 
the internal and external demands of minerals, private and foreign intervention thus are 
required to supplement the efforts of the government in this sector.  
 
Understanding the need of private and foreign co-operation, various reforms in the sphere 
are being appraised. Till recently, foreign equity holding of 100 per cent was hitherto, 
allowed on automatic route for all minerals except diamond and precious stones for both 
mining and exploration. For diamond and precious stones 74 per cent equity was allowed 
through automatic route and proposals for more than 74 per cent equity had to be routed 
through Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) for clearance. Government now has 
taken a decision in January 2006 to allow 100 per cent FDI through automatic route in 




India still has a regulated export policy in the case of minerals. The extent of trade 
regulation varies across minerals. The nature of restrictions on export of some major 
minerals is given in the following table: 
 
 































1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05
%
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Table 10: The Nature of Restriction on Exports of Minerals. 
 
Item description  Export policy  Nature of restriction 
Sand and soil  restricted  Export  permitted  under 
license 
Iron ore other than those specified 
under free category 
State treading 
enterprise (STE) 
Export through MMTC 
Iron of Goa origin when exported to 
Chilna, Europe, Japan, South korea, 
and Taiwan irrespective of Fe 
content 
Free  
All iron ore of Fe content up to 
64per cent 
Free  
Iron ore concentrate prepared by 
beneficiation and\or concentraton of 
low-grade ore containing 40per cent 
or less iron produced by KIOCL. 
STE KIOCL,  Bangalore 
Iron ore pellets manufactured by 
KIOCL out or concentrates 
produced by it 
STE KIOCL,  Bangalore 
Manganese ore excluding the 
following:  lumpy\blended 
manganese ore with more than 46per 
cent manganese 
STE Export  through: 
a)MMTC 
b) MOIL for manganese 
ore produced in MOIL 
mines. 
Lumpy\blended manganese ore with 
more than 46per cent manganese 
Restricted  Export permitted under 
license. 
Chrome ore lumps with Cr2O3 not 
exceeding 40per cent 
STE  Export through MMTC 
Crude  Oil  STE  Export through Indian 
Oil Corporation. 
 




A number of items fall under import restriction. Import of slate falling under heading 
2514, marble (excluding asbestos) under heading 2515, granite under heading 2515 and 
marble and other items under code No. 25174100 and 25174900 are restricted. However 
import of uranium and thorium ores concentrates, titanium ore and concentrates, etc. are 




Mining rules by and large, cover the followings: 
 
•  The Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.   115
•  Mineral conservation and development rule, 1988. 
•  Granite conservation and development rules, 1999. 
•  Mining leases (modification of terms) rules, 1956. 
•  Mineral conservation and development rules (MCDR)Forms 
•  Mineral concession rules (MCR)Forms 
•  Granite conservation and development Rules(MCR)Forms 
•  Marble development and conservation rules, 2002.  
 
Almost all the aforesaid rules deal with the rigorous procedure of granting mining 
operation. For example Mineral Concession Rule lays down a series of unavoidable 
stringent conditions that an applicant has to abide by in order to acquire reconnaissance 
permit or prospecting license or mining leases.  
 
Reconnaissance permit is granted for the purpose of undertaking "reconnaissance 
operations" which means any operation undertaken for preliminary prospecting of a 
mineral through regional, aerial, geophysical or geochemical surveys and geological 
mapping, but does not include pitting, trenching, drilling or surface excavation.  
 
Next to reconnaissance permit, there is prospecting licensing. It means a licence granted 
for purpose of undertaking prospecting operations with a view to exploring, locating or 
proving mineral deposits. 
 
Grant of mining lease allows the lessee to undertake mining operation and also vests with 
the right of sublease. But in every step the applicant has to go through an 
incomprehensible complex bureaucratic procedure. 
 
Amendment to MCR: 
 
Some noticeable amendments have taken place with reference to The Mineral Concession 
(Amendment) Rules, 2005 (Up to May 2005). 
 
•  Restriction of minimum area for grant of mining lease shall not be applicable in 
case of renewal of mining leases. 
•  The guidelines for computation of royalty on minerals on ad-valorem basis with 
reference to rule 64D (case 3) will be applicable to aluminium (bauxite and 
laterite dispatched for use in alumina and aluminium metal extraction) besides 
primary gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, and tin. 
•  The amended rule 66A (special provision related to atomic metals) makes it 
mandatory that the licensee or lessee shall not win or dispose of any newly 




Mining Acts include the followings: 
 
•  Mine and Minerals (Development And Regulation) Act,1957   116
•  Cess and Other Taxes on Minerals (Validation) Act, 1992 
•  Goa, Daman, Diu Mining Concessions Act, 2002 
•  Forest (conservation) Act and rules, 1980. 
 
Mine and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 discusses the regulations on 
reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence and mining operations. It also specifies the 
rates of royalty and dead rents on major minerals. 
 
Rates of Royalty: 
 
Royalty is a kind of levy that a lessee has to pay to the State Government for undertaking 
mining operation. These rates are only applicable when mining operation is in place and 
varies across minerals. The central government, exercising the power conferred by sub-
section (3) of the section 9 of the MMDR Act1957, has amended the rates of royalty on 
major minerals (excluding coal, lignite and sand for stowing) and dead rents respectively. 
Table below provides the changed rate of royalty on some minerals. 
 
Table 11: Rates of Royalty 
 
Items  Rates of royalty 
Agate  10 per cent of sale price on ad valorem basis. 
Copper  3.2 per cent of LME Copper metal price 
chargeable on the contained copper metal in 
ore produced. 
Diamond  10 per cent of sale price on ad valorem basis 
dolomite  Rs 45 per tonne 
felspar  10per cent of sale price on ad valorem basis 
gypsum  20per cent of sale price on ad valorem basis 
Iron ore: 
i) lumps 
a)with 65per cent Fe content or 
more 
b) with 62per cent Fe content or 
more but < 65per cent of Fe content 
c) with < 62per cent of Fe content 
ii)  Concentrates prepared by 
beneficiation and\or concentration 
of low grade ore containing 40per 
cent Fe or less. 
 
 
Rs 9 per tonne. 
Rs 11 per tonne. 
 
Rs 8 per tonne. 
 
Rs 4 per tonne. 
Kyanite  10per cent of sale price on ad valorem basis 
Manganese ore: 
a)  ore of all grades 
b)  concentrates 
3per cent of sale price on ad valorem basis 
1per cent of sale price on ad valorem basis 
 
Source : Indian Bureau of Mines, Govt. of India; Ministry of Mines. (these rates are not 
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Dead rents: 
 
Dead rent is a kind of duty paid by the lessee when he owns mining lease but does not 
start mining operation. Rate of dead rent applicable to the leases granted for low value 
minerals are Rs 100 \ha per annum for first two years of lease and Rs 400\ha per annum 
for 3
rd year onward. For medium value minerals the rate is twice the rate specified before. 
For high value minerals the rate is thrice the rate specified for low value minerals. In case 
of precious metals and stones it amounts to four-times of the same. 
 
The act “Cess and Other Taxes on Minerals (Validation) Act, 1992” validates the 
imposition and collection of cesses and certain other taxes on minerals under certain state 
laws. “Goa, Daman, Diu Mining Concessions Act, 2002” provides for the abolition of the 
mining concessions in operation in the union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Forest 
(conservation) Act and rules, 1980 also intends to conserve forests and other matters 
connected therewith. 
 
Some of the recommendations of the Hoda Committee in this regard are as under: 
 
•  Prospecting license only approves an area of 25 sq kms. But in order to make the 
investment feasible the area should be increased to 50-100 sq kms. 
•  The minimum area for prospecting licence should be stipulated at 10 sq kms in order 
to avoid non-serious investors. 
•  Mining lease is granted over an area of 10 sq kms subject to degree of mineralisation, 
geology of the deposit and proposed realistic production plans. It is suggested that the 
area should be sufficient for exploring mines at a proposed production rate for 70 
years original     grant and remaining period (for the renewals) for leases linked to 
integrated steel plants, subject to a maximum of 20-25 sq kms within a state. 
•  Stipulated time periods have been mentioned for the provisions of reconnaissance 
permit, prospecting licensing and mining lease. But this specific period should be 
reckoned form the date of completion of all the clearances namely forest, 
environment, land etc. 
•  The recent framework of exclusive reconnaissance permit fails to attract investors in 
exploration activity. It is suggested therefore, viewing at the three-tier system 
practiced over the world, that an “open sky” policy of non-exclusive RP along with 
exclusive LAPL (on first come first served basic) should be adopted to attract 
investors. This LAPL, in turn would allow shallow pitting, trenching, and surface 
drilling. A non-exclusive RP holder with exclusive LAPL/PL would be entitled to 
direct grant of mining lease. Existing RP holders would be governed by existing law 
of priority until the duration of the RP runs out. Fees for RP, LAPL and PL would be 
pegged at high rate to avoid unserious applicants.  
•  Area, to be considered under LAPL should be 5000 square kilometer for 8 years with 
a reduction down to 500 sq. km after 5 years and 100 sq. km after 6 years. 
•  Persons holding LAPL/PL would exclusively be entitled for ML. 
•  Viewing at the value addition criteria, preference to the grant of LAPL/PL or ML 
would be given to those who are willing to set up an industry. 
•  Miners should be given the right to mine the associated minerals discovered during 
mining operation subject to all conditions mentioned therein.   118
•  In the context of allocation of captive mines, committee thinks that there is no 
problem of availability of iron ore till the end of twenty-first century; hence policy 
change on the ground of resource exhaustion is untenable. The position although 
should be kept under review and adjustment would be made in accordance with the 
emerging situation.  
•  The existing captive mine owners should get their mines renewed again. 
•  In a situation of multi application for grant of iron ore LAPL/PL/ML the existing 
investment in steel plants which have exhausted their current captive mines should 
also be a consideration. The applicant however has to qualify all the criteria 
mentioned therein. 
•   The steel makers who are in existence since July 1, 2006 and do not have captive 
mines, may be given preferential allocation of adequate iron ore reserves with in the 
state. 
•  Captive mine owners should only use reserves for their own purpose and are not 
allowed to sell in India or abroad. 
•  Each state government should form a Mineral Development Fund with an earmarked 
15 per cent of annual royalty collections for the Fund. 
•  Mineral corporations of the state government should be encouraged to take up 
development financing and promotion of mining infrastructure projects. NAHI, 
Railways and Port authorities should expedite NH, Railway and Port projects which 
are pending for a long time. Power and Rural Water Supply Scheme also should be 
extended to the mining areas to meet the requirements.  
•  Recently, different states are imposing different levies on mining activity; there is no 
parity in the rates charged by different states. So this arbitrariness in the rates should 
be removed. 
•  The ongoing method of fixing the rate of royalty should be transformed into ad-
valorem rates. 
•  The rates of dead rents should be revised and new formulation of dead rent needs to 
be brought in so as to deter unserious mine owners. 
•  The committee recognizing the impact of ban on export proposes that the export 
should not be banned and quantitative restriction on export should be removed with a 
condition of review of the situation after ten years. The current system of licensing 
and canalization also should be discontinued.  
•  Transaction value of minerals and the profit element should be incorporated to 
calculate the value of the mineral while measuring royalty. 
•  Section 11(5) confers a right to the state government which allows it to grant a lease 
to an application out of turn subject to two conditions namely i) recording special 
reasons and ii) previous approval of central govt., as opposed to first come first 
served rule. This sub- section should be deleted in view of section 11(5). 
•  In reference to section 11(5) state government can issue mining lease to an applicant 
irrespective of date of submission of application, in production of special reasons. 
The special reasons should be illustrated in the provision itself. 
•  Central Government has the power to make rules on the issues provided therein. 
Exercising such right, Central Government should set up Facilitation Body which 
would integrate the whole procedure of mining operation. 
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Steel production in India has maintained a reasonably strong growth trend, 
especially after the economic reforms in the early 1990s. For a few years, towards the end 
of the decade the production growth rate did slowdown on account of global economic 
recession, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, that affected the investment 







Source: Source: Joint Plant Committee and A.S.Firoz, Op. cit.  2007. 
 
Since the mid nineties, the production growth rates in India have been higher than 
the consumption growth rates, except for the last two years.  As a result, the external 
trade balance has changed significantly with the changes in imports and exports.   
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Table-1 : India’s External Trade in Iron and Steel: April December 2006-07 
 
(Figures are in thousand tonnes) 
 
Product Imports  Exports 
 
Pig Iron  2  240 
Semi-Finished Products  230  296 
Bars and Rods  238  258 
Structurals 70  54 
Railway Materials  2  0 
Plates 625  96 
HR Coils/Strips  950  1150 
HR Sheets  14  0 
CR Sheets/Coils  325  438 
GP/GC Sheets  140  1353 
Electrical Steel Sheets  215  18 
TinPlates   82  27 
TMBP 1  0 
Pipes ( Large Diameter)  38  135 
Total Finished Steel  2725  3529 
 
Source: Joint Plant Committee 
 
 



























Structure of Steel Industry in India  
 
The Indian steel industry is highly fragmented. The level of fragmentation can be 
better appreciated when one looks at the number and individual size of the induction 
furnaces, Electric Arc Furnaces (EAF)s, Sponge Iron (DRI) plants and the stand alone 
rolling mills. Barring the EAFs in Essar Steel and the Ispat, the other EAFs in the country 
do not even exceed the 60 tonne mark, with most of them lying in the range of 20-30 
tonne. The Induction furnaces are mostly in the size of 3-12 tonnes each. Most of the 
induction furnace units have more than one furnaces have annual production capacity in 
the range of 30-100,000 tonnes.     
 
While there is no clear estimate of how many induction furnaces or rolling mills are 
actually in operation currently, the JPC figures, based on some earlier survey show that 
there are over 1200 induction furnaces and over 35 EAF units in the country. The number 
of rolling mills producing both long and flat products will be over 1500. Similarly, over 
350 DRI units are reportedly in existence with most of them to be in operation by the end 
of the year.       
 
Imports of steel into India have been either for final consumption, undertaken by the 
consumers directly or traders, or by steel producers themselves (merchant mills or even at 
times by integrated producers).  The Indian steel industry is import dependent for 
intermediate (like HR coils) and semi-finished (billets/slabs mainly) products.  Even 
higher value added products like Tin Mill Black Plates (TMBP) and CR sheets are 
occasionally imported by the merchant mills for further value addition. The part of this 
dependence is due to lack of domestic capacity to produce the grades in specific size and 
chemistry. The bulk of the imports of these materials are due to pure commercial reasons.  
 
India’s export basket was small in the past with semi-finished steel, bars, wire rods and 
cut to length (quarto) plates accounting for the bulk of it. The situation is quite different 
now with sharp rise in exports of HR coils, CR coils and sheets and galvanized or colour 
coated sheets.  
 
India’ stainless steel exports have also shot up sharply. Interestingly, the same products 
dominate the country’s import basket as well. India is now a strong importer of HR coils, 
plates, bars and rods, pipes, tinplates and electrical steel. The country is net exporter in 
CR sheets/coils and galvanized sheets.  
 
  Globalisation opened up huge opportunities for the country’s steel industry.  The   
industry’s bold entry in to the international market was shaped by domestic supply and 
demand imbalance in the first place and then by substantial export subsidies and 
incentives the industry got on exports ( most of those are gone now ) from the 
government in the early period. Over time, finding new avenues, the industry invested on 
products specifically for the global market. These include products like coated steel 
sheets (galvanized, colour coated etc..)  and bright bars. Market niches have been 
effectively developed by the industry where economies of scale have been a strong factor.  
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India has a diverse export destination for her steel. However, the bulk of the exports are 
confined to six regions ; ( a) The Neighbouring countries, ( b) Europe, © China,  (d) 
South East and East Asia ( including Korea and Japan ), (e) USA and (f) the Middle East.  
Since the exports have been primarily driven by market opportunities, the share of each 
individual country or region changes over time. In the last two years, the share of India’s 
neighbours has dropped significantly whereas the same for Europe has increased sharply.  
 
There are also allegations that Indian steel companies have found it strategically 
meaningful to continue export products like HR coils in significant quantities to maintain 
tactical advantage in home market. By creating artificial shortages, especially in specific 
size and grade dimensions, the domestic prices could be taken beyond the level permitted 
by the free play of the market conditions locally.  
 
Indian government has announced its steel policy and there it has made projections for 
exports up to 2020. Interestingly, the government has set a target of raising steel exports 
to 26 million tones. Imports have been projected at 6 million tonnes.  
 
Indian Steel Capacity 
 
There is substantial under-coverage of production units in the official statistical system 
and clear under-reporting of output and capacity by individual units. These problems 
have been recognized by the government and attempts are being made to have to sort 
these out. Till a final picture emerges from the official sources, the following estimates 
have been accepted to represent the current status of steel industry capacity. (Table-2)  
 
Table-2: Crude Steel Production Capacity 
 




Share in Total 
in 2006-07  
(per cent) 
 
SAIL 14.77  14.77  25.7 
Tata Steel Ltd  5.0  5.0  8.7 
RINL 3.4  3.4  5.9 
Essar Steel*  2.4  3.0  5.2 
JSW Steel  2.4  3.8  6.6 
Ispat Industries  2.4  3.0  5.2 
Induction Furnaces  18.6  20  34.8 
Medium/Other Small  4.5  4.5  7.8 
Total 53.47  57.47  100 
 
* Essar Steel actual steel making capacity seems to have been raised to 4.6 million tonnes but no 
official communication to that effect was available. Their sponge iron capacity has also been 
reportedly been raised to 5.2 million tonnes  
 
Source: Joint Plant Committee and A.S.Firoz, Op Cit, 2007.  
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The major steel companies can be divided into two groups - multi product and single 
product plants. The multi-product group includes producers with both flat and long 
products. SAIL and Tata Steel are the main players. Among SAIL plants, Bokaro (BSL) 
and Rourkela (RSP) are fully flat products plants while Bhilai (BSP) produces long 
products as also cut to length plates. Durgapur (DSP) produces long products as also 
some quantities of narrow HR strips (skelp). The IISCO plant produces long products.  
 
On the other hand, RINL and JSPL are fully long products plants while Essar Steel, JSW 
Steel and Ispat Industries are fully flat products plants.  JSW, however, has acquired 
Hospet Steel that produces billets.  While allocating capacities either to the flat or the 
long stream is easier in a single product plant, there are always some difficulties doing 
the same with a multi- product plant, given the excess mill capacities that provide the 
flexibility to the producers to change product mix at will depending on the market 
conditions.      
 
The existing capacity is largely utilized in the larger plants but the capacity addition there 
has been lethargic. The additions have come mostly in small bits and largely scattered. 
The industry lived for the first couple of years of this boom on the capacities built in the 
mid and the later part of the 1990s. These were mainly for flat products.  Thereafter, most 
of the plants, however, continued to add some small capacities at their existing locations 
in brownfield mode.  
 
The long products capacities have been added largely by smaller plants – most of them 
are induction furnace based with a few mid size plants with either Mini Blast Furnace 
(MBF)/ (Basic Oxygen Furnace) BOF or MBF/Direct Reduced Iron (DRI)-BOF/EAF as 
the technology route. Capacity utilization rates in smaller plants has been lower. Low 
break even rates facilitate continuation of these plants at lower capacity utilization. 
 
The steel industry is upbeat with new projects announcements every day. The progress in 
these projects, however, not been very encouraging. Therefore, one is constrained to 




Occurrences of Iron Ore in India 
 
The entire country is divided into five zones of iron ore occurrences as indicated below: 
 
 
Zone-A   Jharkhand and Orissa 
 
Zone-B   Chhattisgarh and Maharastra 
 
Zone-C    Karnataka  
 
Zone-D   Goa and Reddi, and  
 
Zone-E   Kudremukh, Bababudan and Kuda Chadari of Karnataka.  
 
Zone-wise description of the deposits is given below: 
 
 




In Jharkhand state, Haematite deposits occur in a number of prominent hills in 
Singhbhum district. The significant deposits of this district are Noamundi, Gua, 
Barajamda, Kiriburu, Meghahatuburu, Manoharpur and Chiria. The Chiria deposit is 
reported to be the single largest deposit in the country. The annual production from 




The iron ore deposits in Orissa are found in the District of Keonjhar, Sundargarh, 
Mayurbanj, Cuttak, Koraput, Sambalpur and Dheen Kanal. Of these, deposits of 
Keonjhar and Sundargarh districts are worth mentioning. The important deposits 
containing large reserves of high grade (55per cent to 69per cent Fe) are Thakurani, Joda, 
Banspani, Joruri, Malangtoli, Khandadhar pahad, Kalmang, Barsua, Bolani, and Kalta. 
Malangtoli is the largest deposit containing high reserves with Fe content varying from 
(55per cent to 63per cent Fe). Gandhmardhan is another large deposit in terms of size and 
grade. 
 
Orissa contributes about 50 million tonnes of iron ore production per annum. 
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ZONE - B 
 
Chhattisgarh   
 
Important deposits in this zone are Bailadila, Dalli, Rajahara, Rowghat, Mahamaya etc 
Two important iron ore bearing areas i.e Bailadila range and Rowghat are located in 




Bailadilla range of hills is about 40 Kms in length and 10 kms in width. 14 deposits have 
been distinctly demarcated and designated serially from 1 to 14. Initially explored and 
prospected by GSI the deposit remained un-exploited till 1960 on account of remote 
location inaccessibility. Further exploration was taken up in early 60’s by IBM, GSI and 
NMDC for planned exploitation. Since then NMDC has been operating mines at deposits 
14,11C, 5, 10 & 11A. 
 
The reserves in the explored deposits were estimated at 972 million tonnes. 8 blocks in 
the region are yet to be prospected. They are assessed to contain about 256 mt of ore 
(based on geological mapping). Thus the total available reserve at Bailadila work out 
to1228 million tones which accounts for 11 per cent of the total Haematite ore in the 
country.  
 




Rowghat deposit is another large deposit in Bastar tribal region. Six deposits viz. have 
been identified with total geological reserves of about 711 million tonnes.  
 
Dalli  –  Rajahara  
 
Containing high grade of iron ore these deposits are located in Durg district of 
Chhattisgarh State and are being exploited by Bhilai Steel Plant for vaptive consumption. 
 
ZONE – C 
 
Prominent deposits are located in Bellary – Hospet sector and those are Donimalai, 
Ramandurg, Kumaraswami, Thimmappan gudi, NEB range Ettinahatti and Belegal. Of 
above Donimalai and Kumaraswamy are under exploitation by NMDC while part of 
Thimmappan gudi is owned by M/s.Mysore Minerals and other private companies. The 
annual production of iron ore from this zone is around 34 mt. contributed by NMDC, 
M/s. Mysore Minerals, M/s.MSPL and other parties.  
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Goa is the only State where large number of iron ore deposits are concentrated in a small 
area of about 3700 sq.km. The production from Goa region is about 24 million tonnes at 
present.  
 
ZONE – E 
 
This zone contains mainly magnetite ore deposits at Kudremukh, Bababudan and Kuda 
chadari. Prospecting at Kudremukh and Bababudan deposits was done by NMDC.  
 
Bababudan did not get clearance from Ministry of Environment & Forests for 
exploitation.  
 
However Kudremukh project was developed as an export oriented unit and the mine was 
in operation with a high level of mechanization and automation for about 29 years. 
Mining activities at Kudremukh mine have been discontinued since December 2005 
following a directive from the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 
 
In order to exploit the magnetite ore in the eco-fragile “Zone-E”, the only option 
available is by underground mining like the Kiruna iron ore mine of Sweden. 
 
To take care of the flora and fauna, while mining can be carried out below the superjacent 
ground, the beneficiation plant can be suitably located in an area where disposal of 























Extracts of CAG report 
 
 
Steel Authority of India Limited 
 
18.4.1 Non-disposal of iron ore fines accumulated at Gua Ore Mines Non-disposal of 
iron ore fines accumulated at Gua Ore Mines resulted in nonrealisation of revenue 
of Rs.1507 crore. 
 
The mechanised mining of Gua Iron Ore Mine, a captive mine of IISCO♣, was started in 
May 1958. The iron ore lump produced in the mines was directly consumed by IISCO in 
its blast furnaces but the fines generated were required to be converted into pellets in the 
Pelletisation Plant or sinter in the Sinter Plant before they could be consumed. As IISCO 
had no Sinter Plant, the fines could not be consumed in IISCO. The fines were either sold 
or dumped in the stockyard. Examination of records (April 2005) revealed that Bokaro 
steel plant and Durgapur steel plant of Steel Authority of India Limited had sinter plants 
and supply of iron ore fines to these plants from Gua mines was economically feasible. 
Bokaro steel plant regularly received iron ore fines from the Kiriburu mines (368 km) and 
Meghahataburu mines (369 km) linked to it but was accepting iron ore fines from Gua 
mines (272 km) only to meet the shortage of ore fines. Similarly Durgapur steel plant 
received iron ore fines from Bolani mines (319 km) and not from Gua (312 km). The 
sale/dispatch of fines from Gua mines had been very poor. Out of the average production 
of 1.78 MMT per annum during the five years 2000-01 to 2004-05 only 0.71 MMT (40 
per cent) was dispatched and the balance of 1.07 MMT was being added every year to the 
accumulated stock of 12.16 MMT (March 2000) dumped in the stock yard. As a result 
there was accumulation of 35.04 MMT of iron ore fines valuing Rs.1507 crore as on 31 
March 2005.  
 
The Management while accepting the facts (September 2006) stated that the fines 
stockpile had accumulated over a long period (from 1958) and could not be liquidated 
within a short span of time due to various constraints such as: 
 
(i)  Railways did not have adequate capacity to dispatch fines from Gua station, 
 
(ii)  Supply through land routes to different ports was not economically viable, 
 
(iii)  Price of fines was erratic and 
 
(iv)  Poor quality of fines. 
 
Further, efforts were being made to increase the dispatch of fines from Gua mines and 
about 1.52 MMT were dispatched during 2005-06. The reply of the Management did not 
reflect the position fairly as the stockpiling was mainly due to the inability of the   128
Management to dispose of enough quantity of fines. Dispatch of 1.52 MMT of fines 
subsequently during 2005-06 provided evidence that it was possible to dispatch 
substantial quantity of iron ore fines from Gua. This was despite export of large 
quantities of iron ore fines from the country and significant increase in the price of the 
iron ore fines in recent years. 
 
The matter was reported to the Ministry in November 2006. The Ministry while accepting 
the fact (December 2006) stated that the Government of Jharkhand had raised objection 
to the sale of iron ore for export on the plea that SAIL was not an iron ore trading 
company. The reply did not appear to be relevant since the Audit comment was on sale of 
iron ore fines and not export of iron ore. 
 
Thus, the accumulation of iron ore fines resulted in non-realisation of revenue of Rs.1507 
crore*. In addition, accumulation of iron ore fines was an environmental hazard and 






*Calculated at Rs.430 per MT, the rate at which fines were supplied to Rashtriya Ispat Nigam 
Limited 
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